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Introduction 
 
In 2004, the South Caucasus states (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) entered the 
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The policy is designed for the 
countries which are situated around the EU and have no EU membership perspective. The aim 
of the ENP is to develop the bordering states so that there is not much difference between the 
levels of prosperity of the EU members and non member neighbours. The EU would like to 
enjoy a ring of well governed countries, which are stabile with high levels of security. Thus, 
one could argue that the European Neighbourhood Policy is a kind of security policy as well, 
aimed at security promotion in the Union’s Neighbourhood.  
At the same time, one should not forget that the abovementioned neighbourhood is 
quite large geographical space and measures the North African states (Morocco, Algeria, etc); 
the Middle East states (Israel, Lebanon, Syria, etc.); the South Caucasian states and some East 
European states like Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. All these countries are different in terms 
of economic and social development, political orientation and stability. 
As stability is concerned, the South Caucasus can be evaluated negatively only. 
There are three (Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in 
Azerbaijan/Armenia) post soviet ethno-political conflicts in the region. These conflicts hinder 
the countries to develop and encourage trans-national crime to grow. At last, the recent war in 
Georgia (August 2008) has underlined the instable character of the region in political terms. 
The South Caucasus is rich with natural oil and gas (the Caspian region); it has a 
very strategic location connecting Europe and Asia (TRASECA) as well as Russia and the 
Middle East. Accordingly, there are various international actors (major actors in the South 
Caucasus are: Russia, USA, and the European Union) with different interests concerning the 
region. Exactly these different interests and consequently different political behaviour made 
the South Caucasus confusing with little chance to make right political calculations. At the 
same time, this ambiguity made the regional conflicts frozen and complicated to solve. All 
these, surely, had its own impact on the EU’s policy towards the South Caucasus, and have 
shaped the uncertain character of the latter which I will examine in the work. 
After the enlargement of 2004 and then, that of 2007, the EU’s interests towards the 
region grew soundly and stability in the South Caucasus became important on the Union’s 
political agenda. The latter has introduced the ENP to the region and tries to promote stability 
and peace in the South Caucasus via developing the countries politically and economically. 
Thus, the EU is a security promoter in the region, which tries to stabilize the area through 
providing only “soft” means – economic and technical assistance. Here, arises a question: is 
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the above mentioned enough to reach the goal? Respectively, is the ENP (or could be) the 
right policy towards the South Caucasus as peace building and security is concerned? 
This is an interesting question, but it is hard to give a final answer to it. The South 
Caucasus is not stabile and consequently, there are frequent and unpredictable ups and downs 
in the region’s political and economic life. So, to have a permanent policy towards that kind 
of region is really hard for the EU. Besides, different members of the Union have different 
priorities concerning the South Caucasus; this fact defines the inconsistency of the EU 
performance in the region. I will scrutinize this problem later in the work. 
The European Union in the South Caucasus is a quite new topic and accordingly, the 
scientists have begun to address this issue sufficiently in the end of 90s first. The most of 
them have a similar view and argue that the European Union’s policy towards the South 
Caucasus is not precise and clear. For instance, Macfarlane calls the EU policy towards the 
region - “non-strategy”1.  
There is a big record of EU policy critic, but few recommendations are given how 
the Union should proceed to be successful in the South Caucasus. But, even if such 
recommendations are provided, they are directed to the European Union forgetting that the 
relations are bilateral and only the EU could not change anything, if the latter’s intentions 
would not be reciprocated.  
In this PHD work I will try to give an answer to the question I rise above. The work 
consists of the three main parts. The first part is a descriptive part in which I introduce the 
South Caucasus and the main foreign interests in the region. While giving a short historical 
understanding of the area, I underline Russia’s huge influence on the region in negative terms. 
Then, I explain the state of the present situation in the three South Caucasian states, so that the 
reader has a good understanding of the contemporary processes in the area. This chapter is 
important in order to build up a kind of political and economic picture of the South Caucasus, 
without which it would be difficult to understand the European Union’s policy towards the 
region. 
 As next, I introduce the European Union as a global actor. I give the needed 
understanding of the latter’s genesis as an international actor and explain in what way the EU 
contributes to global processes. I don not go deeper into the economic dimension of the 
worldwide action, but put in the light issues interconnected with security and stability around 
the Europe.  
                                                 
1
 Dannreuther Roland – European Union Foreign and Security Policy, towards a neighbourhood strategy. 
London 2004. pp. 118-134 
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The following chapter is dedicated to the European Union in the South Caucasus. In 
the beginning, I introduce the Union’s interests in the region and tell how these interests have 
changed depending on developments in the area. Afterwards, I argue what particular interests 
the South Caucasus states have, as relations with the EU are concerned. I discuss on 
Georgia’s, Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s aspirations towards the EU as compared to their 
interests towards other international actors in the region and give evaluation to those in the 
light of the conflict resolution.  
The next chapter provides a basic understanding of the EUSR mandate to the South 
Caucasus region and explores weaknesses interconnected with the mandate’s conflict 
resolution relevant part. Hence, analysis is given to the EUSR post as a possible part of the 
conflict resolution mechanism and suggestions are made how the latter could be improved in 
this respect.  
In the chapter 5, analysis is given to the ENP in the South Caucasus region 
discussing its all conflict resolution related mechanisms. The Analysis is made from the both 
– the EU as well as the SC states – sides and is directed in the light of the question already 
known to us – whether the ENP in terms of conflict resolution  is, or could be, the right policy 
towards the region. While underlining weaknesses to the policy, I make some suggestion, 
which, I believe, could change the ENP’s faith put under question towards more success in the 
South Caucasus.  
Thus, the first part of the work provides a main understanding of the political South 
Caucasus, EU as a global actor and the latter’s activities in the region with respect to peace 
building; without this knowledge it would be hard to judge the ENP in terms of conflict 
resolution.  
In the second part of the dissertation, I give analysis to the ENP relevant EC 
documents (Country Reports, Country Strategy Papers, National Indicative Programmes, and 
Action Plans) with respect to conflict resolution. I discuss on the papers for the three SC states 
and argue that there exist differences in the EU contribution to the process of conflict 
resolution country to country. Besides the differences, I underline that no Action Plan of the 
three states responds to the conflict resolution issue adequately; though, the Georgian one is 
more competent in this respect than that of Azerbaijan or Armenia. And, even if, there are 
some really good initiatives from the EU side to deepen the cooperation with SC states in 
security matters, such as close cooperation in CFSP and ESDP field, I declare that this level 
of EU engagement is not enough to move the ice towards the conflict settlement. But, at the 
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same time, I underline that this kind of contribution is what EU is willing to provide at this 
moment taking into the view its uncertainty towards the South Caucasus.  
So, this part of the thesis is an analytical part and serves in order to fully explore the 
potential of the Action Plans in the conflict resolution field. 
The third part of the work starts with the evaluation of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy as a security policy. I argue that through this instrument, the Union should be in a 
position to take over much more responsibility in conflict resolution processes in its 
neighbourhood. Then, I give a final evaluation to the EU performance in the South Caucasus 
in the light of the recent developments (Russia-Georgian war of August 2008). I emphasize 
that the war has shown how fast the efforts made by the international actors to settle a peace 
for so many years can be crushed. Afterwards, I give some basic data how the EU has 
responded to the crisis, and underline that the European Union has developed itself and has 
given more or less coherent response to the Caucasus crisis as compared to the Balkans or the 
Iraqi performance. 
As a next step, I give some recommendations for the both parties (the European 
Union and the South Caucasus states) as well as to the regional actors as Turkey and believe 
that these recommendations are keys to stability and security in the South Caucasus. 
In the end of the paper, I make a final conclusion stating that the EU remains 
uncertain towards the South Caucasus countries and this uncertainty is to be treated in 
conjunction with EU-Russian relations and the SC states’ political orientations. I argue that 
till Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan will show a real pro EU orientation and clear 
willingness to integrate themselves in the EU structures, the European Union will follow its 
“soft” approach towards the region. Besides, I declare that the EU is the only party, which is 
really interested in stability and security promotion in the South Caucasus and give the 
Russia-Georgian war as an example. At last, I give the answer to the question which I have 
raised in the beginning of the paper – Whether the ENP is, or could be, the right policy to the 
South Caucasus in order to promote security and peace in the region. 
So, in this PHD work I analyse the ENP with respect to peace building and security 
promotion. Its social and economic dimensions are not touched in this thesis; but, the whole 
work is dedicated to the question above. Therefore, as a result of the analysis and then 
recommendations given on the ground of the weaknesses identified, this paper seeks to give 
an answer to the question. 
 
 
 12 
Presentation of literature and deficits in those studies 
To present the topic and implement ideas, I have used a broad band of literature, 
mainly from the field of political science. Those can be divided mainly in two kinds. The first 
kind of the field literature examines the European Union as an international actor in general. 
In such works the EU policies are scrutinized, which the latter uses to perform worldwide. 
The papers identify weaknesses and/or strengths to the policies (such as, for instance, ENP, 
CFSP, ESDP, etc.) and analyse them.  
As an example for the abovementioned kind of the literature, I would like to present 
the Carlotte Bretherton and John Vogler’s book – “The European Union as a Global Actor” 
(Second Edition). London, 2006. In this work, the European Union’s potential as a global 
actor is fully explored. Analysis is given to the EU as an economic power, a trade actor as 
well as environmental one. The most interesting for us is the analysis of the Union’s 
performance as a security and military actor in the scope of the CFSP and ESDP. In the 
conclusion, it is said that the European Union is still under construction; and although, there 
are many improvements to be identified, the Union’s development as a security community 
and military actor is still open ended. 
The second book, which I would like to present, is the Fulvio Attina and Rosa 
Rossi’s edition – “European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues”. 
The Jean Monnet Centre “Euro-med”, Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, 
2004. This paper consists of the articles written by diverse authors, which analyse the ENP in 
various dimensions. Interesting is the evaluation of the ENP as a security policy by Fulvio 
Attina. Remarkable is the ENP and democracy promotion by Elena Baracani as well. 
Regional cooperation under the EU neighbourhood policy by Ekaterina Domorenok is also 
provided in this book. 
Further more, the Nicolas Hayoz, Leszek Jesien & Wim Van Meurs edition – 
“Enlarged EU, Enlarged Neighbourhood; Perspectives of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy”, Bern 2005 is of my concern as well. This work also contains various contributions 
from diverse authors to the topic of the neighbourhood policy. It starts with defining the 
margins between the non-EU Europe and the European Neighbourhood by Antoinette 
Primatarova; then, the ambiguities in relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbourhood 
are explored, written by Nicolas Hayos/Franz Kehl/Stephan Kuster. The EU-Russian relations 
are also well examined in the paper. 
These books give a very good analysis to the EU as a global actor and/or the 
European neighbourhood policy identifying weaknesses and the grounds on which those are 
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born. But, at the same time, it must be said that these papers provide much critic, but little 
suggestions to improve the weaknesses. Thus, they identify correctly where a need is, but give 
no remedy to satisfy the need. 
The second kind of the literature discusses the European Union’s performance in the 
South Caucasus. The latter belongs to Area Studies type of publishing where analysis is given 
to the Union’s relations with the region. Worth to mention is the International Crisis Group’s 
article – “Conflict resolution in the South Caucasus: the EU’s role”. Europe Report No.173, 
20 March 2006. In this report, the EU performance in the South Caucasus with respect to 
conflict resolution is fully analysed. First, the development of the Union’s policy towards the 
region is discussed; then analysis is given to the regional cooperation issue and Action Plans 
dealing with conflict resolution. The EU contributions to the conflicting regions (Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) are examined separately one by one. The Crisis Group 
provides recommendations to the European Union in the report suggesting how the latter can 
upgrade its role in the South Caucasus.  
The next work, I would like to present is – “The South Caucasus: a challenge for the 
EU” by a group of authors at the Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers No. 65, Paris 
December 2003. This paper scrutinizes the South Caucasus giving a thorough overview of the 
region in terms of overall political, economic and social situation; external actors; crime in the 
region; etc. Then, the policies of the international actors, such as Russian, USA, UN, OSCE 
and NATO, are analysed. What role the energetic resources and their transportation play in 
the region is examined in a separate chapter. In the end, analysis is given to the European 
Union and its policy in the South Caucasus complemented with recommendations to the EU. 
In the Roland Dannreuther’s edition – “European Union Foreign and Security Policy 
towards a neighbourhood strategy”, London 2004 – analysis is given to the Union’s foreign 
and security performance in the light of the neighbourhood. Relevant for my paper is the 
chapter “The Caucasus and Central Asia: towards a non-strategy” by S. Neil Macfarlane. He 
analyses the situation in the regions and then outlines the EU interests in the area. Examining 
the EU policy and the instruments introduced to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, he 
concludes that there is no EU strategy in those regions. 
Besides, important contributions to this kind of field literature are: Diplomatische 
Akademie Wien – “Promoting institutional responses to the challenges in the Caucasus”. 
Favorita Papers 2001; Bruno Coppieters, Michael Emerson and others – “Europeanization and 
Conflict Resolution. Case Studies from the European Periphery”. Gent, Academia Press, 
2004; etc. 
 14 
As presented above, the field literature provides a good analysis to the European 
Union in the South Caucasus, many of them examine the latter’s potential to solve the 
conflicts in the region. Besides, there are papers, which give recommendations to the EU on 
the ground of the problems identified. Nevertheless, it must be underlined that in the most 
cases, the recommendations are given to the European Union only and not to the SC states. As 
mentioned previously, the EU-South Caucasus relations are bilateral and the EU can not 
change anything unilaterally, if its efforts are not reciprocated by the countries. 
Further more, taking into the view that the European Union is a fast moving target 
and its policies change within short period of time as a result of a completed/planned 
enlargement or something else, we can argue that the abovementioned literature is already 
outdated and needs upgrading. The most recent development, which took place in the South 
Caucasus and influenced the EU-SC relations, was the Russia-Georgian war in August 2008. 
Thus, there is a need of a scientific work which would mirror the latest developments in the 
EU-SC relations and explore the EU potential to promote security and resolve the problems in 
the region in the light of recent developments.  
At last, some of the papers discuss on the character of the Action Plans and the ENP 
in terms of conflict resolution; but, no one has asked till now, whether the policy is (or could 
be) the right policy towards the South Caucasus as the peace building is concerned.  
In this paper, I try to respond all the deficits outlined above. The European Union 
performance in the South Caucasus with respect to peace building in the region is up-to-dated 
(November 2008) as well as the recent political developments in the SC states are examined. 
In the end of the PHD work, on the ground of the weaknesses identified, recommendations are 
given to the European Union; the South Caucasus countries and Turkey, as the latter can also 
contribute to the Union’s performance in the region. 
 
Interests as a term in the field of political science  
Before I proceed, it is important to know how political interests are born. As 
Sebastian Mayer outlines in his scientific work, national interests in the democratic OSCE-
world originate from the political processes. Interests are not steadfast but result of a political 
identity building process (Reese-Schaefer 1999). The post modern representatives in the 
international relations conceptualize interests as only interpretations which are influenced 
neither from the concrete world nor from the material abilities (Campbell 1998; Shapiro/Alker 
1996). In other few cases, interests can alter following material circumstances (Zuern 1992, 
Wendt 1992). In this respect, Ernst Haas (2001) argues that interests of the actors are 
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originated from their political imaginations. Sometimes, as abovementioned, these interests 
are influenced by the material structures surrounding the actors. Thus, interests can be 
understood as affinity, aim and intention of individual or collective actors, which depend on 
material grounds and, at the same time, could be influenced by international factors.  
In contrary to the classical strategic concept, which is a product of thorough 
information and of a good adjustment of means and strategies towards good formulated end, 
Sebastian Mayer introduces the term of bounded rationality (by Herbert Simon 1982). The 
latter means that the rationality of political decisions is bounded as far as those are met on the 
basis of incomplete information. Besides, this incomplete information is born through specific 
preferences, adjustment and strategic model, which is characterized by a high level of 
constancy. In this respect, the human action is guided by these cognitive rules as well. So, 
after that, there is no rationality, but the latter is embedded in diverse cultures and will be 
designed differently in every case.
2
 
I think that the abovementioned theory is important for the paper as far as one has to 
know, first, how interests and preferences are born in general, in order to be in a position to 
analyse or judge somebody’s decision in international relations. Thus, the abovementioned 
theory, could prove to be useful in analysing the European Union’s performance in the South 
Caucasus or the vice verse, the political decisions made by Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
 
My approach 
Taking into the view the question raised previously, this PHD work, ideally, has to 
fulfil the following requirements: The first chapter of the part one has to provide a kind of 
introduction to the South Caucasus. The political, economic and social situation following by 
the external actors’ (but the European Union) interests in the region is to be presented so that 
the reader has a good understanding of the political past and present in the South Caucasus as 
well as the foreign interests concerned in the region. Important is that the factors which 
influenced or continue to influence developments in the area either negatively or positively 
are thoroughly scrutinized.   
The second chapter of the part has to present the performance of the European Union 
as a global actor and problems interconnected with it. An accent is to be made on the EU as a 
security provider and a peace promoter. At the same time, the deficits concerning this issue 
are to be scrutinized so that sufficient information is provided about the Union as an 
international actor together with identifiable strengths and weaknesses. 
                                                 
2
 Mayer Sebastian – Die Europaeische Union im Suedkaukasus. Baden-Baden 2006. p.27 
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The third, fourth and the fifth chapters to the part one of the PHD work have to be a 
kind of mix of the previous two chapters; thus, the European Union’s performance as a 
security provider and a peace promoter in the South Caucasus is to be presented. First, an 
understanding of the EU interests in the region, followed by the latter’s past involvement in 
the area is to be given. Then, aspirations of the South Caucasus states towards the Union is to 
be scrutinized, so that one acquires a good understanding to what extend are the parties 
interested in reciprocal relations and what incentives or disincentives are interconnected with 
this issue. Important is as well, to be clarified where these interests derive from and what 
factors did influence the political decisions made. 
In the fourth and fifth chapters, where the post of EUSR to the South Caucasus and 
the ENP are analysed with respect to conflict resolution, is to be made clear how recent EU 
policy developments are compatible to peace building and security promotion in the region. A 
sufficient understanding of the following issues is to be provided: the ENP introduction to the 
South Caucasus and the problems interconnected with it; how the latter can effect the EU-
Russian relations; what are the SC states’ preferences to be included in the Action Plans and 
how efficiently these documents respond to conflict resolution issue. Besides, discussions are 
to be held about strengthening civil society in the South Caucasus region interconnected with 
the Europeanization process in the area. Development perspectives of the latter, as well as, 
how this process could effect the peace building in the South Caucasus should be scrutinized 
appropriately. 
The part II of the thesis has to analyse the Georgian, Armenian and Azeri Action 
Plans with respect to conflict resolution. Thus, it must be clear for the reader, how good and 
with what means the documents respond to the issue as well as what differences exist in the 
Action Plans country to country. All the positive and negative items to the conflict resolution 
in the papers should be explored. Analysis is to be given to the instruments provided in the 
Action Plans and their potential to contribute to peace building. So, the compatibility of the 
EC documents and the conflict resolution in the South Caucasus together with the factors 
influencing the latter are to be examined. 
The third part of the work must analyse the ENP as a security policy. First, an 
understanding of the types of security arrangements is to be provided and then, the ENP is to 
be embedded in those types. At the same time, the factors which have influenced or continue 
to influence the development of the ENP as a security policy should be investigated 
adequately. 
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Afterwards, the final evaluation of the European Union’s performance in the South 
Caucasus must be scrutinized respecting the factors which did or still influence the latter’s 
policy towards the region. The recent developments in the EU-South Caucasus relations are to 
be presented in the light of the Russia-Georgian war (7-12 August 2008) and evaluation is to 
be given to the action of the Union as compared to the past experiences. 
The latter is to be followed by recommendations made upon weaknesses and needs 
identified. They should give suggestions to the European Union as well as the SC states and 
other parties concerned (Turkey) in order to perform better and contribute decisively to 
conflict resolution. These recommendations are to be personal perceptions of actions, which, 
if fulfilled, could promote peace in the South Caucasus, respectively, the European Union’s 
performance as an international mediator in the region. 
In the final conclusion, following the facts made clear in the text, a kind of prognosis 
of EU-SC states’ relations is to be made. In the end, relying on the facts provided in the work, 
the question raised in the beginning is to be answered. 
 At the same time, it is to be declared that taking into view the big volume of the 
topic and related literature, it is not possible all nuances and items to be touched and 
scrutinized thoroughly. However, I look forward to present and analyse all the issues being 
relevant and decisive to the topic. 
Thus, the analysis in this paper makes clear that the interests of the European Union 
towards the South Caucasus are not steadfast and are influenced by various factors. However, 
the SC states themselves too are not confident in their external relations and perform 
ambiguous. Consequently, the abovementioned has its negative influence on the conflict 
resolution processes in the region; and if it will go on in the same manner, no stability or 
security promotion in the South Caucasus will be the matter. Accordingly, if the EU and the 
South Caucasus states are willing to change something in the status quo and open the way to 
an efficient conflict resolution process, it is time for acting in a right way, and which way I 
consider to be right is provided in my recommendations and final conclusion respectively. 
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I)  The South Caucasus and the European Union in the Region. 
1. The South Caucasus and main foreign interests in the region. 
1.1 The South Caucasus – a brief overview   
The South Caucasus
3
 is a land of ancient traditions and history. The valleys of the 
region represent a natural way of encounter and communication among three continents: 
Africa, Asia and Europe. South to the Tiger and Euphrates rivers and the Arabic peninsula, 
East into the Caspian region, North towards Eastern Europe and Russia, and westwards into 
the Black Sea and Mediterranean regions, the Caucasus is the natural convergence of all 
routes.  
Over hundred of thousand of years, the first humanoid presence in the region 
evolved into human settlements that left abundant vestiges of ancient civilization, vestiges 
that are disseminated everywhere in those mountains and valleys. The Caucasus, thus, became 
the centre of a system of communications and a pole of civilization that progressed over the 
centuries combining land and sea transportation to favour exchange of cultures and promote 
trade of commodities. Recently, the same scheme became the fulcrum of a complex system of 
corridors that in today’s global economy are better known as TRACECA4.5 
It is obvious that having such a location the South Caucasus has a crucial impact on 
the world geopolitics and was always a subject of dispute between great powers. 
 
Russia in the South Caucasus 
After expanding their rule over the Caucasus in 1921, the Soviets undertook a 
territorial design which had several objectives: First, it sought to conciliate their interests vis-
à-vis the different South Caucasian republics according to the political and strategic priorities 
aimed at protecting their territory from internal break ups and external threats. Basically, they 
used the principle of “divide et impera”6 to keep the territory under control. The result was a 
territorial disposition based on ethnic lines. The immediate result was that ethno-national 
identities territorially circumscribed were encouraged and indeed developed strongly. On the 
other hand, it put the seed for inter-ethnic animosities and conflicts.
7
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The Soviet territorial arrangement consisted of union republics: Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan with population about fifteen million.
8
 Besides, there were autonomous republics: 
Abkhazia (with short term of Union Republic) and Ajara within Georgia as well as 
Nakhichevan within Azerbaijan. At last, there existed the following autonomous regions in 
the South Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) and South-Ossetia (Georgia). During all 
the Soviet period the disputes over levels of autonomy and territorial agreements were 
constant.  
 
The Soviet break up and recent situation  
Terry D. Adams says: “(…) Caucasian leaders should look more carefully to their 
regional politics first, and not be seduced by more fickle distant partners. Russia is and always 
will be a reality in the Caucasus, and this must be recognized.”9 
The entities that emerged in the South Caucasus after the Soviet collapse could 
barely be considered as states. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were recognized by the 
international community, and assumed the various responsibilities that accompany this 
process, such as seats in the United Nations General Assembly. But in practice, sovereignty 
hardly existed within the boundaries of these countries. In the first years following the Soviet 
collapse, Georgia suffered two conflicts with separatist regions (Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia)
10
 inside its borders, as well as civil war in late 1991. The writ of the Georgian state 
did not extend far beyond the administrative boundaries of the capital city, Tbilisi, which 
certainly had no monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Several armed militias vied for 
power, and parts of the country laid beyond the control of the government. The same situation 
was to observe in Armenia and Azerbaijan as fighting for the control of Karabakh
11
 territory 
were started between these neighbouring states.  
The South Caucasian countries have come along the way since the early 1990s. 
Constitutions have been ratified, electoral processes regularized and armed militia groups 
reigned in. In 2003, the so called Rose Revolution marked the strength of Georgian society as 
much as the weakness of the state. As Lynch declares, Civil-military relations are poor in each 
South Caucasus state, either because the military plays too strong role in politics or because 
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the civilian leadership has purposefully sought to weaken the armed forces. Both Azerbaijan 
and Georgia have seen unrest in their armed forces because of the conditions of service and 
the lack of funding by the government. Relations between the central governments in the 
capitals and the regions were also troubled. The capital cities have attracted all of the pledged 
investments, which made the gap with the surrounding regions wide. On a daily level, an 
individual’s interaction with the state is distinctly predatory: either one has a 
position/function, in which the resources of the state may be captured for private use, or one 
has to apply various forms of state rent-seeking behaviour. Lynch says that the institutional 
weakness of the South Caucasian is a vicious circle: the governments suffer from very low 
levels of tax collection, which provides little revenue for the provision of public services in 
health care and education, the latter creates greater public discontent as well as incentives for 
corruption – all these decrease popular willingness to pay taxes.12 
The weakness of the South Caucasian states is evident also in the large proportion of 
their populations who have left their countries to work abroad as economic migrants. The 
figures vary between ten to twenty percent of the working population who left mainly for 
Russia. This trend reflects the lack of professional opportunity available in the region. It may 
also illustrate a deep-seated perception of illegitimacy of the states that have arisen in the last 
ten years.
13
  
Further more, the Russian-Georgian armed confrontation which took place in the 
beginning of the August 2008, has underlined how unstable the situation in the region is in 
spite of international involvement and external actors’ contribution to peace building for so 
many years. 
 
Crime in the Region 
The abovementioned situation in the South Caucasus gave a good ground for crime 
expansion which is quite multifaceted in the region involving issues posing a mainly 
economic threat, such as smuggling of alcohol, cigarettes and fuel; but also issues with much 
wider implications, such as the smuggling of narcotics, weapons, persons and components of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The consequences of crime in the South Caucasus 
affect both the region itself and Europe. Cornell states: as criminal networks entrench their 
influence over the economic and political elites of the states in the region, they become 
increasingly powerful actors which have a clearly destabilizing effect on these societies. 
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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, transnational crime has gradually grown in 
importance in all the former Soviet states. Following Cornell’s analysis, several factors 
common to those states have made this very rapid growth of transnational organized crime 
possible. First factor is the weakness of state structures; second, the economic recession that 
followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the failure of the most former Soviet states to 
generate sustainable economic development; third, the former Soviet space is auspiciously 
located between the source of illicit drugs, especially the opiates produced in Afghanistan, 
and their main market – Europe. Moreover, state institutions have proven to be malleable to 
corruption. Cornell says that in countries such as Georgia or Tajikistan, officials at the highest 
levels have leading role in organized crime.
14
 
Given the global convergence of separatism and/or extremism with crime, the 
persistence in the South Caucasus of armed ethnic separatism and uncontrolled territories is a 
priori a facilitating factor for crime. The links between separatist and extremist political 
groups on the one hand and transnational crime on the other are plentiful in the region; such 
groupings typically turn to crime to finance their ideological struggle, no doubt attracted by 
the large sums of money to be made as well. Cornell gives the instance of the war in 
Chechnya throughout the 1990s. Chechnya and Dagestan both saw a boom in organized 
crime, including the smuggling of arms, drugs and other commodities, and abductions of 
people for ransom. Criminal groups operating in the North Caucasus have spilled over into the 
South Caucasus, for example in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, and also in Azerbaijan, where 
the influx of Chechen refugees and the proximity to criminalized and troubled Dagestan has 
facilitated the presence of criminal networks with links to the North Caucasus.
15
 
So, crime is directly connected to the deadlocked armed conflicts of the South 
Caucasus, which highlights the dangers posed to the international community by separatist 
ethnic conflicts and resulting state weakness in the region. Breakaway areas such as Nagorno-
Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, have been credibly and directly implicated in 
transnational criminal activities. Moreover, as Cornell declares, the separatist areas should not 
shoulder the blame alone. Just as Chechnya would never have become a hub for smuggling in 
1991-94 without criminal links to the Russian government; in the same way the separatist 
regions of the South Caucasus could never have become hotbeds of crime if they were not 
have been permeated by the same phenomenon. At the same time, there is no doubt that the 
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persistence of unresolved conflicts increases the attractiveness of the South Caucasus for 
transnational criminal networks. Moreover, crime creates incentives on both sides of the 
deadlocked conflicts to preserve the status quo, and this is immensely detrimental to most 
people in the region, but at the same time beneficial to those profiting from crime. 
The drug trade is the leading business in transnational organized crime, primarily 
because it is where the largest profits are made. But, Cornell argues that the drug trade is by 
no means the only international criminal activity in the Caucasus. The smuggling of small and 
heavy weapons, as well as materials for WMD, also happens there. The region figures in the 
North-South direction with the smuggling of arms and WMD components from Russia to the 
Middle East; in the East-West direction with the smuggling of arms from Asia to Europe; and 
in the South-North direction with the smuggling of small amounts of sophisticated weaponry 
to Chechnya.
16
 
Following Cornell, criminal networks also challenge state control over territory. As 
the example of the Pankisi Gorge illustrates, a lack of control also endangers the Caucasian 
states’ relations with their neighbours. Crime also influences the effectiveness of foreign, 
security and aid policies of Western states towards the South Caucasus and is a problem that 
should be incorporated into those policies in order for them to become effective in achieving 
their stated aim of improving security and economic development in the region.  
The abovementioned simply illustrates how transnational crime could be a potent 
factor effecting the political and economic future of the South Caucasus. 
 
The Caspian Oil and Gas and its transportation 
In the 20
th
 century Baku Oil has had a disproportionate influence on world affairs 
that continues to today. “Blood, Oil and Politics” are the stuff of contemporary Caucasian 
history.
17
 
Adams indicates that by 1900, Baku oil production led the world. Under the 
remarkable leadership of the Nobels and the Rothchilds, it was a centre of technical 
innovation and global finance. But, Baku was also a centre of conspicuous consumption, 
which very publicly displayed the worst aspects of unconstrained Capitalism.   
Baku oil then became a key strategic target for Germany and turkey in their attempts 
to fuel their war efforts in the World War I. After the war Britain took control of the oil. 
Caucasian leaders used Baku oil as a political lever to the West in their attempts to secure 
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their fragile independence in 1918. Unfortunately, in 1919 Lord Curzon in London and 
President Wilson in Washington decided jointly that the security of the Caucasus was not 
worthy of the costs involved; consequently, the Bolsheviks occupied the Caucasus and Baku 
Oil fell under Soviet control for the next 70 years.
18
 It is an interesting fact, which indicates 
that the Caucasus was a subject of politico-economic calculations and a concern of USA-
Europe vs. Russia in the past as it is today. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Baku Oil has got a huge 
importance and was to be used as the key political weapon in Caucasian foreign policies, 
since, as Adams underlines, Caspian oil and gas is the only hope for the region’s economic 
renewal. 
The Caspian is important because it is one of the world’s major producing areas in 
which actual oil production remains essentially in the hands of market-oriented international 
energy companies. Its particular importance to Europe is that the most of the additional 
Caspian oil and gas output is to move westwards to European and Mediterranean markets, 
although some oil will move by tankers to the giant US East Coast market. 
Besides, Adams declares that the South Caspian area suffers from an excess of gas 
reserves and a dearth of regional commercial markets. Two thirds of the world’s gas reserves 
are found within the countries that surround the Caspian Sea. But, with an absence of 
proximal commercial markets there are few underlying incentives for regional gas 
development. In the South Caspian the recent offshore giant gas discovery by BP at Shah 
Deniz (6.6 to 20bcmy) has captured the last remaining market gap in Turkey.
19
  
Since, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan secured their independence amidst 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, only a couple of major new oil and gas pipelines were 
completed. Among them are: the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s 567,000 b/d (barrel per day) 
system that links Tengiz and Atyrau in Kazakhstan with the Russian Black Sea port of 
Novorossiysk; the 1.0 mb/d (million barrel per day), $2.95 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline, which carries oil from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan; the 
other is its twin: a $1 billion gas line that runs parallel to BTC from Baku to the environs of 
the Turkish city of Erzurum, where it joins Turkey’s main east-west gas line.20 Here, it would 
be worth to mention that the nearest way to provide the western world with energetic goods 
would be through Iran; but, while the US preventing Iran from emerging as a significant 
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regional player
21
 and Azerbaijan with Turkey confronting Armenia, Georgia became the only 
country and the nearest way for the pipelines to reach West Turkey.    
As John Roberts indicates, the EU is heavily dependent on energy imports, 
particularly in oil, but its position is somewhat ameliorated by the fact that well over 20 per 
cent of its oil imports come from Norway. Overall, in 2000, the EU was dependent on imports 
(including supplies from Norway) to meet some 75 per cent of its oil requirements. By 2030 it 
is expected to be 85 per cent dependent on oil imports. According to the European 
Commission’s Green Paper, Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply, 
adopted in November 2000 and published in 2001 - which in places tends to lump Norwegian 
production in with EU North Sea oil output - the EU anticipates that oil demand will rise from 
around 12 mb/d (million barrel per day) in 2000 to some 13.2 mb/d in 2030. At the same time, 
its principal domestic and near-domestic sources of crude oil - the North Sea (including 
Norway) and internal production in various EU member states - is expected to fall from 
around 7.0 to 6.0 mb/d. In effect, the EU will move to much the same condition as the United 
States is in today - reliance on (non-Norwegian) imports to meet around 60 per cent of its oil 
needs.
22
 
So, from the abovementioned it can be easily understood how important is the Caspian 
oil for the EU today and its role will be increasing gradually in future, although, the latter has 
less significance as compared to Russian resources. Consequently, today, as we will see it 
later in the work, peace in the South Caucasus deserves more attention on the EU’s political 
agenda as it was in the past years. Surely, the latter has much to do with the fact that stability 
in the region is a precondition for the EU energy security.  
Besides the existing conflicts in the area mentioned previously, disputes between 
Azerbaijan and Iran as well as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan regarding the South Caspian 
boundary claims, make the situation more strained. I will not get in closer touch of this 
problem, since, the latter falls outside the topic the paper envisages to study. 
 
1.2 Main foreign interests in the region 
After the Soviet dissolution, the South Caucasus became again an important geo-
strategic area, connecting Europe with Asia. The region freed from the Soviet control and 
opened itself to the world; so, the world started showing interests in the area. The South 
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Caucasus became a potential energy corridor, particularly for the oil and gas reserves of the 
Caspian Sea; but also to the broader potential energy resources coming from Central Asia 
through the South Caucasus towards Europe. Soon, after the economic interests were 
concerned several confrontations emerged in the region.  
The end of the Cold war revealed and reawakened also ancient rivalries and 
“unfinished businesses”. Basically, the confrontation in a broad sense has risen between 
Russia-Armenia-Iran against Georgia-Azerbaijan-Turkey-US. The logic of alliances follows 
very much this pattern. However, it has evolved in time.  
External actors have impeded natural character of the political struggle in the South 
Caucasus. External actors’ manipulation in the regional conflicts has stopped the stronger to 
win. Russia as an external mediator has clearly helped shift the course of the events in South 
Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh providing military support to the separatist regions; 
and, if it belongs to speculation, it is arguable that without that military support from outside, 
the wars would not have been frozen but won by Tbilisi and Baku.  
In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia provided with the necessary military 
support to the enclave, and Russia on its turn, supported Armenia. Thus, the intervention of 
external neighbouring actors has contributed to worsening of the situation. The latter is true 
for the role of Turkey in the conflict as well.
23
 
Since the beginning of the Soviet break up, Russia’s performance in the South 
Caucasus has been constant. The western influence came some years later. The US and 
increasing interests of NATO were motivated by the factors such as natural resources, 
counter-terrorism; with an increasingly major direct concern also regarding the danger of 
contagion of the conflicts to neighbouring countries and then the odds for a war at a larger 
scale. According to Lynch: “For the United States, NATO and the EU, the South Caucasus is 
an area of opportunity, in terms of the exploitation of the region’s energy reserves, its 
geographic position… (But) the region is also an area from which threats stem, in the form of 
criminal transit flows, the presence of international terrorist networks and the danger 
associated with the weakness of the South Caucasian states.”24  
Turkey and Iran, after the Cold War have also been able to re-establish their traditional 
bounds with the South Caucasian people, and have also contributed to the complexity of the 
present situation in the region. 
Iran has tried to hinder political stability and economic development in Azerbaijan, 
fearing that a strong Azeri nation would manage to attract and mobilize the around 20 million 
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Azeri that live in the north Iran at the border with Azerbaijan. Iran fears future possible 
demands from Azerbaijan over its historic territory in terms of irredentism or else separatism. 
Besides, Azerbaijan and Iran have faced some pre war situations and significant tensions over 
the control of the oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea. 
Turkey, with ethnic, linguistic and religious ties with Azerbaijan has established 
strong links with Baku, and has been giving military and logistic support to Azerbaijan in its 
war against Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.  
Relations between Armenia and Turkey are very tense. Turkey keeps a blockade on 
Armenian borders until the latter’s military forces withdraw from the illegally occupied 
territories of Azerbaijan around Nagorno-Karabakh. On the other hand, Armenia keeps 
pressing Turkey and the international community to acknowledge the Armenian genocide 
during the World War I by the Ottomans. Furthermore, Armenia raises, somehow, claims over 
its historic territories in the North-East Turkey, which arguably were lost after a treaty 
between Turkey and the Bolsheviks in the end of the World War I. 
In the beginning of the 90s, the Relations between Russia and Georgia have been 
particularly tense; and Moscow’s involvement in the South Ossetian and Abkhazian wars was 
particularly striking. Georgia has been trying to force Russians to withdraw their military 
bases from its territory. Georgia turned very quickly and actively towards the western world 
after its independence. Georgian interests were not in the scope of Russia’s ambitions; that is 
why the latter has clearly supported the less powerful irregular armies of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia to win their battles for independence against Tbilisi. However, the role of Russia is 
particularly ambiguous. If Moscow has indeed and does still support the Abkhazians and the 
Ossetians in their rebellions against Georgia, why does it deny to both separatist in all 
demands of adhesion to the Russian federation? It was a constant demand of the two 
territories since the Soviet dissolution. Until very recently (end of August 2008), Russia has 
not even recognized the de facto states for so many years.
25
 
On the contrary to Georgia, Armenia holds voluntarily one Russian military base. 
Armenia has always had good relations with Moscow since the Soviet break up. Affirm some 
authors, as I have already suggested, Russia has backed up Yerevan in its fight against Baku 
over Nagorno-Karabakh. Through this action, Moscow’s intention was to keep Azerbaijan 
weak and dependent, which would enable Russia to influence the oil and gas reserves of the 
Caspian Sea. 
The role of the western world has had a very anecdotic impact on the frozen conflicts 
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so far. However, regional and universal multilateral organizations have been very intensively 
involved in finding a resolution, even if without any significant success so far.  
The prospects of rich oil resources which later proved exaggerated made the USA to 
show a more active role in the area. Also, after the attacks of the September 11
th
 and all the 
panoplies about the axes of evil being somehow established in Georgia’s Pankisi gorge, made 
the US make very clear movements towards the South Caucasus.  
Finally, and the most important probably, the west, especially the US, but also more 
and more the EU and the NATO have been aware of the geo political importance of the area 
in terms of war contagion potential involving the NATO countries like Turkey as well as the 
countries with nuclear weapons like Russia. This has made NATO to start a clear 
rapprochement to the countries in the South Caucasus. Today, Georgia is one of the pilot 
NATO partner countries and shows ambitions to join the Alliance in the near future.  
Some authors affirm that all the external actors in the region care more about 
themselves than about the South Caucasus. Also, they point out that the great powers fight 
against each other to control the area and this hinders the necessary measures to be taken to 
find a solution to the frozen conflicts. 
As Waal suggests, the international involvement in the Caucasus has had some special 
characteristics: first, the policies of the external actors in the region tend to be magnified and 
misinterpreted in positive or negative terms. Like in the case of the US military support to 
Georgia through the GTEP, which was seen by Georgia as a clear support against the 
separatist regions, and a contribution to alter the balance of powers and allow regaining the 
lost territories. However, this seems to be exaggerated to Lynch, according to whom, this is 
not meant to change the positions of the parties or in any case is not enough for that. Still, 
Cornell suggests the contrary.
 26
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Other features of massive external involvement in the area are: inconsistency of the 
policies to the region; minimal impact of the external intervention as far as solutions are 
concerned; lack of seeking for common solutions among the three South Caucasian states and 
the three state lets beyond selfish geopolitical and ethnical interests. Finally, despite the 
attention it has received, the region remains strategically ambiguous for the western actors, 
which defines their uncertainty towards the South Caucasus.
28
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Russia – an ambiguous player 
Since the beginning, the Russian role in the South Caucasus was very active and 
justified on several grounds: security, economic and broadly geo strategic ambitions. The 
proximity of the Caucasus to the Russian border is at first glance a major element to 
understand Russia’s policies towards its Near Abroad. However, Russia’s ambitions, interests 
and needs in the South Caucasus clashed with an immediate reaction of the new South 
Caucasian states to head towards the west. This tendency was especially strong in Georgia, 
also clear in Azerbaijan and to a lesser extent in Armenia. 
As the Cold War was finished, the western states viewed a chance to gain influence 
over resources in the area. However, it has been implicit and very obvious that the Caucasus 
was still a zone of Russian influence. This logic has started to change somehow with Russian 
own shifts in its policy priorities, motivated by several reasons: for example, the war in 
Chechnya and its lack of resources. At the same time, it is clear that Chechnya sharply limited 
Moscow’s space for manoeuvring in the Caucasus and massively undercut its ability to 
project power.
29
 According to Baev: “Russian policy itself should be recognised as an 
extraordinary complex and incoherent combination of unsustainable aspirations, incompatible 
interests and uncoordinated activities.”30 To the contrary, Moscow views its role for the South 
Caucasus development in the following way: “It is obvious that the countries of the region 
cannot develop outside the framework of the general Caucasian historical process. Wide 
economic and cultural cooperation, close ties between people of various ethnic origins and 
religious affiliation have always been determining factors in the history of this region. They 
remain significant under the contemporary conditions too.”31  
At the same time, Russia has played an intrusive role in the region, helping the 
separatist countries giving military, economic and logistic support. Russia has also supported 
Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in their war, be separatist, be irredentist against Azerbaijan. 
By supporting pro-Russian separatist movements in the Caucasus, Russia has assured both its 
influence in the region and has impeded the penetration of western influence. Still, Russia 
itself views this in a total different way: “Russia fully recognizes the right of its Caucasian 
neighbours to freely choose partners and develop cooperation to make the Caucasus stable 
and peaceful.”32 
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At the same time, it is interesting as well in what way has Russia contributed to the 
conflicts, their break up and their present freezing? As I explained already, the three republics 
are a product of a previous Soviet border design. I used, as several authors have, the term of 
divide et impera or divide and rule. It can be argued that after the Soviet empire dissolution, 
the Russian Federation has basically played the same strategy to continue keeping the area 
under its control. However, if Moscow under the red flag basically supported Tbilisi and Baku 
against independence demands of autonomous territories; with the break up of the Soviet 
Union Moscow shifted towards supporting the secessionist territories in order to hold the 
former Union republics under control. 
The way Moscow has oriented its foreign policy towards the former Soviet republics 
depends on every case and every time. The Russian policies towards the neighbouring 
countries have reasonably intrusive. As Lynch explains, there was a shift in Russia’s policies 
towards the South Caucasus sometimes supporting the secessionists and sometimes the South 
Caucasian states. According to Baev, Russia has behaved itself “simultaneously as an old 
colonial power in retreat and a young expansionist state, as a guardian of the status quo and as 
a dynamic predator.”33 These may explain the ambiguities. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has created two institutions, one 
political and one security oriented in order to maintain its influence over the former 
territories: the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)
34
 and the CSTO (Collective 
Security Treaty Organization).
35
 However, neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan automatically 
decided to be parties to them. Later, given the complicated nature of the inter-ethnic territorial 
conflicts and the involvement of Russia in both disputes as a mediator, they were forced to 
enter the CIS. Still, Russia has used these supposedly multilateral organizations to continue its 
unilateral on bilateral based policies towards the Caucasus. For example, the CIS peace 
contingent in Abkhazia is almost 100% made of Russian soldiers. 
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However, after their independence the three new states Azerbaijan, Georgia and to a 
less extend Armenia immediately shifted towards the west searching for the western security, 
political and economic institutions. The case of Georgia is probably the most obvious and 
paradigmatic. The shift to Europe responds to the following motivations of the country: 
firstly, European identity and culture of the Georgians; secondly and the most important, their 
conviction that their survival and progress would be more assured with western support and 
within the western institutions protecting them from the intrusive role of the powerful 
neighbour impeding their state and nation building process. 
However, state weakness, “shy” and weak western support together with the 
Caucasian states’ dependence on Russia for military, economic or energy support forced them 
to shift towards the more realistic Russian policy and re-establish links with their two century 
hegemonic capital - Moscow. 
The territorial conflicts were the core of the weakness through which Russia was 
implementing its political and economic interests in the area. The conflicts forced Georgia 
and Azerbaijan into the CIS. The conflicts forced anti Russian Tbilisi to sign a military treaty 
with Moscow. All in all, the conflicts allowed Russia to weaken the pro western South 
Caucasian republics, with such strategic territories as Abkhazia on the Black sea and oil rich 
Caspian shore in Azerbaijan, by helping the separatist to secede and later acting as an arbiter 
under the umbrella of the CIS. 
So, the way Russia has undergone its policies of intrusion and weakening of the South 
Caucasus can arguably be called ambiguous; because of the clearness of the objective of 
weakening and hindering the process of state building and hence promoting the state failures 
by encouraging the conflicts and their freezing. Actually, it is not very erroneous to call 
Russia a “promoter” in the present state of the situation in the conflict regions, in so far as, the 
freezing is a direct consequence of its intervention by means of self-sponsored cease fire 
agreement. Socor calls this Russian policy “controlled instability”.36 According to whom, this 
intervention has gone to the point of fomenting and at the same time managing the conflicts, 
so that Russia has played “the dual role of party to and arbiter to the conflicts”. For Socor, the 
objectives of Moscow have changed from impeding the countries’ independence towards stop 
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them from approaching and eventually integrating the western institutions, European and 
Euro-Atlantic structures. In the same line, Guerer affirms that “Russia took advantage of the 
erupting territorial conflicts to strengthen its position in the region, and therefore had hardly 
any interest in finding a solution to these conflicts”.37 
In what way has Russia justified its pro-secessionist policies? Basically, two 
justifications: terrorism and the Chechen problem as well as possibility of fighting spreading 
within its own borders. The border insecurity problem regarding Georgia’s lack to control its 
own territory, has been one of Russia’s main concerns, and has used those to interfere in the 
Georgia’s territorial disputes. The concerns of Russia about terrorists from Chechnya finding 
shelter in the Pankisi gorge (Georgia), or more in general, the international crime networks 
operating from the Pankisi gorge, have also been used as justification to intervene. 
Thus, one of the key components of Russia’s justification to intervene was the 
problem of fighting spill over to its territory. As far as the North Caucasian people helped 
militarily the Ossetians and Abkhazians in their fighting against Georgia, Russia was forced 
somehow to take part in those actions assuring that the war would not affect its territory. 
However, this does not explain why the help was directed to the secessionist territories and 
not to the central governments. At some point Russia’s action was aimed at threatening Tbilisi 
of attacking it, if it could not put an end to the anarchy and the war. Russia made it clear as 
well that it was concerned about its own secessionist potentials in the North Caucasus, so 
military intervention was necessary. At the same time, the recent intervention in Georgia of 
August 2008 was justified on different grounds such as defending the right of Russia’s 
citizens. Thus, it is not difficult for the latter to find a justification to its actions. On the other 
hand, referring back to the first justification above, even if a preventing fighting is something 
to be content about, the war ending with a cease fire agreement seems to be more a defeat for 
Tbilisi and Baku than anything else, which in the long term may have rendered the conflicts 
particularly intractable. So, the outcomes through cease fire agreements are a direct product of 
Russian ambiguous behaviour, empowering the break away territories and freezing the 
situation in the South Caucasus in order to make Georgia and Azerbaijan dependent on 
Moscow. 
As a complement to the abovementioned, it can be argued that the decisions to take a 
hard line position by such minorities as are the Abkhazs and the Ossetians can only be 
understood if their elites were counting on Russian support. Elites in the secessionist 
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countries, well linked with the Russian military were counting on their powerful neighbour 
and responded to Tbilisi’s aggressive policies with extremist demands legally founded on the 
still Soviet system. Nagorno-Karabakh, in the same way, was counting on Armenia’s support 
and Armenia on its turn on Russian military help.  
At last, in order better to evaluate the abovementioned Russian policy towards the 
South Caucasus, it would be useful to treat all these in a broader global context one more 
time. The predominance of Russia must be seen in the context of a growing counter veiling 
engagement of the USA and NATO in the region. Azerbaijan and Georgia have both indicated 
interest in a possible NATO membership and expressed their wish to see the deployment of 
NATO troops as a support to resolve the conflicts. The primary interest of the USA, apart 
from demonstrating a strong anti-Russian presence in the Caspian region, lies in the oil and 
gas reserves and supply of the world markets with energetic resources by circumventing 
Russia and Iran. In this respect, the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the 
Transcaspi-oil/gaspipeline is to be taken into account. Georgia, as the transit country with 
access to the Black Sea is playing its part in the “great game”. So, Russia recognizing the 
abovementioned is trying to hinder the US/NATO penetration in the South Caucasus and 
respectively, takes efforts not to lose but to broaden its influence over the three South 
Caucasian republics and oil/gas fields in the Caspian.  
 
Turkey and Iran 
The break down of the Soviet empire permitted Turkey and Iran to become again, as 
they had been historically, important actors in the South Caucasus.
38
 According to some 
authors, the opening of the region allowed a competition to influence the area based on a false 
premise: that the Russian role would completely disappear and the South Caucasian states 
would be not able to build up own internal and external policies.  
Turkey rediscovered after the Soviet dissolution that around 120 Turkic peoples were 
all spread in the new independent states of the Caucasus and Central Asia.
39
 Iran, as with 
similar pan- Turkic ambitions, also tried to be a key cultural reference promoting a vision of a 
“millennium-old Persian cultural sphere” still strong and alive even after two centuries of 
Russian domination. 
The reality proved the contrary. Armenia was already very closely linked to 
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Moscow. In 1993, Azerbaijani president Aliyev, after the coup against anti Russian 
Elchibey
40
, brought Azerbaijan into the CIS. Also, Shevardnadze, after Gamsakhurdia
41
, 
joined the CIS and signed military agreements with Russia that put Tbilisi completely 
dependent on Moscow. Further more, all peace mediations of Turkey and Iran failed, while 
Russia was able to mediate in all the conflicts, at least to attain a cease fire. The strong 
international presence in mediating the conflicts forced to modesty the initially ambitious 
intentions of Iran and Turkey. 
Still, since the Soviet demise, Ankara and Tehran have been cautious in their 
relations with Moscow, proof of which is the fact that they did not recognize the self 
proclaimed independent states of the South Caucasus until Russia did it itself. 
If, the role of Russia as a former super power or core of the hegemonic Soviet Union 
has been clearly protagonist and also ambiguous, Turkey an Iran have been more limited and 
more clear in their involvement. Still, their presence has contributed to the conflicts’ frozen 
situation in a decisive way. If, the impact of Russia on the conflicts can be established as a 
direct main causation component, in the case of Turkey and Iran, they have indirectly 
contributed to the state of the conflicts, adding to their unresolvability. 
If, strategies of Turkey have been basically sponsored by Washington and NATO in 
its attempt to continue its policy of slow penetration into the area gaining ground over Russia 
and isolating unfriendly Iran and its revolutionary Islamic model of cultural and social 
development; Iran has sought to strengthen ties with Moscow to produce exactly the contrary 
– trying to overcome the US blockade by weakening its penetration in the South Caucasus. 
Iran has worked on the improvement of its relations with Russia; as Cornell suggests, there 
exists actually a strategic partnership between the two parties in order to avoid Turkish and 
US penetration and the SC countries’ western aspirations. Besides, the Caspian Sea 
controversies linked with possible attack of Iran over Azerbaijan have forced Tehran to 
strengthen its ties with Moscow.
42
 
Turkey has been also equivocal in its intentions even if very contained due to its 
responsibilities as a NATO country. Some fightings between Armenians and Turkish were 
reported to have happened at some point of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, even if anecdotic. 
Turkey keeps a blockade against Armenia having the country almost complete locked and 
isolated if the piece of border with friendly Iran would not exist. The main component for 
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Turkey as a neighbouring country of the two South Caucasian states in war is the ethnic and 
linguistic similarity with Azerbaijan as well as the past confrontation against Armenia and 
Armenian population in its North-East borders during the World War I in 1915. These facts 
are potential source of complications. The situation has surprisingly taken a new turn when 
Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan in late January 2004 has stated that his party may decide to 
re-open the borders with Armenia “if friendly initiatives of Turkey may reciprocate”.43 This 
decision was motivated by the pressure from the EU to comply with the community 
conditions for joining the Union; but, willingness to permit the poor population of the 
northern part of Turkey to trade with Armenia was decisive as well.  
Concerning the abovementioned, the Azerbaijani president Aliyev warned with 
withdrawing from the peace talks, to which the Turkish ambassador in Baku responded that 
Turkey maintains the 10 years old three conditions for any opening of the borders with 
Armenia: 1) withdrawal from occupied Azerbaijani territories surrounding Nagorno-
Karabakh; 2) end of Armenian territorial claims on Turkey’s Eastern Anatolia region and 3) 
an end to Armenia’s campaign to secure international recognition of the 1915 killing of 1.5 
million Armenians by the former Ottoman Empire as a genocide.  
The conclusion is that Turkey has made clear that his alliance with Azerbaijan is 
untouched and solid. According to Herzig, “the success of the Azeri lobby in mobilizing 
public support has been instrumental in holding Ankara back from establishing normal 
relations with Armenia until the Karabakh dispute is resolved”.44 
The geo economic concrete interests of Turkey in the region become clear by taking 
a look at its ambitions of becoming an energy corridor between the Caspian Sea and Europe. 
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline are the proof 
of this. Besides, Turkey has promoted BSEC project, headquarters of which are located in 
Istanbul, in order to strengthen its links with Black Sea region, among others, with Georgia. It 
is also to be mentioned that North-East part of Turkey is populated with assimilated ethnic 
Georgian Lazs, which still maintain contact with their ancient home country. 
Turkey and to a lesser extent Iran have suffered of some minor border violations as 
well as fighting spill over during the military actions over the Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992-94. 
It has been mostly the Azeri refugee flows from the region displaced after the ethnic 
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cleansings and the war itself.
45
 
In sum, if the dominant role of Russia in the conflicts’ outcome seems indisputable, 
Iran and Turkey have been minor participants. Turkey – supporting Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabakh and Iran – fearing a strong Azeri nation, with its close links to Russia added to spill 
over potential of the conflict. 
 
United States and NATO in the South Caucasus 
Here, I will not discuss the role of the international organizations involvement in the 
South Caucasus, although they have been very actively presented since the beginning of the 
Conflicts. The OSCE and the UN have been deeply committed even if no results have been 
achieved – the OSCE in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia and the UN in Abkhazia. The 
European Union will not be discussed either, since detailed discussion follows hereafter. 
So far, the real role of the west
46
 in the conflicts’ present state can only be 
understood in negative terms, i.e. the conflicts are the way they are because west was not 
there or did not wanted to be there; the frozen conflicts are what they are because of a “lack of 
west”. 
If, Russia, Turkey and Iran, especially Russia, had a key role in the conflicts from the 
beginning; the western intervention took much longer to appear. The impact of the west in the 
area can be seen as indirect even if Russia’s pervading and invading policies were a measure 
of foreseeable penetration of the western world. The western role in the South Caucasus has 
been “shy” and very limited in the early days of the Soviet dissolution. It seemed that 
somehow the west assumed that the Caucasus was logically a Russian zone of influence, and 
they have allowed Russia to do and undo at its own sake. The west did not think the conflicts 
had a lot to do with them. According to Socor: “Even as Euro Atlantic interests grew vital in 
this region (strategic-military access eastward, energy transit westward, security on the NATO 
and EU new south-eastern border), the main Euro Atlantic actors apparently chose to 
postpone conflict-settlement efforts, rather than risk a falling-out with Russia at that time”.47 
Nuriyev reminds that Georgia and Azerbaijan tried to approach the western world after 
independence, but they did not obtain any help.
48
 
NATO’s cooperative efforts with new partners became a significant activity of the 
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new Alliance as it became dear that European security was indivisible and only through coop-
eration with non-NATO members, security and stability throughout the European continent 
would be ensured. The Euro-Atlantic (NATO) interests and strategic position in the South 
Caucasus region can be basically explained by three elements: first and obviously, the 
recession of Russia and hence the opened chance for western oriented politics; secondly, the 
mid-90s discovery of Caspian oil and gas potential as a key to Europe’s future energy 
balance; thirdly, the operational requirements for antiterrorism after the September 11
th
. Other 
interests were the important role of the South Caucasus as a transit corridor with direct access 
to the Greater Middle East, and the region uniting the Black Sea with the Caspian Sea. The 
three South Caucasian states are members of the NATO Partnership for Peace since 1994.
49
  
Armenia’s cooperation with NATO remained more limited than it of Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, partly because of its reliance on Russia for military assistance and partly because 
of its poor relations with Turkey, a NATO member state and neighbour. However, after Javier 
Solana’s visit to Yerevan in February 1997, Armenia decided to enhance its cooperation with 
NATO by participating in military training exercises and developing a peacekeeping 
contingent to participate in UN operations. As a result of increased US military assistance to 
Azerbaijan after the 11
th
 September, Armenia decided to expand its cooperation with NATO, 
and expressed its desire to hold a NATO PfP exercise in 2003; and to obtain NATO assistance 
in the areas of civil emergency planning and peacekeeping.
50
  
The terrorist attacks of the 11
th
 September 2001 gave NATO an additional boost of 
cooperation in the area specifically related to the fight against international terrorism. 
Following the 21 November 2002 Prague summit
51
 and the June 2004 Istanbul summit, 
NATO gave itself a more global role widening the scope and depth of NATO members and 
partners. According to Cornell, after the Istanbul Summit the South Caucasus can be seen as 
an “integral part of the NATO security architecture”. 
Russia remains deeply concerned over the growing ties between Georgia and NATO. 
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As we could observe, Russia applied several economic, political and very recently even 
military measures
52
 against Georgia in order to hamper the latter’s integration in the NATO.  
At the same time, NATO’s such a close cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan, 
created high expectations of the countries’ governments that NATO would resolve their 
security challenges. However, it was confusion that NATO would become the new guarantor 
of peace and security in the region, or even, would assist in the resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh, Abkhaz or South Ossetian conflicts.  
NATO has regularly condemned the use of force in the region and expressed its 
support for the territorial integrity of the South Caucasian states. However, NATO countries 
have refrained from getting directly involved in conflict resolution, deferring to other 
international organizations such as the OSCE or the UN. Not only did NATO not intervene to 
stop the violence or to impose a settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, as it did in Bosnia and Kosovo, but it has not become involved in peacekeeping 
operations at all along the various cease-fire lines. In all fairness, it must be said that when 
these conflicts erupted, NATO did not yet have a mandate to intervene in out-of-area 
operations and conduct peace support operations. It took three years of bloody fighting and 
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia for NATO to conduct its first air strikes against Serb positions in 
the summer 1995. 
Despite NATO’s positive and increased involvement in the region, major 
shortcomings remain. First of all, NATO managed to address only peripherally the main 
security threats and challenges effecting countries in the region - i.e. unresolved conflicts, 
open borders, weak and corrupt state structures, inefficient armed forces, and arms and drug 
smuggling. NATO’s limited involvement in the South Caucasus, especially as far as peace 
support operations are concerned, contrasts sharply with the organization’s deep involvement 
in other parts of Europe, particularly in former Yugoslavia. Only more recently, and within 
the context of the war on terror, have crucial security issues been addressed, such as the 
enhancement of border controls. Despite their high value, the NATO PfP and IPAP programs 
remain limited instruments for resolving the region’s pressing security needs. 
After the September 11
th
 attacks, the US interests in the area were determined by 
their fear that terrorists were looking for shelter in the out of Tbilisi controlled Pankisi gorge. 
This forced them to establish closer contact with Georgia. The US began the Train and Equip 
                                                 
52
 In the spring of 2006, Russia has banned its market to Georgian production and recently, in fall 2006, Russia 
stopped its diplomatic relations with Georgia. In the beginning of 2007 the diplomatic relation were renewed but 
economic restrictions were still in power. At present, After the Russia-Georgian war (7-12 August 2008), there is 
no relations between the countries.  
 38 
program (GTEP) in 2002 in order to enhance Georgia’s abilities to control its territory and 
fight terrorism.
53
 In 2005, the US launched the Sustainment and Stability Operation Program 
(SSOP), where 60 million USD has been allocated. Besides, Georgia has become a recipient 
of the US government’s Millennium Challenge project signed in September 2005, which 
provides the country with access to 295.3 million USD over the next five years with a focus 
on regional infrastructure rehabilitation and enterprise development. Moreover, Georgia will 
continue to receive assistance from the US State Department within the Georgia Border 
Security and Law Enforcement Program (GBSLE) launched in 1997.
54
 At the Georgia Donors 
Conference in Brussels on 22 October 2008, following the August invasion by Russia, the US 
government pledged new assistance to the country amounting one billion dollars.
55
 
Thus, US implemented aid to the South Caucasus, in particular to Georgia, which 
might have and it certainly had a positive impact on the frozen conflicts. They have invested 
on military measures that might strengthen the position of Tbilisi. However, military solutions 
to the conflicts seem improbable; still, a stronger position of Tbilisi on negotiation table might 
give it odds for a favourable deal. The US makes efforts to create an independent Southern 
belt in the soft Russian underbelly. The pipelines are political projects which are to provide 
the non-oil exporters in this belt with fuel and transport fees in order to make them less 
dependent on the Russian market. 
There is an another view by H.G. Heinrich at the University of Vienna and 
Diplomatic Academy Vienna concerning the Russia-US relations after the September 11
th
: 
“The US certainly will show themselves less concerned about Russian conduct in the 
Caucasus area in return for Russian support in the anti-terrorist war. US attention will then 
move away from the Caucasus (especially Georgia) and concentrate on Central Asia. 
Accordingly, Putin will continue to play the Wahhabi card. He will continue to oppose NATO 
presence in the region, unless an extremely beneficial bargain can be struck (What's it for 
Russia?). Russia’s divisive strategies are highly likely to be continued, especially if the 
prevailing feeling is that they have free hands. This means that the Abkhaz and the South 
Ossetian conflicts will not be resolved soon, let alone the Karabakh conflict.”56 
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It is a pretty interesting position and it is true to some points, but, so far, the US does 
still show its interests in the South Caucasus. The August 2008 confrontation is a good 
justification of it, or we can look at the recently (April 2008) held NATO Bucharest Summit, 
where the USA fully supported Georgia (while Germany and France took the Russian position 
and voted against) in granting MAP to the latter. The pro Russian position of the leading EU 
member states as France and Germany could be interconnected with European Union’s 
dependence on the Russian energetic resources. The Bucharest Summit was a kind of 
precedence, where the EU showed its back to the USA and supported Russia in its demands to 
prevent Georgia’s integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures.  
As Brenda Schaffer (Diplomatic Academy Vienna) declares, Washington views the 
US presence and policy in the South Caucasus as a component of its larger Middle East and 
anti-terrorism policies. Washington has viewed the energy resources of Azerbaijan in two 
ways: firstly, as a contributor to global oil supply diversification, and secondly, as oil in the 
margins (an effective tool for lowering oil prices). As to the Armenia-Azeri case, she argues 
that domestic interest groups, especially the Armenian-American lobby, through influence 
over Congressional decisions have had a large impact on the formation of current US policy 
towards the region. At the urging of the American-Armenian lobby, Congress imposed 
sanctions on Azerbaijan in 1992 in the form of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act that 
barred direct government-to-government assistance. Following the September 11
th,
 the US 
administration has waived the Congressional sanctions on Azerbaijan. Many in Azerbaijan 
felt that the sanctions were waived by the US only in order to take advantage of Azeri 
airspace and bases concerning the Iraqi crisis and confrontations with Iran. 
Here would be also worth to mention that despite the increased activism, US policy 
towards the region continues to be contradictory and inconsistent due to the often conflicting 
policy directions of different arms of the US government - mainly the congressional versus 
the executive branch. For instance, despite the long-standing promotion by US officials of the 
BTC pipeline, Congressional members who receive considerable support from the American-
Armenian community tried to frustrate this project. Moreover, congressionally allocated aid to 
Armenia is still the highest per capita of all the former Soviet states despite Yerevan’s strong 
cooperation with states of concern to the United States such as Iran and Syria not to mention 
the latter’s close relations with Russia. At the same time, the United States joined efforts in 
the OSCE Minsk Group, which has led the external efforts aimed at resolving the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict.
57
 Thus, inconsistence of actions and kind of ambiguity is existent on the 
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US side as well. 
As Schaffer suggests, a strong motivating factor in the US decision to promote the 
BTC pipeline was the anticipated economic benefits for Turkey as well as the desire to link 
Turkey to the states of the Caucasus and avoid a crisis in the Bosporus by not increasing 
tanker traffic from the Caspian region. Washington gave the Republic of Georgia special 
attention and promoted more cooperation with Tbilisi than with neighbouring Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. The special policy towards Tbilisi is motivated by Georgia’s strategic geographic 
location on the Black Sea, which confers a pivotal role in the region’s development. 
Moreover, the special treatment of Georgia may have emanated from the fact that relations 
with Georgia were less controversial from the US domestic perspective than relations with 
either Armenia or Azerbaijan.  
In addition, it can be argued that Washington seemed to support Georgia’s defiant 
stance towards Moscow directly or indirectly. It is to be mentioned as well, that although 
Russia’s policies regarding Georgia were an issue of contention between Washington and 
Moscow, they were not a central point of discussions held on Russia/US summits or other 
meetings until the Russia-Georgian war of 2008.    
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have given an overview to the South Caucasus region. I presented 
its past and today; its geo-economic as well as political importance together with Caspian oil 
and gas. In separate chapters, I have described what role does the Caucasus play in the 
transnational crime and have shown how relevant external actors have been in shaping the 
present form of the South Caucasian territorial disputes and hence contributing decisively to 
the overall situation in the region.  
As it seemed, the most and overwhelmingly relevant external actor has been and is 
the Russian Federation. Then, from the regional powers to a much lesser extend, Turkey and 
Iran. Finally, I have given an overview of the changing influence and impact of the west, from 
its virtual inexistent to some growing commitment to the area. However, as it is to see from 
above, the sole western actor that has had a real or potential impact on the region is the USA. 
The NATO has been hampered in its efforts to address the security challenges by a 
series of factors: the limitation of mandates, lack of adequate resources, internal 
disagreements among member states and the absence of strong political will to become more 
deeply engaged in the region. The west has tended to devote most of its attention to other 
regions of the world, such as the Balkans, Central Europe, etc; and has failed to devote to the 
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South Caucasian region the attention and resources it requires. However, it would be unfair to 
place the blame for the difficulties faced by the region entirely on the west. The three South 
Caucasian states bear the greatest share of responsibility for the outbreak of the various 
conflicts and for failing to resolve their most pressing security needs. 
Lastly, as the European Union becomes deeply involved in the region more and 
more, it can share the experience gained by its western colleagues over the past fifteen years 
and act in a more coherent and efficient way. This, possibly, would contribute to promotion of 
the conflict resolution and to the enhancement of security and stability in the South Caucasus. 
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2. The European Union as a global actor 
“The EU is in itself a peace project and a supremely successful one ... Through the 
process of enlargement, through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, through its 
development co-operation and its external assistance programmes the EU now seeks to 
project stability also beyond its own borders. (Commission 200k 5).”58 
The end of the Cold War had great significance for the evolution of the EU as a 
global actor, mostly because of the new demands coming from Central and East European 
countries. As Bretherton and Vogler argue,
59
 bipolarity doubtless permitted, and economic 
globalization encouraged, the development of cooperation in Europe. However, the European 
Union as a political form is unique; its creation reflect a combination of external demands and 
opportunities, and political will and imagination on the part of its founders. It is a moving 
target under construction that can frustrate the best efforts of an analyst.  
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) which entered into force in 1993, have had 
undoubtedly importance for the development of the European Union as a global actor. At the 
same time, attempts were made to develop Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for 
the newly created Union, and thus, give a political direction to external policy. 
In 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam (TOA) provided the CFSP with a new position of 
High Representative, which was filled in by Mr. Javier Solana. Afterwards, in 2003, the 
Treaty of Nice strengthened the institutional structure of the CFSP by creating the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
Karen Smith identifies the following characteristics of the European Union in 
International relations: promotion of regional cooperation, human rights, democracy/good 
governance, conflict prevention and fight against international crime.
60
  
In order better to understand the EU’s commitment to act as a global actor, we 
should treat the whole political situation from the international perspective by that time. Many 
factors have forced the European Community (EC) to become an international political actor. 
The end of the Cold War has emerged the European Union’s new role in challenging US 
hegemony. The EU had to compete with the US and Japan in high technology through the 
single market program and subsequently the Lisbon Strategy. Besides, the emergence of 
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armed conflict in Europe in the early 1990s, and fears of widespread political instability in 
Eastern Europe suggested a significant role for the EU as a regional security actor. 
To facilitate more sustained diplomacy, the Union has developed some foreign 
policy instruments. Appointment of the EU Special Representatives to areas of particular 
concern such as the Balkans, the Middle East, the Great Lakes region of Africa and 
Afghanistan, later the South Caucasus, was very good initiative in order to stabilize the 
regions. Besides, the Commission operates an external service with some 130 delegations in 
less developed countries of the EU concern. They do not operate as a traditional foreign 
service however. Arguably, political reporting is often very weak and the focus of 
delegations, reflecting the principal areas of Community competence, has been first on trade, 
second on aid and only third on CFSP.
61
 This is truth for the South Caucasus region as well. I 
will examine this problem thoroughly later in the work. 
Moravcsik says that the single most powerful policy instrument of the EU for 
promoting peace and security in the world today is the ultimate in market access.
62
 Indeed, as 
we will see later, the Union is the biggest donor in the conflict ridden areas of the South 
Caucasus and tries to promote peace and security mostly with economic means only. 
Nevertheless, the EU also uses its economic instruments to pursue objectives in the area of 
human rights and poverty alleviation.  
The European Union’s capacity in development and humanitarian assistance policy 
areas is truly global in scope. The EU is the world’s largest donor of both development and 
humanitarian assistance. The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was 
established in 1992. It operates essentially as a Directorate-General (DG) of the Commission. 
ECHO’s task is to provide emergency assistance, on the basis of need, to victims of natural or 
man-made disasters. Funding derives primarily from the Community budget, although a small 
proportion of the European Development Fund (EDF) (€14.1 million in 2003) is used for 
emergency assistance purposes. ECHO does not itself carry out field operations; these are 
sub-contracted to more than 180 organizations which have signed a Partnership Contract with 
the Commission, including UN agencies, the Red Cross/Crescent and numerous NGOs.  
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2.1 The European Neighbourhood Policy. 
The significance of the EU relations with its South and East peripheries has 
increased since the end of the Cold War. During the latter, there were limited relations with 
East European countries, but after the Cold War the Union have had to give an argent 
response to the dramatic events happened. “The peaceful revolution which swept Eastern 
Europe in 1989 is probably the most significant event in global terms of the past 45 years. It is 
happening on the very doorstep of the European Community. It represents a challenge and an 
opportunity to which the EC has given an immediate response.” (Commission 1990b:5).63 
Success in developing mutually satisfactory relations with neighbours and 
(potential) candidates is of paramount importance to the enlarged Union. Both the Eastern and 
Southern peripheries are characterized by economic and political instability and bitter, 
unresolved conflicts. As a consequence, both are identified in the Union’s Security Strategy as 
potential sources of risk to European security. Both, too, are important in supply or transit of 
energy to the EU. While the Security Strategy makes clear the Union’s interest in surrounding 
itself with a ring of well governed countries, the principal discourses employed within the 
Union have not been of security and interest, but of inclusion and neighbourhood. 
Rhetorically, at least, the central aim of the Union is to extend to the East and the South its 
values and practices and hence stability and prosperity. This is to be achieved either through 
incorporation (the Western Balkans and possibly Turkey) or neighbourhood (NIS
64
 and 
MNC
65
).  
First, there was made a kind of differentiation between the countries. Divisions were 
made as a consequence of the Union’s decisions on eligibility for membership. While it is 
envisaged that the Balkan countries will accede to membership; Ukraine, Moldova and the 
countries of the South Caucasus, which have aspirations for membership, are excluded - as 
are Russia and Belarus. The granting of a membership perspective is the most potent policy 
instrument of the Union available, and there is no doubt that it is used to some effect.  
The acceleration of the processes of reform in Turkey as membership became more 
evidently attainable, attests to this. In the Western Balkans, too, the decision (in early 2005) to 
delay accession negotiations with Croatia on the grounds of inadequate compliance with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), is instructive. This decision was a 
good instance for other states, and was followed immediately by enhanced cooperation with 
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the ICTY by the Serbian government anxious to embark upon the road towards EU 
membership.
66
 
Undoubtedly, the 2004 (later 2007) enlargement represented a success for EU 
external policy. Nevertheless it raised a number of challenges - not least that of managing 
relations with neighbouring countries to the East and South in a manner that will avoid 
creating destabilizing processes of inclusion and exclusion; there was a need of development 
of mutually satisfactory relations with neighbours temporarily or permanently excluded from 
candidacy. The launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was an attempt of 
providing an overarching framework for EU relations with Southern and Eastern “non-
candidate” neighbours. 
The concept of neighbourhood means denial for accession at the same time. Via 
ENP the Union conveys its desire for close and cordial relations with countries around the 
borders of the enlarged European Union. As Bretherton and Vogler argue, “the apparent 
denial of “European” status to countries such as Ukraine is both resented and contested; and 
may be subject to reversal in the future. Meanwhile, the ENP is designed to accommodate 
considerable differentiation in relations between the EU and its neighbours.”67  
The European Neighbourhood Policy has two main objectives: strengthening 
stability, security and well-being for EU member states and neighbouring countries, and 
preventing the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. 
At the same time, through this framework the Union could play a more prominent role in 
peace building processes. 
Shared values, strong democratic institutions and a common understanding of the 
need to institutionalize respect for human rights will open the way for closer and more open 
dialogue on the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and the development of the 
European Security and Defence Policy. A shared neighbourhood implies burden-sharing and 
joint responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by conflict and insecurity. 
Bretherton and Vogler suggest that greater EU involvement in crisis management in response 
to specific regional threats would be a tangible demonstration of the EU’s willingness to 
assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in the neighbouring countries. 
The key ENP instruments through which the policy will be implemented are the 
Action Plans. According to the Council, these Action Plans should be political documents, 
                                                 
66
 Dannreuther Roland – European Union Foreign and Security Policy, towards a neighbourhood strategy. 
London 2004. pp. 62-77 
67
 Bretherton Carlotte and Vogler John – The European Union as a Global Actor (Second Edition). London, 
2006. p.148 
 46 
building on existing agreements and setting out the over-arching strategic policy targets, 
common objectives, political and economic benchmarks used to evaluate progress in key 
areas, and a timetable for their achievement which enable progress to be judged regularly.  
The Strategy Paper is another ENP instrument which sets out principles and scope 
for the neighbouring countries.  
Country reports, covering progress in implementation of bilateral agreements and 
related reforms, reflect the political, economic, social and institutional situation in the 
countries and focus on priority areas of the European Neighbourhood Policy. These 
documents are basis for drafting the Country Strategy Papers and/or the Action Plans.  
The Action Plans, which are negotiated between the EU and individual neighbours, 
are drafted following the specific priorities, which the Union might have towards a 
neighbouring partner country. These range from commitment to democracy and the rule of 
law, through rights of minorities, trade union rights and gender equality, to combating 
terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Other priorities include economic and social 
development, trade and border management. Specific regional initiatives are proposed in the 
areas of energy supply (several countries are important sources of, or transit routes for, oil and 
gas), transport and environment. 
Since the beginning 2007, there is a new instrument of financing the ENP objectives 
called ENPI
68
. Its aim is a better support to the neighbouring countries in building democracy 
and economic development, which on its turn serves to the top intention of the EU – to have a 
ring of well governed countries/European democracies based on the EU values. 
I will provide detailed analysis of each of the abovementioned ENP instruments in 
the second part of the work while discussing on ENP with respect to conflict resolution for 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.  
The European Neighbourhood Policy offers many incentives
69
 to the neighbouring 
countries. Most significant is the prospect, depending upon progress, of moving beyond 
cooperation to integration - in relation to the Single Market and other EU policies and 
programmes. These provisions will be covered by new contractual arrangements, in the form 
of European Neighbourhood Agreements. Thus, the ENP could lead to a relationship 
extending to “everything but the institutions”. At the same time, following the External 
Relations Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner’s speech in 2004, “still everything is possible”. She 
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meant that inclusion in the ENP “doesn’t close any doors to European Countries that may at 
some future point wish to apply for membership”.70  
It seems that the neighbourhood policy adopted the same instruments and techniques 
based on the evolved pre-accession process for the Central and Eastern European states, 
which are judged to have worked in promoting political reform in candidate countries. 
Respectively, in the first phase of the ENP political priorities are contained in the Action 
Plans, while for candidate countries they are contained in the Accession Partnerships. In the 
second phase, the Commission will report on progress accomplished by the neighbour, as far 
as every year the Commission reports on progress accomplished by the candidates; and then, 
on the basis of this evaluation, the EU will review the content of the Action Plan and decide 
on its adaptation and renewal as it is for the candidate countries – the Union updates the 
priorities contained in the Accession Partnerships almost every year. All these similarities 
confirm the statement of the Commission that in enriching relations with partner countries, it 
will draw on the experience gained in supporting the process of political transition in the new 
member states and in candidate countries. 
The main difference between the EU relations with candidate countries and those 
coming within the framework of the ENP (non-candidates) has to do with incentives, as only 
the first foresees the prospect of full EU membership, which is widely recognized to have had 
a powerful positive effect on the processes of democratic transformation and consolidation 
among the Central and East European countries. The other foresees the eleven incentives
71
 in 
the short term, which aim at reinforcing political, economic and cultural cooperation and 
some political and economic integration in the long term, which is very different from 
membership. Elena Baracani raises the question whether the ENP incentives will make 
neighbours accept the political conditionality?
72
 It is a pretty interesting question and it could 
have different answer for every different participating country. Here, we meet another 
weakness of the ENP framework; there is no differentiation made between the participating 
states, but each of them is handled with the same strategy coming within the scope of the 
ENP. However, we have to take into the view that the states as different as Georgia and 
Morocco, Armenia and Egypt could not be expected to implement the EU values and 
priorities equally good within the same timeframe. And, the priorities of the countries are 
surely as different as are their levels of economic, social and political development – Georgia, 
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while prioritizing conflict resolution issue to be on the first place in the Action plan; Egypt 
might wish the document to be built on the Association Agreement provisions in order to 
further liberalize the duty free trade with the EU. I will get back to this problem later in the 
third part of the work. 
Thus, the ENP ultimate objective is to share a stake in the single market with 
neighbouring countries. Nicolas Hayoz argues that this objective is very ambitious and poses 
a number of problems. Firstly, it needs pointing out that two vital corners of the single market, 
namely free movement of people and the freedom to provide services are difficult today to 
obtain in their entirety even for the current EU member states. The new members still have to 
cope with the transition period for free movement of workers that may last up to seven years 
after their accession. The current initiative of the Commission to fully liberalize the provision 
of services across internal borders faces strong objections from a number of countries, 
including such big players as Germany and France. Thus, the problem with this offer may be 
that the carrot itself is not really a carrot. The ENP addressee countries may rightly ask, what 
this stake can mean precisely, and how the EU (not only the Commission) is going to arrive at 
this point? In other words, how the EU wants to extend the cornerstone of the single market in 
form of free movement of workers on its neighbours, if it does not operate fully for itself?! 
Besides, the carrot of the single market has always come with the prospect of membership, i.e. 
participation in decision making bodies.
73
  
One more problem which arises concerning the ENP is that it is not clear if the 
incentives offered by the framework will prove adequate to achieve the Union’s aim of 
ensuring the economic and political stability of the Eastern neighbours. Moreover, the Union 
is involving itself in a highly volatile region (Eastern Europe and the Caucasus), which is 
regarded by the Russian government as the zone of its special responsibility. The need to 
exercise caution in the face of Russian sensitivities may prove a major impediment to EU as a 
global actor. Besides, Russia’s military presence in Moldova and Armenia as well as close 
interests in the separatist Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia generates tensions 
in the EU-Russian relations. A good example for the latter is the recent (August 2008) armed 
confrontation between Georgia and Russia, which has had its negative influence on the 
European Union and Russian relations. A detailed discussion on this issue will be provided 
later in the work. 
By discussing the EU-Russian relations, we should not forget that the EU market 
became the destination for more than 50 per cent of Russian exports, the bulk of which 
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(almost 70 per cent) comprise fuel products.
74
 This proves how difficult would it be for the 
EU to speak against Russia with demanding voice. However, the EU for Russia is the biggest 
trade partner at the same time.  
A further problem to the ENP is the issue of inconsistency. Bretherton and Vogler 
argue that some west European countries adopt a placatory stance towards Russia, but the 
Polish and several other Eastern Member States’ governments urge that relations with 
Ukraine should be prioritized. They suggest that any significant division which may arise 
between Member States over prioritization of relations with particular candidates or 
neighbours would impede the Union’s effectiveness as a regional actor. The Commission has 
recommended, “In the implementation of the ENP, it is of the utmost importance that the 
Institutions and Member States act in a consistent and coherent way” (Commission 2004a: 
6).
75
 The problem of inconsistency is existent in the EU relations with the South Caucasus 
too; thus, I will turn back to this problem later while discussing on the Union’s performance 
in the region. 
 
2.2 Common Foreign and Security Policy 
“It is my belief that in this global age a Union of our size, with our interests, history 
and values, has an obligation to assume its share of responsibilities ... The question, therefore, 
is not whether we play a global role, but how we play that role.” (Solana 2002: 3, emphasis in 
original).
76
 
If we imagine how many Member States have to cooperatively exercise common 
external and security policy, it would become clear that there might be some problems in 
coherence and consistence of the common action. Indeed, such problems exist between 
Member States as well as EU institutions and the latter.  
The long established divisions between Atlanticist Member States such as the UK, 
the Netherlands and Portugal, and those led by France which advocate an independent EU 
posture are of greatest importance among many observed Member States differences. The 
relative influence of large and small Member States can be considered as a further source of 
tension. 
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Problems of consistency were, of course, starkly revealed by the Member States’ 
divisions over the 2003 invasion in Iraq. This deep division has shown that the CFSP was a 
week foreign policy tool by that time and the European States have had to work hard in order 
to be able of exercising common action in foreign policy matters. Nevertheless, as a German 
diplomat made it clear, the situation could be worse if the CFSP would not exist and every 
state would act on its own.
77
 From this perspective, the CFSP can only be evaluated 
positively. It is also to be mentioned that in the same year (2003) the EU’s first ESDP 
operations were conducted in Macedonia and Democratic Republic of Congo. Furthermore, 
the European Security Strategy, a document that aims to provide an overarching framework 
for the Union’s role as a global actor, was published in the same year. Thus, although it failed 
to give an adequate response to such big challenge as it was the Iraqi crisis by that time, the 
Union has proven that it was able to undertake common actions at a smaller extent. 
In the context of high profile, damaging divisions between Member States over the 
Iraqi war, the need to provide strategic direction for EU external action was perceived to be 
urgent. Production of the European Security Strategy reflects that perception. The Security 
Strategy provides a framework that links long-term priorities of the EU - promotion of 
regional stability (importance of a ring of well governed countries) and strengthening of 
multilateral processes and organizations - with renewed (after 11
th
 September) commitment to 
combat terrorism and prevent the proliferation of WMD.
78
 As suggested, the problem of 
consistency is identifiable in the EU relations with the South Caucasus states as well; but, as it 
is outlined above, this kind of division is a good instance for the Union to set up a more 
developed strategy in order to give an adequate response to the identified weaknesses; and I 
hope it is going to be so in the SC case too. I will not go into the depth this time, since a 
detailed analysis of this problem is provided hereafter. 
As I have already mentioned in the beginning, the post of EU Special Representative 
(EUSR) were introduced to the areas of concern of the EU. This action was aimed at 
facilitating policy implementation on the ground. The EUSR’s presence symbolizes the 
Union’s commitment, while facilitating sustained diplomacy in support of conflict resolution 
and transmission of locally gained information to policy planners in Brussels. The 
responsibilities of EUSR are set out by the GAERC
79
 in Joint Actions, which take the form of 
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a mandate. The operations of EUSR have, on occasion, been impeded by cross-pillar disputes 
mainly (but not only, as it appears below) over shortfalls and delays in provision of funding.
80
  
In March 2005 the appointment of an EU Special Representative to Moldova, 
primarily in the context of conflict over the disputed region of Transdniestria, was met with 
Commission insistence that the person appointed should not be involved in implementation of 
Moldova’s recently agreed ENP Action Plan. Although, the issue was resolved through 
negotiation of a compromise mandate, which states that the Special Representative will deal 
only with “relevant aspects” of the Action Plan,81 it provides us with a good example of the 
cross-pillar tensions, which mostly appear in new policy areas. The mandate of the EUSR to 
the South Caucasus is interesting in this respect too. I will analyse the latter in the chapter 4 of 
the work. 
The European Union uses several economic instruments within the scope of the 
CFSP in relations with third countries in order to assist them financially in various fields. The 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was established in 1994. Its 
aim is to contribute to the four following priority areas in underdeveloped countries. These 
are: Democracy and the rule of law; abolition of the death penalty; prevention of torture; and 
support for minority rights. Although this instrument is declared to be successful, it is 
relatively modest when compared with the development assistance provided from the 
Community budget and the European Development Fund (EDF). As we will see later, this 
instrument is implemented in the SC region too. 
Another successful economic instrument under CFSP is the Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism (RRM). It was adopted in 2001. The Commission was authorized to make rapid 
disbursements of funds from a dedicated budget line.
82
 This mechanism is intended to support 
conflict prevention measures or assist in maintaining or re-establishing civic structures. It was 
first used in Macedonia in 2001. The RRM has been used in Georgia after the Rose 
Revolution in 2003 as well.  
Assessment of the effectiveness of the Union’s policy instruments is difficult, but it 
is clear that CFSP has increased in activity during the recent years. Consequently, there was 
an increased international recognition of the EU as a global actor. This can be understood in 
terms of the Union’s broader involvement in such hot spots in the world as: the Balkans 
(Stability Pact for the Western Balkans, where the EU has a leading role) and the Middle East 
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Peace Process (EU is a part of the Quartet). Here would be worth to mention that the Chinese 
government has acknowledged the EU “as a major force in the world”.83  
 
2.3 European Security and Defence Policy  
The ESDP has a highly intergovernmental character. In terms of policies and 
institutions, the ESDP is embedded within the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It 
provides the latter with additional instruments while supporting its normative positions and 
commitment to multilateralism. Bretherton and Vogler indicate that the ESDP is clearly not 
configured for territorial defence. War, fighting and global power projection are not the 
functions of the ESDP, but stabilization and peace enforcement, with the capability to operate 
beyond Europe. 
The history of Kosovo engagement has shown that the international community did 
too little and too late to prevent the escalation of a conflict which had been evolving over 
more than a decade. The EU members were confronted with their own inability to tackle the 
problem suitably. At the beginning of the debate on the ESDP, the United Kingdom and 
France were interested only in military or defence aspects, while the Scandinavian states were 
feared a militarization of the EU. Germany has taken a mediator role. The Goeteborg 
European Council endorsed the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. 
Conflict prevention was described as one of the main objectives of the Union’s external 
relations. The programme states that “in line with the fundamental values of the EU, the 
highest political priority will be given to improving the effectiveness and coherence of its 
external action in the field of conflict prevention.” Furthermore, it contains an expression of 
willingness “to set clear political priorities for preventive actions, improve its early warning, 
action and policy coherence, enhance its instruments for long- and short-time prevention, and 
build effective partnership for prevention.”84  
The European Council of Helsinki agreed on the military headline goals. These 
headline goals envisaged that the member states must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 
days and sustain for at list 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of 
the full range of Petersberg Tasks
85
. Future ESDP planning envisages: Joint disarmament, 
support to third countries in combating terror and security sector reform in the context of 
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wider institution building. The use of force is permissible in cases of state failure “should it 
prove necessary, as a last resort” (Council of the EU 2004c: 6). There is also a responsibility 
for the international community to intervene “where there is a serious risk of large scale loss 
of life, ethnic cleansing and acts amounting to genocide”. Military action may in certain 
circumstances be justifiable, when a state is “unwilling or unable to deal with the threat posed 
by a non-state actor on its territory”. There was intense debate in the Council about the 
circumstances in which the Union might use its newly acquired capabilities as a security 
actor. Highly controversial, was the question of the need to act before “countries around us 
deteriorate” where “Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future?” 
Here is an answer to the question: “(…) it (the EU) should carefully weigh the consequences 
of action against the consequences of inaction.” (Council of the EU 2004c:8).86 So, we can 
argue that Military intervention is only justifiable for the EU if there are no other valid 
options to act. As we will see it hereafter, the EU comes in a slight touch with instruments of 
the ESDP in the South Caucasus region, in particular, in Georgia as the Union has provided 
an urgent help to the country after the Rose Revolution. But, EU military action in support of 
the SC states, I believe, is excluded, at least in this phase of the EU-South Caucasus relations. 
A good example of the latter is the EU diplomatic efforts to mediate between Georgia and 
Russia in summer 2008. More discussion to this point I will provide in the third part of the 
work. 
 
2.4 EU Cooperation 
The Union is not an unilateral actor only, but it cooperates in diverse fields with 
various states and international organizations in order to be more efficient. The EU-UN 
(United Nations) cooperation is of great importance as far as all the previous and current 
ESDP operations have been conducted under the aegis of UN Security Council resolutions.  
The EC has a delegation to the UN since 1974, and it has observer status at the UN 
General Assembly. Furthermore, the EC is a party to over 50 UN multilateral agreements and 
conventions as the only non-state participant. The UN is seen as a key partner in conflict 
prevention and crisis management by the EU. The June 2004 agreement has promoted 
collaboration between the EU and UN in Crisis Management. Following the agreement the 
EU can support the UN peace operations in two main ways – through coordinating individual 
Member State contributions or through ESDP operations at the request of the UN.  
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The European Union has number of reasons for intensifying its relations with UN. 
For example – UN has much more field experience than the EU, when conflict prevention and 
crisis management are concerned. Besides, cooperation offers the possibility of task sharing 
and promoting synergy, thus reducing costs and increasing efficiency. Here would be worth to 
mention as well that both organizations are promoting regional and sub regional integration as 
a path to peace building and conflict prevention. Not to forget that through such teamwork the 
profile of ESDP will grow and so will the EU’s identity as a cooperative security provider. 
Thus, the Union is generally prepared to offer all its new capacities arising from the 
framework of ESDP to the UN.
87
 
EU cooperates with individual countries as well. Member States are welcome to 
include elements from third states (non-EU/NATO members and accession states) in their 
“battle groups”. Canada together with Switzerland, Norway and Iceland are the regular 
contributors, which have participated in all the ESDP operations so far.  
As far as the relations between the EU and OSCE are concerned, it has been 
critically asked whether the evolving ESDP is designed to support or to sideline the OSCE. 
Even before the CFSP was conceived, the CSCE/OSCE offered a promising framework for 
concerted EU action, and that is still the case today. Moreover, there have been many 
concerted actions at the strategic level (the stability pacts for Europe and for South-Eastern 
Europe to mention just two) and the operational level (monitoring of elections and 
cooperation with OSCE observers in the Balkans). In 2004, the European Council approved a 
report prepared by the Presidency considering practical implementation of EU-OSCE 
cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation 
(15387/1/04 REV1).
88
  The report reflects two main goals: to strengthen the relationship and 
to reinforce the performance of the EU within the OSCE. The long-term objective for the EU 
is to preserve full implementation of the OSCE values and standards in the Euro-Atlantic area. 
Besides, it is to be indicated that the president of the Commission and the External Relations 
Commissioner participate in summits as well as ministerial councils of the OSCE. EU 
members contribute two-thirds of the OSCE budget and the EU gives considerable support to 
the field activities of the OSCE through the EU budget. The OSCE is therefore regarded by 
the EU as an international lead organization that could benefit from the ESDP project.
89
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One problem that occurs in this cooperation in general, is the inter-pillar rivalry, lack 
of compliance by Member States and their lack of homogeneity. As Hans-Georg Erhart 
suggests, actions by the Member States within the framework of other international 
organizations have to be coordinated in a better way so that a common position is reached. To 
achieve the abovementioned is not easy because of the Member states’ non compliance; there 
is an increasing awareness that Europe will only be able to have a say in the word affairs if it 
speaks with one voice. 
Thus, we have seen how the EU cooperates with the UN, OSCE and the other 
partner non-EU states. This cooperation is interesting to the paper, since, as it appears later, 
the UN and the OSCE are main partners of the EU in the South Caucasus region too as project 
implementation is concerned. 
 
Conclusion 
In many ways the EU from its original conception in the form of the European Coal 
and Steel Community was always in the business of providing security. This role derived 
from its presence. However, significant developments from the late 1990s through to the first 
deployment of forces under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 2003 can be 
regarded as a transformation in which the Union acquired not only an unprecedented military 
capability but a security strategy to inform its use. 
The key security challenge to the EU is not defence of its territory, which is no 
longer the issue, but the need to construct a policy towards its neighbours that responds in a 
sensitive manner to the challenges coming from East or South. In combating these challenges, 
the “soft” security provided by development assistance and humanitarian aid is considered by 
the Union to be more efficacious than the “hard” security of military defence. This is true as 
we will see later while analysing the EU performance in the South Caucasus with respect to 
conflict resolution. As Antonio Missiroli concludes: “The EU has not yet completed its 
transition from a purely and genuinely “civilian power”… to a fully-fledged international 
actor in its own right that aims to project security beyond its borders. The completion of such 
transition is still open ended…”90  
In order to achieve its objectives, the Security Strategy acknowledges that the Union 
must be more proactive and more capable if it is to fully exploit its presence. Enhanced 
capability depends upon the ability to address the problems of consistency (between Member 
States and EU policies) and coherence (internal co ordination within the Commission and 
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between the Commission and the Council), which I have encountered previously. It is 
probable that, as the Union enlarges, problems of consistency will be exacerbated, and 
balance will need to be made between size and effectiveness. Coherence problems, 
particularly in relation to cross-pillar coordination, also need to be addressed. The 
Constitutional Treaty attempted to deal with these matters, and its rejection can only be a 
setback to the aspirations contained in the Strategy. 
The ongoing enlargement process may have enhanced security, but it brings the 
Union closer to troubled areas. There is a strong EU interest in events in the Southern 
Caucasus. These developments have led to a situation in which there is a new and highly 
significant strategic dimension of the EU-Russia relationship. Both, Russia and the EU are 
jointly concerned with instability in the South Caucasus region. As argued previously, 
military instruments of the ESDP would never be deployed in this area without the support 
and collaboration with Russia. That is why the EU has applied only diplomatic measures as 
Georgia-Russian military confrontation has occurred (August 2008).Thus, the South Caucasus 
is a subject of the EU and Russian common concern, which makes the strained political 
situation in the region even more tensioned. Let us get a deeper insight in the South Caucasus 
issue in order to get a better understanding of the abovementioned. 
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3. EU in the South Caucasus 
 
Before I proceed, I would like to remember the reader the way interests derive in 
international relations, which I have presented in the introduction. The following statements 
are vital for this chapter: 
 Interests are not steadfast but result of a political identity building process (Reese-
Schaefer 1999) 
 Interests of the actors are originated from their political imaginations (Ernst Haas 
2001) 
 
3.1 Interests and role of the European Union in the South Caucasus and its 
performance among other external mediators in the region. 
Over the last ten years, European views on the South Caucasus have repeatedly 
shifted. After the signature of the 1994 so-called “Contract of the Century” on the exploita-
tion of Azeri oil reserves by western companies, the western states started to view the South 
Caucasus in more positive terms as a bridge linking different important areas. However, the 
11
th
 September terrorist attack and the failure of domestic and regional reforms by the South 
Caucasus states, had contributed to the region’s negative perception, primarily in security 
terms.
91
  
Further more, the states have experienced processes of de-industrialization, large-
scale emigration (mainly to Russia) and mass poverty. Georgia and Azerbaijan face severe 
separatist threats from Abkhazia, South Ossetia and respectively Nagorno-Karabakh inside 
their borders. These internal weaknesses made these states vulnerable to external insecurity 
developments. As I have already argued, the region has become a transit zone, as well as, a 
source of transnational organized crime. All these have had definitely a negative impact on 
EU deeper engagement in the region. 
After the 2004 and 2007 enlargement, importance of the South Caucasus region 
and its security for the European Union has increased very much. Geographic proximity, 
energy resources, pipelines and the challenges of international crime and trafficking make 
stability in the region a clear EU interest. As Coppieters declares, the European Union has 
no military ambitions in the region that could be compared to those of the United States or 
Russia. The EU’s concern to ensure energy security dictated its support for western pipeline 
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and a policy of diversification of transport routes for oil and gas.
92
  
Thus, it is not the Union’s objective to extend its exclusive influence in Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, but to promote the role of international law in these three states 
founded on the principles of the UN Charter and state sovereignty. Dov Lynch underlines 
that “the EU will not act alone, but will seek to support and facilitate the activities of key 
states and international organizations already active in the region.”93 And it is exactly the 
matter as we will see it later. 
The rule of law, human and minority rights, fight against organized crime and 
development of functioning market economy are precondition for sustainable development 
and creation of a climate for free trade and investment. To this end the EU works in close 
cooperation with UN and OSCE – main international actors in the South Caucasus. But, this 
is not enough to promote stability as it appears below. The EU should make decisive steps 
in order to stabilize the region. For instance, the Union should make use of its strategic 
partnership with Russia to develop common approaches to the South Caucasus. Besides, the 
EU’s cooperation with Turkey should increase in scope. Turkey, as already argued, has its 
own influence on the region and is in a position as NATO state and candidate country to 
contribute to security promotion in the area.  
The peaceful Caucasus is of utmost importance for the Union; but, at the same 
time, the EU can not act free in the region because of the two great powers (Russia and 
USA) which have their own interests concerning the area. On the one hand, the South 
Caucasus is close enough that the European Union was forced to consider its interests in 
promoting stability to avoid any regional aggravation that might spill over. But, on the other 
hand, the EU is not ready to grant the three South Caucasian countries a clear priority.   
Membership prospect is the Union’s most successful incentive which has had a 
positive influence on Central and East European countries to comply with conditionality and 
conduct various important reforms vital for western democracy. Following the Crisis 
Group’s analysis – as the EU is unlikely to offer membership to Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan even in the medium term, it must identify innovative means to impose 
conditionality on its aid and demonstrate influence.
94
   
The European Union is considered to be rather a weak player in the South 
Caucasus as compared to the US or Russia. EU’s involvement in the region in terms of the 
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conflict resolution is limited to some unarmed military observers from the EU member 
states within the UNOMIG
95
in Abkhazia. Besides, the European Union has given material 
support to the OSCE observer mission at the Georgian border with Russian Federation. This 
support was intended to help avert a spill over of the Russian-Chechen war into an open 
Russian-Georgian conflict. After the summer 2008 armed confrontation between Georgia 
and Russia, the EU has launched an observer mission in Georgia. I will provide more 
information to this topic hereafter; but, the latter is a good example of the fact that the 
Union’s interests and consequently involvement in the region is getting in depth. 
From the perspective of Georgia, the greater involvement of west in the conflict 
regions may lead, in the long run, to a realignment of forces that would be to the latter’s 
advantage. From the Abkhaz and South Ossetian perspective, Russia’s strategic interest in 
preserving a foothold in the region makes them confident that they will not be subdued 
against their will into a federal arrangement within Georgia. And, at last, from the EU point 
of view, the most European Union member states do not consider the South Caucasus to be 
of significant strategic importance as compared to Moldova and Ukraine. This could serve 
as an explanation for the EU’s nearly non involvement in the South Caucasus political 
processes in the past years. 
As the Crisis Group suggests in its report, to become more effective the EU must 
increase its political visibility. Although, it gives much aid to the region through new and 
old instruments, its political engagement in the area has been minimal compared with 
Russia, US, UN or the OSCE. But, if there is a need this engagement to become productive, 
the Union’s ability to provide incentives and apply conditionality should grow.96 
In 2003, there was a great shift forward in EU-South Caucasus relations. The 
Union tried to change its sole economic presence in the region towards more security and 
introduced the post of a Special Representative to the area. This positive step can be 
considered as a clear EU sign and willingness to get some political stakes in the South 
Caucasus. Arguably this shift forward can be related to the following:  
Firstly, the 2004 enlargement would bring the region nearer to the Union, so peace 
and stability in the area became more important on the EU political agenda than it was in 
the past.  
Secondly, the Georgian Rose Revolution, which was a clear expression of the 
Georgian people that they voted for a real western democracy, gave additional incentives to 
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the Union to rethink the policy towards the South Caucasus. More to the point, the 
Commission has introduced the Rapid Reaction Mechanism to Georgia in order to support 
the post Rose Revolution democratization processes under the European Security and 
Defence Policy.  
Energy security for the West, development of transport and communication 
corridors between Europe and Asia, and containment such threats as smuggling, trafficking 
and environmental degradation played certainly a significant part also while deciding for 
more political engagement in the region.  
The inclusion of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the ENP and negotiations on 
the Action Plans were the next important issue to be mentioned regarding the EU-South 
Caucasus relations. Unfortunately, as we will see later, neither the post of Special 
Representative nor the ENP action plans tackle appropriately the conflict resolution topic. 
More to the point, the EU does not participate directly in the negotiations on Nagorno-
Karabakh, Abkhazia or South Ossetia problems. And, as it appears later in the paper, in and 
around Nagorno-Karabakh the EU has done little for conflict resolution. 
From the abovementioned it is easy to understand that EU is not certain about its 
policy in the South Caucasus. The Union can not exactly determine its role in the region. As 
Dov Lynch argues: the EU policy towards the South Caucasus is not the result of calculated 
decisions taken as part of clear policy-making processes; quite the contrary: much of EU 
thinking and policy is the result of contingent circumstances, the pull of events from the 
region itself, functional to the member state holding the presidency at a particular period, as 
well as the role of strong individuals inside the EU machinery.
97
  
On the other hand, it is quite easy to blame the European Union but the situation in 
the region is more complex as it seems. The South Caucasus is a web of different political 
interests be foreign, be local. This fact makes the present condition even more strained. The 
EU itself is a young international actor with still some weaknesses but, at the same time, it 
is to be characterized with high speed development tendency. From non-involvement to 
inclusion of the South Caucasian states in the ENP, the Union has fast and positively 
upgraded its interests towards the region; and, if we treat all these from the scope of its high 
speed development tendency; I could imagine that the EU in the near future would be in a 
position to give an appropriate answer to the challenges in the South Caucasus, which is 
hard to believe at present.  
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Let us follow the steps the way EU has developed its policy to the region and 
analyze them, maybe it would be helpful better to understand the European Union’s 
uncertainty towards the South Caucasus. 
 
3.2 The South Caucasus from PCAs to ENP 
In the past years, the picture of EU-South Caucasus relations looked like the 
following: economic interaction of the South Caucasus with the EU was peripheral as it is 
today, and as a consumer market the South Caucasus was negligible. There were some EU 
interests towards the energetic resources of the Caspian Sea, which could decrease the 
latter’s dependency on the Persian Gulf and Russia, but they were not considered vital 
enough. The South Caucasus was also peripheral in terms of the EU security interests. The 
frozen conflicts did not constitute significant threats to European security as did the 
conflicts of the Balkans.  
For present, the situation has changed. The Caspian energy resources have 
attracted important capital investment by European oil and gas companies, and are relevant 
to Europe’s energy security. The Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh 
and the Georgian-“Russian” dispute on Abkhazia and South Ossetia have a destabilizing 
potential for Europe’s southern core, which makes the settlement of these conflicts a clear 
EU interest, especially, as they effect relations of the EU and important partners such as 
Russia. 
Another incentive, which makes the South Caucasian countries attractive for the 
European Community is their function as a bridge to other regions. In the second half of the 
1990s, the location of the South Caucasus states on the old Silk Road raised the prospect 
that these countries would emerge from the political isolation in which they had found 
themselves during the first years of independence. It also responded to the hope that their 
geopolitical location would lead to economic development, integration into global markets 
and political stability. The EU gave strong financial support for the development of a 
diversified transport system between Europe and Asia, crossing the South Caucasus. But, 
the failure of these states to remove regional barriers to trade (such as sanctions policies 
regarding unresolved secessionist conflicts), the lack of cross-border cooperation policies 
and the corruption of custom officials were a strong disincentive for the Union.
98
 
Till 1999, there were nearly no significant relations between the South Caucasus 
states and the EU. Only ECHO and FSP were set up by the Commission in 1992. This help 
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was launched to the region in order to respond the humanitarian crisis in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, largely caused by the Abkhazian, South Ossetian and respectively 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. Between 1992 and 2004, humanitarian assistance provided by 
ECHO and FSP totalled €168 million in Georgia, €160 million in Azerbaijan and €171 
million in Armenia. Unlike its two neighbours, Georgia continues to receive ECHO help till 
present.
99
  
In 1999, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was brought into 
force, which was signed between Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and the European Union in 
1996. It was the first “policy” of the EU in relations with the whole post Soviet space. Here, 
I would like to mention that in 1999 Georgia became a member of the Council of Europe 
too. So, 1999 is the year of the Europe’s “real appearance” in the South Caucasus, which 
means – it took Europe eight years after the Soviet Union dissolution to start its engagement 
in the region.  
The PCA regulated relations, defined objectives and subject for cooperation as 
well as institutional mechanisms of interaction between the EU and its partners. For 
example, as Dov Lynch defines, the PCA to Armenia was 76 pages long paper, which 
contained 102 articles, 4 annexes and 1 protocol. The articles ranged from political 
dialogue, trade, business and investment issues to economic cooperation and intellectual 
property questions. Initially valid for ten years, the document set four objectives for 
cooperation: to develop closer political dialogue; to support Armenia’s democratic 
consolidation and market transition; to promote trade and investment; and to provide the 
basis for cultural, scientific, technological, legislative and other forms of cooperation. While 
the articles dealing with political dialogue called for closer ties “to resolve the region’s 
conflicts and tensions”, the heart of the PCA was economic and technical.100 Thus, the 
author is trying to give us a message that although the EU relations with the SC states were 
made stronger through implementation of the PCAs, this promotion had only economic and 
technical character. And, as we will see later this problem is existent regarding the ENP 
Action Plans too. 
The European Union is definitely a latecomer in the South Caucasus; since, by the 
time of EU landing in the area, the UN and OSCE have had already several years’ 
experience in the region not to mention Russian lasting “efforts” to settle a peace. But, even 
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after the PCA has begun to run, the EU implemented TACIS program, which was a sole 
economic instrument (non-humanitarian, financial and technical assistance) basically in 
order to help to poor CIS states. It means the EU preferred to stay in a political shadow 
regarding the South Caucasus by that time. 
Since 1999, EU funds have mainly gone to support PCA implementation. The 
TACIS National Indicative Programs (NIP) 2004-2005 prioritized support for institutional, 
legal and administrative reform and addressing the social consequences of transition and 
economic development. Between 1992 and 2004 TACIS national allocations were €111 
million in Georgia, €123 million in Azerbaijan and €99 million in Armenia. Funds from the 
European Agriculture Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF) in 1992-2004 totalled €62 
million in Georgia, €65 million in Azerbaijan and €50 million in Armenia.101 Besides, the 
European Commission within the framework of the TACIS program supported the creation 
of a filter system against drug trade from Afghanistan along the old Silk Road.  
A Communication on EU relations with the South Caucasus under the PCA of 
June 1999 identified the conflicts as the root causes of the region’s political, economic and 
humanitarian problems. In the Commission’s view, EU assistance could only be effective if 
two conditions were fulfilled: firstly, if the conflicts were settled; and secondly, if regional 
cooperation became possible. The EC also recognized that the “effectiveness of EC 
assistance is directly connected to the development of the peace processes”. However, the 
member states declared that the PCAs offered the best framework for the transformation of 
the three states. There would be no strategy, and no political role other than that offered by 
the PCA framework. As Dov Lynch puts it out – “The GAC (General Affairs Council) 
recognized that EU assistance would be ineffective without conflict settlement, but refused 
to create a framework that would actually enhance the prospects for the settlement – the 
PCAs patently not being enough for these purpose. (…) The EU had entered something of a 
vicious circle, where the correct analysis was being made but there was no political will to 
act on its conclusions.”102 
Nevertheless, in 1999, with the implementation of the PCA, the EU’s nearly non 
involvement in the South Caucasus was changed towards more active approach. EU 
activities in the region included:
103
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1. reinforced political dialogue with the three states through the PCA mechanisms, 
including also EU declarations and statements on developments in and around the region’s 
conflicts; 
2. support to the OSCE in South Ossetia, through EU funding of small-scale 
rehabilitation programmes on the ground, and the presence of the Commission as an 
observer in the Joint Control Commission (since April 2001) that runs the Russian-led 
peacekeeping operation in the conflict zone; 
3. some EU support to the rehabilitation of Azeri regions freed from Armenian 
occupation and a declared readiness to support large-scale rehabilitation in the case of a 
settlement between the two parties; 
4. support to the Georgian border guards through three Joint Actions, as well as 
assistance to the OSCE in monitoring sections of the Georgian-Russian border; 
5. support to the rehabilitation of the Inguri power complex, jointly controlled by 
Abkhazia and Georgia. 
 
Although these activities are not negligible, EU preferred to stay in a political 
shadow by not involving itself in peace negotiation processes directly. 
In early 2001, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit in the Council 
Secretariat contributed a paper that called for a major review of EU policy to the South 
Caucasus region. In the first half of 2001, the Swedish presidency set the South Caucasus as 
one of its priorities. Under this impetus, the Council’s Policy Planning and Early Warning 
Unit published its paper on 4 January 2001 and the first ministerial troika visit was made to 
the capitals of the South Caucasian states in late February 2001. In “Financial Times” on 20 
February, was published an article affirming that “the EU cannot afford to neglect the 
Southern Caucasus”, and pledging a more targeted EU political role to support conflict 
resolution. The Conclusions of the GAC of 26 February 2001 launched the first phase of a 
process which ended in July 2003 with the appointment of a Finnish Diplomat as the EU 
Special Representative to the South Caucasus. 
The GAC declared indeed that “the EU is willing to play a more active role in the 
region … and look for ways in which it can support efforts to push and resolve conflicts and 
contribute to post-conflict rehabilitation.” However, the idea of raising the level of dialogue 
with important regional actors, such as Turkey, Iran, Russia and the United States, was 
never fulfilled.
104
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The Iraqi crisis has had a negative impact on the EU-South Caucasus relations. 
Planed second ministerial troika visit to the region was postponed as a consequence of the 
United States’ attack over Iraq in 2003. However, additional rehabilitation assistance was 
secured for the region in the framework of the TACIS. 
Kidnapping of the British Banker Peter Show in Georgia, has had an additional 
negative influence on the EU policy towards the South Caucasus. Besides, the Commission 
marked out lack of progress in the political and economic transition of the three South 
Caucasian states and their implementation of the PCAs. A broad EU political role in the 
region was necessary.
105
 
Indeed in 2003, as mentioned above, the Union made a decisive step forward 
regarding the South Caucasus region appointing the EU Special Representative (EUSR). 
The post was filled in by the Finnish Ambassador Heikki Talvitie. Although, it was a clear 
change in the EU nearly non involvement towards more political presence in the South 
Caucasus, the EUSR has had no mandate to participate in the conflict negotiation processes 
directly. This underlines the EU uncertainty towards the region one more time. On the one 
hand, the Union expresses its ambitions to get political stakes in the South Caucasus; but on 
the other hand, it is too “shy” to make it happen. A detailed discussion about the EUSR and 
its mandate follows hereafter. 
Although the EU was still uncertain regarding its political role in the South 
Caucasus, financial allocations to Georgia after the Rose Revolution increased dramatically. 
As Crisis Group indicates, impressed by the reformist rhetoric of President Saakashvili’s 
new administration, the EU expressed firm political support for stability and reform in the 
country. In June 2004, the Commission pledged nearly 1 billion USD. On 2 July 2004, the 
Commission made available €4.65 million under its Rapid Reaction Mechanism for 
measures to reinforce the rule of law and democratic processes; and at the request of 
Georgian authorities the Council launched the ESDP rule of law mission to help address 
urgent challenges in the criminal justice system. The new EU projects were partly conflict 
prevention measures – efforts to solidify the revolution’s foundations and combat risks of 
destabilization. They also complemented existing TACIS programs supporting institutional, 
legal and administrative reforms.
106
 
A further fact, which has had its negative impact on EU-SC states relations, is the 
issue of the SC countries’ exclusion from the Wider Europe framework in early 2003. 
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Somewhat surprisingly, the Commission changed its mind very quickly and recommended 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to enter the newly drafted ENP in June 2004. More to that 
point, in September 2004, the President (by that time) of the European Commission 
Romano Prodi paid a ground-breaking visit to the South Caucasus. It is very interesting, 
why did change the Commission its mind so quickly and with what factors is this decision 
interconnected. I will try to examine this development below.   
The exclusion of the South Caucasus states from the Wider Europe framework and 
the later inclusion can be considered as a further hesitation of the EU. As already argued, 
incoherence is the biggest problem of the Union. Pamela Jawad declares: “As far as 
individual Member States are concerned, all in all, the South Caucasus countries have 
lacked a lobbyist among them (…) in order to catalyze a greater interest from Brussels.”107  
Different member states have different priorities. They do not have a coherent 
position regarding the South Caucasus. In the beginning, France and the UK have taken a 
critical position towards an enhanced role of the EU in the region. It was rather because of 
the fact that they, both, have taken an active role in their national policies. However, the UK 
lobbied for Georgia to be included in the ENP and even keenly advocated its EU accession 
after the Rose Revolution. This changing position of the UK has certainly much to do with 
the fact that British Petroleum (BP) had a leading position in the construction of the BTC 
and the BTE pipelines.
108
 
Some Member States have called for a stronger role of the EU in the South 
Caucasus. Among them are Germany and several Nordic states. Germany has been one of 
the most active European players in supporting the South Caucasian states ever since their 
independence in 1991. It takes actively part in multilateral organizations like OSCE 
missions; Germany supported very much the creation of the OSCE Minsk Group
109
 as well. 
It has launched a “Caucasus Initiative” in its development cooperation in April 2001, aimed 
at a better understanding between the three countries by promoting measures with a cross-
border impact in five sectors: reforming the judiciary and developing civil society 
(municipal democracy), facilitating access to credit in the private sector, securing supplies 
in the energy sector, combating tuberculosis in the health sector, and preserving 
biodiversity.  
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In development cooperation from 1992 to 2002 Germany spent a total of 540 Mio. 
€ in the South Caucasus (Armenia 180,63 Mio. €, Azerbaijan 134 Mio. € and Georgia 226 
Mio. €).110 Although it has supported the inclusion of the South Caucasus countries into the 
ENP; along with France, Germany has been least supportive in relation to the region’s 
accession in the Union. There were no overt interests put forward by the latter other than 
fostering regional cooperation and conflict resolution mechanisms. Germany also holds as 
an unrealistic perspective the aspirations of the South Caucasus countries for their 
integration into the western alliances like NATO.  
Greece, Italy, Finland and Sweden are considered, too, as having some special 
interests for the region. In the first half of 2001, the Swedish presidency of the EU called for 
increased attention to be paid to Moldova and the Southern Caucasus, but this was not 
considered as a priority by the Belgian presidency in the second half of the same year. With 
regard to Georgia, Sweden was one of the main advocates of the latter’s incorporation into 
the ENP and has undertaken to double her development assistance, while emphasizing that 
development cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan, whose “will to implement political 
reform appears to be limited (...), should again be limited in financial scope”.111 
Following Dov Lynch’s interpretation: “the South Caucasus failed to feature in the 
“Wider Europe” Communication because initial discussions in Brussels centred on the three 
states with which the EU would border after enlargement (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova). 
The other “older” neighbours were added in a “Christmas tree” approach, where member 
states added their decorations. The South Caucasus, having no internal advocate, was left 
aside”.112 
At the same time, one should not forget that a number of the EU member states 
have had developed special positions in the region by the time of denial. The Group of 
Friends of the UN Secretary General, which is set up in order to contribute peace process in 
Abkhazia, includes the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Russia. 
Besides, France holds one of the chairs of the Minsk Group together with Russia and the 
United States. Still, coordination between the EU member states as well as the member 
states and Brussels has rather been poor. Therefore, the EU itself must develop a clear 
understanding of the range of the European Community and the member state activities in 
the region. A coherent and effective EU role can only be based on a comprehensive grasp of 
European policies. Moreover, a greater degree of communication can be expected between 
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the member states and the EU. The CFSP High Representative and the EU Special 
Representative can play a bridging role in this respect. The EU will only be able to exploit 
the tool of conditionality in relations with the three states, if the Union itself is better 
coordinated and targeted. 
On the other hand, as it defined by Bruno Coppieters
113
, the exclusion of the South 
Caucasus from the Wider Europe framework should not be seen as resulting from 
geographical considerations.
114
 This choice is rather to be understood as the result of a shift 
in European attitudes to the South Caucasus in previous years. In 2003, Georgia, Azerbaijan 
and Armenia were depicted in more negative terms than in the past, owing to the failure of 
reformist policies, the widespread corruption and criminalization; the PCAs remained 
largely unfulfilled and all the fruitless attempts to reach a settlement in the numerous 
conflicts. The EU’s allocation of over a billion euro to the region for the period 1991-2000 
(not including support from individual member states or from the rest of the international 
community) did not produce the expected changes. This has prompted a negative answer to 
the question of whether or not to include the South Caucasus in the 2003 Wider Europe 
policy framework that aimed at highly complex economic and institutional reforms. From 
the perspective of the Commission, such an inclusion simply did not have a reasonable 
chance of success, nor were there sufficient grounds for it, particularly as many of the key 
objectives and incentives (with the exception of the liberalization of the four freedoms) were 
already included in the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. 
But, at the same time, we should think how this decision could affect for instance 
Georgia, which has several times underlined its high aspirations towards Europe and 
considers itself as an European country. The same is true, but to a less extend, for 
Azerbaijan and Armenia. The reform potential in Georgia and other two countries of the 
South Caucasus largely depends on the ability of external players, including the European 
Union, to support the emergence of forces favourable to reform and to provide them with 
domestic legitimacy. In such a context, the exclusion of the South Caucasus from an 
enhanced policy of European integration could have a demobilizing effect on regional 
political elites and public opinion, thereby weakening the socializing potential of the EU. 
Besides, it was not reasonable to exclude the South Caucasus from the scope of a large-scale 
EU integration project while, at the same time, the region was fully integrated into several 
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existing European and international security organizations (OSCE and CoE). Although, the 
Commission and the Council were completely right to assume that weak states such as 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan cannot realistically be expected to attain the ambitious 
objectives formulated in the Wider Europe framework in the foreseeable future, one must 
however take into account the fact that states just as weak as the South Caucasus states (e.g., 
Moldova) were included in the Wider Europe framework.
115
  
After the Rose Revolution and the enlargement 2004, decisive changes were made 
in EU-South Caucasus relations. As abovementioned, the South Caucasus states were 
included in the European Neighborhood Policy and EU political involvement in the region 
rose as do financial assistance. So, one could argue, as EU security was concerned (because 
of the enlargement) and positive developments (the Rose Revolution) were made in the 
region, the Union’s answer was a coherent and rapid action (inclusion of the SC states in the 
ENP and implementation of instruments to promote democratization processes). One could 
ask: If the South Caucasus states would fulfil all the accession requirements, would the EU 
grant them the candidate status?    
The enlargement 2004 brought new advocate states for the South Caucasus with it. 
These are Poland and the Baltic States. Poland, even before its own accession to the EU, has 
emphasized the “utmost importance” of the development and democratization of the South 
Caucasus states and initiated an “Eastern Dimension” strategy that seeks to complement the 
EU’s ENP. 
The Baltic States, which share a common background with Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
and Georgia as former members of the Soviet Union, believe they have a duty to act as 
mentors to other states aspiring to join either NATO or the EU. The Lithuania’s Prime 
Minister Algirdas Brazauskas has made a statement during his stay in Germany (May 2006) 
that the Baltic States, which are EU members already, have much experience to share with 
the countries like Ukraine, Moldova and the Southern Caucasus states. Therefore, the South 
Caucasus countries could benefit from the Baltic experience of transition and EU 
alignment.
116
  
Estonia and Lithuania have played an important role in the deployment of “Eujust 
Themis” to Georgia – the EU’s first rule of law mission in the former Soviet Union under 
the European Security and Defense Policy. Besides, Lithuania and Latvia have been active 
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in developing military ties with the three South Caucasian states, including provision of 
training assistance at the Baltic Defence College to officers from the region. 
But, notwithstanding with the fact that EU’s interests towards the South Caucasus 
region are definitely growing and it tries to play more political role in the region, the reality 
is, that, in the recently negotiated action plans little is said about the Union’s exact political 
role in the conflict resolution. As we remember, the same problem was concerning the 
appointment of EUSR. So, the European Union’s uncertainty regarding the South Caucasus 
is still valid and plays a negative role in peace building process in the region.  
So far, the UN and the OSCE have taken the lead in promoting conflict settlement. 
Yet, more than a decade of negotiations led by the UN in Abkhazia, and the OSCE in 
Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, have failed to produce negotiated settlements. 
Ceasefires have been signed, but gunfire is still exchanged. There are dozens of fatalities 
each year, including recent (summer 2008) escalations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
which grew into the broader Russia-Georgian armed confrontation.  
The resolution of the existing conflicts remains frozen, which hampers the South 
Caucasus to flourish. The potential of war is the biggest problem for Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), which is one of the preconditions for the region to prosper. The European 
Union can offer added value to the efforts of the UN and OSCE. It has at its disposal 
political and economic instruments to provide incentives and apply conditionality on 
conflicting parties if it chooses to become more directly involved in ongoing negotiations. 
“EU could assume the Caucasus peacekeeping role” declares Peter Semneby (the present 
Special Representative to the region) in his speech with Radio Free Europe.
117
 According to 
this, possible appearance of the EU in the South Caucasus as a security provider with 
mandate could be imaginable in future. But, at present, in this respect, the EU observer 
mission was launched in Georgia as a result of the Russia-Georgian crisis of the summer 
2008. 
By discussing more European Union engagement in the region, the following 
external factors are to be considered: As Dov Lynch argues – at the time of the EU 
appearance, the region was already crowded with other international actors. For instance, 
the United Nations in Abkhazia and the OSCE in South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh are 
active since beginning of the 90s. Besides, as mentioned previously, the United States 
involvement in the area has risen after the 11
th
 September incident. The South Caucasus has 
become a part of the Great War against Terror campaign. Further more, following the 2002 
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Prague Summit, NATO engagement in the region has increased as well. At last, but not at 
least, Russia’s recent (Summer 2008) aggressive behaviour in the Caucasus makes the 
situation more strained. 
All the abovementioned, make it difficult for the EU to reinforce its political role 
in the South Caucasus. On the one hand, the region is busy, but on the other hand, it seems 
to be confusing as well – while maintaining military contacts with Moscow, Yerevan has 
started to develop ties with the United States as well. Tbilisi with its tight ties with the USA 
is confusing in this respect too. 
At the same time, it is obvious that UN and OSCE are not successful concerning 
the peace building. There is no step forward in terms of conflict resolution to be mentioned 
since beginning the 90s. There is a competitive solution concerning the international actors 
in the region provided by Robin Bhatty – former World Bank Advisor Toronto: “One 
possible solution for international organisations (in the South Caucasus) might be to 
increase state capacity-building and to encourage a focus on strategic reforms planned at 
grass-roots level with observable results, clear outcomes and explicit signposts for 
measuring success. If these criteria are not met and there is no provision for penalties, 
international donors should leave.”118 
The abovementioned should be reason enough for the European Union to change 
its “shy” political approach towards more direct involvement in the conflict solving 
processes and the South Caucasus political life as a whole. But, as Dov Lynch outlines: 
“Georgia is not Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the South Caucasus is not the Western Balkans. 
For all its importance, Georgia is not a first order priority for European Security”.119 
Besides, it would be very difficult for the EU to make such a decision as the South 
Caucasian states are too under developed with weak and corrupt institutional levels. The 
existing conflicts with over a million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) make the situation 
even more tensioned. But, the truth is that the Union has to begin from a specific point and I 
would say, as quickly as possible, because this “frozen” situation makes the conflicts harder 
to solve by the time. EU needs stability in the Caucasus and the latter on its turn needs an 
urgent action. Still, there is another view provided by Dov Lynch: “There is no need for the 
EU now to join the negotiating mechanisms in either conflict. Instead, the EU should seek 
to change the logic that supports the status quo in a way that peacefully opens the path 
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towards new relations between the separatist regions and Tbilisi …”120 But, where is this 
path? Does it exist at all? I will hold a broader discussion on this topic later in the work. 
One more point to be underlined, is the fact that the South Caucasus was never 
treated by the EU as a separate region, but as a part of the former Soviet space. PCA and 
TACIS are good examples, which were implemented in the whole former Soviet area. This 
area comprises twelve states with different geographies, political and economic systems and 
prospects of development. In this respect, the ENP can be considered as a proof of a new 
category of EU thinking, where some Post Soviet countries and regions (mainly those 
located in the Western part of the former Soviet Union) became a clear EU interest.  
The ongoing process of Europeanization is a supporting instrument to the EU 
penetration in the area. The civil society, which is a direct subject to Europeanization, needs 
more support from the EU side. It is a point the Union has to orient itself on. There is a need 
of competent education and training of the civil society representatives and they have to 
participate in the processes of democratization and economic development actively. The 
International Crisis Group states in its report that in Georgia only 18% feel they have 
sufficient information about the Union to make an informed decision whether their country 
should participate in the European integration process. The Crisis Group’s report outlines 
that the process of EU integration in the region is an elite-driven process in which civil 
society barely participates. Local population often confuses the EU with the Council of 
Europe. There is a big need in increasing public awareness of EU institutions, instruments 
and values. In order to counter this problem, Brussels and local governments as well as 
NGOs urgently need to engage with society.
121
    
Education and training of the civil society is to begin in schools and Universities 
as well as in other educational establishments. Maybe it will not have a quick effect, but it 
will be fruitful in the near future and it will be continual with sustainable effect. At the same 
time, this should not be the matter only in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, but in the 
conflicting regions too. The process of Europeanization and implementation of the 
European values could serve as a good basis for the beginning of peaceful negotiations and 
civil society has to play pivotal role in it. 
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3.3 EU Aspirations of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan 
Notwithstanding with the European Union’s interests in the region, the EU 
aspirations of the South Caucasus states are different and of a great importance as well. As I 
have already mentioned, in comparison with Georgia, the EU role in Azerbaijan and 
Armenia is relatively low. The TACIS National Indicative Programs (NIPs) 2004-2006 for 
the two countries prioritize support for institutional, legal and administrative reform and 
address the social consequences of transition and economic development. For some reasons, 
projects in the politically sensitive fields of judiciary and law enforcement reform, civil 
society development and human rights were not defined as areas of cooperation.  
As the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is concerned, the NIPs stated the 
following: the Azerbaijani NIP – “EU accords very high priority to measures which can 
both a) underpin a peace settlement b) and prepare Azerbaijan to derive maximum benefit 
from the ending of the conflict”.  
The Armenian NIP – “the EU/EC shall…continue to follow 
closely…developments on the peace process… including with a view to support efforts to 
resolve the conflict as well as in post-conflict rehabilitation. Support to key infrastructure 
sectors, especially in the energy and transport sectors…. De-mining actions will also form 
an element of reconstruction programs in order to ensure restoration of normal living and 
working conditions”.  
Regarding the conflict resolution, it is obvious that the Armenian NIP is more 
precise and, simply, is more said about the issue than in the Azerbaijani NIP; but still no 
exact EU steps are discussed in terms of peace settling but sole economic post-conflict 
rehabilitation support is addressed. However, no programs to meet the abovementioned 
rehabilitation goals have yet been implemented. 
The International Crisis Group argues that Azerbaijan sees European integration as 
part of its broader regional agenda based on oil and gas resource extraction and distribution. 
A growing self-confidence based on high expectations of oil wealth encourages some elites 
to wonder – “if we have oil, do we still need Europe?” But, on the other hand, there are still 
some people within governmental as well as non governmental structures who believe that 
their country may be losing a historic opportunity to move closer to Europe along with its 
South Caucasus neighbours and risks drifting towards a Central Asian type relationship with 
Brussels instead. At the same time, civil society leaders believe that this shy approach of the 
Azeri government towards implementation of EU values and the integration in the EU 
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structures could be linked to the latter’s unwillingness to take on more human rights and 
democratization commitments.
122
  
Armenia has more economic EU aspiration than political one. It has very little and 
unclear interests in the EU integration and nearly no tendency regarding cooperation in 
security and conflict resolution issues. It could be interrelated with alleged Armenian pro 
Russian orientation; but the truth is that during the last years, Armenia was mainly 
interested in the EU help in transforming and modernizing its institutions and enhancing 
economic cooperation and trade both with Europe and its regional neighbours. It also sees 
the EU as a way to break out of its regional isolation. Armenia believes that through 
implementing institutional approximation it will move faster on integration. 
EU experts consider Armenian officials less politically motivated regarding EU 
relations than their Georgian colleagues. However, in January 2006 drafted National 
Program, which contains a reform package aiming at approximation of Armenian and EU 
legislation standards, could be considered as a great step forward. EU officials 
complimented Armenian authorities and experts for their professionalism and diligence.  
The Crisis Group evaluates Georgia’s EU aspirations as outstanding when 
compared to those of Armenia or Azerbaijan. Although, often these expectations exceed 
what Brussels is willing to do. Georgia counts on more substantial, immediate and 
politically oriented support from the EU side. Georgian “high expectations” lead sometimes 
to misunderstandings. President Saakashvili has publicly and privately shown dissatisfaction 
that the EU was unwilling to provide any direct political help towards the conflict 
resolution. Georgian officials complain that the EU’s approach is outdated, as it continues to 
provide technical experts, sending highly paid European consultants who provide no added 
value in addressing hard or soft security problems. On the contrary, EU officials express 
frustration that Georgian authorities lack the capacity and commitment to engage in 
systematic, technical and coordinated work on reforms.
123
 So, it could be argued that 
Georgians have “high expectations” but little willingness to act and do something in that 
direction. 
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If we treat Georgia’s present political situation from a global perspective, in 
particular, recent developments in Russia-Georgian relations
124
, then it would be clearer and 
easy to understand why Georgia tries to integrate itself in the EU and Trans-Atlantic 
structures within the minimum period of time. But, on the other hand, concerning the 
Georgian aspirations towards the EU, many believe that so far, Saakashvili has not paid a 
lot of attention to Europe, given his close relations with the USA. Dov Lynch puts it out in a 
different way: “President (Saakashvili) who seems more inspired by the rhetoric of 
American neo-conservative thinking than mainstream European discourse.”125 Thus, a kind 
of ambiguity can be seen on the Georgian side as well. 
Lynch sees the EU aspirations of the South Caucasus states in more negative 
terms. He argues that Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia are not demanders of an increased 
EU role as it is the case to the Western Balkans or Moldova. “The EU is seen as one more 
forum where these states may promote their own interests. Tbilisi sees the EU as another 
actor that might offset Russia’s weight in the country. Some in Baku view the EU as an 
organization that might add more weight in the Minsk Group triumvirate co-chairmanship. 
The Union is also often seen as source of financial support.”126 But, if we consider the fact 
that Georgia has received about €301.28 million from Brussels between 1992-2000 and $ 
986 million from US government through the Freedom Support Act program between 1992-
2001, one could argue that the United States is a better source of financial support than the 
European Union. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined the EU performance in the South Caucasus till 
present (2008). We have seen what the EU interests in the region are, how they derive and 
what impediments do hinder the Union’s actions. All the aspects of the EU-South Caucasus 
relations were thoroughly discussed from the PCAs to the ENP. In addition, to obtain the 
whole picture of the constellation of interests in the region, the South Caucasus states’ 
interests towards the European Union were handled separately too.  
Now, in order to get a deeper insight in the EU-South Caucasus issue, I have to 
examine the post of the EUSR to the area and the European Neighbourhood Policy, and 
their implications on the region in more detailed manner. These two relatively new EU 
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approaches to the region are of the most significant importance and deserve to be discussed 
in separate chapters respectively. 
 
4. The EU Special Representative to the South Caucasus  
In 2003, the Greek government holding the presidency supported the proposal to 
appoint an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus region. This proposal first 
was made by the German government in 2001. As Dov Lynch argues: “this was not a 
particularly easy task, given the lack of an explicit common strategy of the European Union 
for Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia (…) but on 7 July 2003 a Special Representative for 
the South Caucasus was appointed.”127 It can be interpreted that the appointment of the 
Special Representative was not good prepared, but a next decision by the EU lacking a 
precise strategy. As it appears later in the chapter, the mandate of the EU Special 
Representative is one more proof of the EU non-strategy and uncertainty towards the region. 
There have arisen several important problems concerning the post of the EUSR in 
the beginning of the appointment already. First problem was financial one. There was no 
money in EU 2003 budget for financing the post. As a consequence, Finland has accepted 
financial responsibility for the first six months period of the mandate. Here is to be said, as 
well, that a number of the member states remained unconvinced regarding the need of the 
EUSR appointment to the region. Uncertainty and inconsistency between the member states 
concerning the South Caucasus area is one of the most important challenges for the EUSR. 
Thus, he may address this problem appropriately and ensure continuity of the member 
states’ preferences. 
The post of EUSR in the South Caucasus was a quite hard and responsible office, 
as far as he has to address a host of concerns that involve interests of Russia, USA, Turkey 
and Iran; besides, the policies of international security organizations such as the OSCE and 
the UN are important in this respect. Nonetheless, his tasks were difficult to fulfil in as 
much as the three states were institutionally weak with corrupt regimes not to mention the 
overall strained economic and political situation in the region.  
Dov Lynch underlines that Brussels must define new common positions on the 
South Caucasus and also has to redefine relations between the EU member states and the 
EU institutions which are already deeply engaged in the area. This could prove to be good 
basis for a new adequate EU approach towards the Caucasus. Lynch says that the Union had 
to be ready to act swiftly and coherently in the perceived “window of opportunity” opened 
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by the elections 2003 in the three South Caucasus states. In this view, the EU was supposed 
to plan and undertake a long-term comprehensive approach to the region and its conflicts. 
But, the expectation is always much more than the reality. The role of the EUSR, as defined 
by the Greek presidency, was to provide Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia with a “sole EU 
interlocutor” on political issues. At the same time, there was a clear indication from the EC 
and the Council that the EU was willing to play more important role in the South Caucasus 
and it will need some time and patience to redefine the policy towards the region. 
The first genuine mandate for the EUSR was valid for six months including: 
“assisting the countries of the South Caucasus in carrying out political and economic 
reforms, assisting (them) in the resolution of conflicts, promoting the return of refuges and 
internally displaced persons, engaging constructively with key national actors neighbouring 
the region, supporting intra-regional co-operation and ensuring co-ordination, consistency 
and effectiveness of the EU’s action in the South Caucasus.”128 Thus, as it is to see from 
above, the SR had a sole assistant role in the conflict resolution processes with no decisive 
part to be played. 
In one of his interviews, Finnish diplomat Heikki Talvitie the first Special 
Representative to the South Caucasus, declared that the EU was interested in increasing its 
presence in the South Caucasus and did not exclude closer ties in the long term, but he 
clearly stated that the EU did not intend to significantly upgrade its ties at the present 
moment.
129
 
On the 1
st
 March 2006, Heikki Talvitie was replaced by Swedish Ambassador 
Peter Semneby. Unfortunately, this change was made without any particular success in 
conflict resolution matters achieved by Amb. Talvitie. Although, his original task regarding 
the conflict resolution - “to assist in conflict resolution” – was fulfilled, the unresolved 
conflicts were still the impediment to the economic and political development in the region. 
All in all nothing has changed.
130
 Consequently, the local authorities believe that the EUSR 
is unwilling to play a leading political role in the region and conflict resolution as a whole. 
Georgian authorities argue that in comparison with the EUSR for Moldova, his mandate is 
weak, focused more on conflict prevention rather then resolution. 
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The old mandate was strengthened in the new Joint Action at the time of the 
Semneby’s appointment; so, now he can “contribute to the settlement of conflicts and... 
facilitate the implementation of such settlement in close coordination with the United 
Nations (and) … the OSCE”. The verb change – “contribute” vs. “assist” – suggests more 
active involvement than mere support of existing mechanisms.
131
 
With his new mandate, Mr. Semneby could try to participate directly in the 
conflict resolution negotiations. This is most likely to happen in the scope of the South 
Ossetian conflict solving process as Georgia has already invited the EUSR to participate in 
the procedure. For Tbilisi, the inclusion of the EUSR in the aforementioned process would 
help in changing existing negotiation formats, which is, following the Georgian perception, 
outdated after a decade of fruitless talks. The EUSR cou1d join the JCC
132
 either as an 
observer or a full participant or even take the lead in creating a new format based on direct 
talks between Georgia, South Ossetia and perhaps Russia. Unsurprisingly, there is an 
insisting refusal concerning any abovementioned changes in the JCC from the South 
Ossetian/Russian side, which has definitely a negative influence on the peace building 
process. Mr. Semneby has stated in relation to the JCC that it is an instrument for keeping 
the conflict frozen and that he intends “to support the conflict resolution mechanisms that 
are functioning for dialogue”, and to “see what (the EU) can do to complement them”.133 As 
far as, there is no more dialogue within the JCC framework as a result of the August 2008 
confrontation, first the EUSR has to bring the conflicting parties back to the table of 
negotiations and then try to implement any of abovementioned changes.  
It is to be mentioned as well that such an openness concerning the EUSR 
participation in negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh was never shown from Armenian or 
even Azeri side. 
One more important point regarding the changes in the EUSR mandate, is the fact 
that the post of Amb. Talvitie was based in Helsinki and his visibility was limited in 
comparison to Mr. Semneby, whose post is based in Brussels. Though, by Crisis Group’s 
interpretation, it would be easier for the latter to ensure a “high degree of availability, 
creating a considerable momentum of EU impact”. Further more, there is a need for more 
coordinated activities between the EUSR and the Commission when dealing with the 
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conflict regions – “When asked where they turn when facing political problems, 
management staff for Commission projects refer to the OSCE or the UN depending on 
whether they were in South Ossetia or Abkhazia. They did not feel that the EUSR had the 
contacts, instruments or influence to address political obstacles.”134 The latter is a very 
interesting message, which is to be realized and addressed appropriately. 
 
Conclusion 
The question – What value can the EU add to conflict settlement? – remains open 
till today. Thus, the EUSR has to make a good use of the new mandate and should change 
his absence on the negotiation tables and ensure continuity of the peace talks. As the Crisis 
Group points it out, the EU should take advantage of the opportunities to implement its 
strategic vision for a peaceful and secure neighbourhood. If it fails to do so, its credibility in 
the region and generally vis-à-vis Russia and the U.S will suffer.
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5. The European Neighbourhood Policy and the South Caucasus 
The Yugoslav conflict of the 1990s outlined some of the dilemmas of a strategic 
foreign policy for the EU, combining agendas of stabilization, transformation and 
integration. The EU member states learned the harsh lessons from their initial failure and 
embarrassment in handling the Balkan crisis of the mid-1990s. By 1999, the EU reluctantly 
accepted the obligations and consequences of aspiring to be a guarantor of stability and 
prosperity in Europe and the world as a whole.  
As Hayoz argues, probably, the most apparent illustration of the fact that not all 
doubts concerning Europe’s strategic qualities have been dissipated is the staffing of the 
ENP. At first sight, the European Neighbourhood Policy might be perceived as enlargement 
“light” with some of the same instruments and mostly the same criteria. Referring back to 
the critic provided previously that the EU knows no foreign policy but enlargement, 
European Neighbourhood Policy is a new paradigm as it explicitly offers no membership 
perspective no matter how remote (but neither precludes future membership). Consequently, 
for the first time, the European Union strives to project its normative stabilizing and 
transforming power without applying its ultimate incentive – the promise of future 
membership. Nevertheless, the enlargement logic of normative conditionality is upheld. 
Assistance and incentives are slanted in favour of the more stable and more Europeanized 
neighbours. Hayoz gives an example of the Orange Revolution in Kiev, which has 
demonstrated how fragile and wavering the EU’s new strategic principle still is. Within days 
of the democratic opposition’s victory, first voices from Brussels felt compelled to 
reconsider the idea of an accession perspective for Ukraine.
136
 
At the same time, important is the heterogeneity of the group of neighbours the EU 
is dealing with. In most countries either market economy or rule of law and pluralist 
democracy is not a matter of political and public consensus. An inclination to political 
rhetoric and simulated reforms on the part of the “partner countries” and an optimistic belief 
in the power of the enlargement model without its incentives and sanctions may prove a 
fateful combination. Hayoz declares that the European Neighbourhood Policy is potentially 
a paradigm shift towards a strategic Europe; it has not become Europe’s next big project and 
lacks political commitment. Atypically for sovereignty-conscious Europe, most of the ENP 
designing has been done by the European Commission rather than by the Council. 
Consequently, the product is strong on the procedural-technical side, but much weaker on 
                                                 
136
 Hayoz Nicolas, Jesien Leszek & Van Meurs Wim – Enlarged EU, Enlarged Neighbourhood; Perspectives of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy. Bern 2005. p.14 
 81 
the political-strategic one.
137
 
Apart from some ambiguities in the criteria and objectives of European 
Neighbourhood Policy, the EU’s motives also deserve closer scrutiny. The most prominent 
motive is the realization that instability and impoverishment (migration, trafficking, 
organized crime, etc.) in Europe’s neighbourhood has direct negative implications for those 
“inside” Europe, whereas, prosperity and stability in its vicinity would per se be politically 
and economically advantageous. As the Balkan crisis in particular have demonstrated, 
human atrocities and armed or frozen conflicts in Europe’s backyard cast a shadow over the 
credibility and authority of the European Union as a regional power.  
Thus, if the EU aspires to become a regional power and the lead actor on the 
European continent, this means that the problems of non-EU Europe are the European 
problems. This chapter not only scrutinizes the implicit assumptions underlying European 
Neighbourhood Policy and identifies non-strategic constraints shaping these policies, but 
also questions the validity and workability of it towards the South Caucasus region. My 
objective is to present not only the state of affairs but also critical reflections – negative and 
positive – about the nature of the ENP in the South Caucasus and foreseeable new 
challenges to the EU in the region. At last but not at least, the ENP relations with regional 
security and conflict resolution will be discussed. The latter is very important since it is the 
topic this paper envisages to study.   
The enlarged EU has new borders with Belarus, Ukraine, Russia (as a consequence 
of the 2004 enlargement), Moldova and the Black Sea (after the 2007 enlargement). These 
new borders have brought EU a new obligation of thinking about the states on its periphery 
and the policies that should be developed in response to potential and actual threats 
emerging from these regions. One more reason why a new policy should be drafted was the 
fact that the PCA approach applied to the former Soviet republics was not good enough to 
promote EU political interests. So, the EU has started to rethink policy towards the states on 
its new borders. During the 90s and in the first years of the beginning of 21
st
 century, the 
European Union’s foreign policy was unskilled. In case the membership prospect was not 
granted to a country, the EU had nearly no other strategy for relations with the latter. In 
2003, the Commission’s “Wider Europe” Communication reflects an attempt to develop 
policies towards states where the EU has significant interests but where membership is not a 
prospect. At the same time, the latter enables the Union to act beyond its borders in order to 
promote own interests in the neighbourhood through promoting security and economic 
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development.  
Division of the member states over the Iraqi war, mentioned previously, was a bad 
proof for the CFSP, but on the other hand, the Iraqi crisis stimulated thinking on the 
development of an EU Security Strategy drafted by Mr. Javier Solana. A major point made 
in the Security Strategy is the need to have a belt of well-governed countries around the 
European Union.  
On 11 March 2003, the European Commission published its Communication 
“Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and 
Southern Neighbours”. As I already previously examined, the South Caucasus states were a 
footnote in the Communication: “Given their location, the Southern Caucasus therefore also 
falls outside the geographic scope of this initiative for the time being.” But later, in June 
2004, the three South Caucasian states, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, were rescued 
from obscurity in the draft EU Security Strategy approved at the Thessaloniki summit. The 
draft Strategy, entitled as “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, outlined the Union’s 
strategic circumstances, the variegated nature of threats facing the Union and the policies 
that must be considered in response. In the section on “Extending the Zone of Security 
around Europe”, the EU Strategy states: “We should take a stronger interest in the problems 
of the Southern Caucasus, which in due course will also be a neighbouring region.”138  
As already argued, the main objective of the ENP is to share the EU benefits with 
neighbouring countries and to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the 
enlarged EU and its neighbours. The European Union took over the duty of creating an 
enlarged area of political stability and functioning role of law. The European Union offers 
the prospect of a stake in the EU’s internal market to those countries that make concrete 
progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic 
and institutional reforms. In order to have a better overview of the ENP offered incentives 
please see the appendix 4.
139
 
As listed in the appendix 4, neighbouring countries are invited to take political and 
legislative measures to enhance economic integration and liberalization, and measures to 
promote human rights, cultural cooperation and mutual understanding. Besides, they are 
explicitly invited also to make steps towards regional security co-management and 
participate in initiatives aimed at improving conflict prevention and crisis management as 
well as strengthening co-operation to prevent and combat common security threats.  
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In order to better understand the South Caucasus region and explain the problems 
which might arise with the European Neighbourhood Policy, it is interesting to know the 
following: A few years ago Alexander Motyl (2001) identified a threefold division of post-
communist states: 1) with market-oriented democracies in East-central Europe, 2) despotic 
states in Central Asia and 3) parasitic authoritarian states in between (the South Caucasus 
region belongs to the latter). The totalitarian control on politics, economy and society that 
existed in the past, helps to explain post-communist trajectories and why it is so difficult to 
build up democracy in the Post Soviet countries. But, the case of Georgia demonstrates that 
countries can escape the “fatal attraction” of semi-authoritarianism.140 
As Dov Lynch argues – “Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” offers a new opening for a 
reinforced and more comprehensive EU strategy towards the region. The opportunity must 
not be missed.”141 It can be inferred from above that there were some definitely important 
positive shifts in the region, which have forced the EU to rethink its 2003 decision of not 
including the South Caucasus states in the framework. 
It is very important to mention that there was an obvious clash between the EU’s 
ENP and Russia’s Near Abroad concepts; this, especially, concerning Ukraine and the South 
Caucasus. During the EU-Russian summit on 25 November 2004, the discussions 
concerning Ukraine dominated the summit. “Russia wants to know where the European 
Union will stop. Does it plan to swallow up Ukraine, Belarus and the Caucasus too?” It is 
the fact that the EU and Russia openly divided on Ukraine and this has very much to do 
with the ENP.
142
 At the same time, as Pamela Jawad argues – “Russia is a more important 
strategic partner for most Member States than Georgia”.143 It might mean that the South 
Caucasus region is less interesting for the Union than Ukraine. Dov Lynch states the 
following: “The EU has no interests in conflictual relations between Georgia and Russia. 
For all the importance of Georgia, the Union and member states have no desire to be forced 
to choose between the two. (…) at the same time, EU-Georgian relations cannot be held 
hostage to the “strategic partnership” with Russia. The challenge for the EU and its member 
states is to strike a positive balance between these two imperatives.”144 If we treat this 
statement in the scope of the recent developments (armed confrontation of August 2008), 
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the Union have done everything to mediate towards peace and has been neutral in its 
activities being neither pro-Russian nor pro-Georgian. 
The biggest problem discussed concerning the substance and purposes of the ENP 
is whether the latter delivers the right incentives. Instead of providing answers/solutions to 
well defined questions/problems, it actually is more eager to conceal problems and 
supersede questions. In the EC communication the explanations start not with what the ENP 
is about, but jump into what it is not about. How exaggerated it might sound, it is true and 
supported by a lot of official statements like: “We cannot go on enlarging forever” or 
“Accession is not the only game in town”, etc. 
It can be argued that there are similarities as well as differences between the 
strategy of democracy promotion through enlargement and a strategy of democratization in 
the framework of the ENP. Both require commitment to EU values from candidate/ENP 
member countries. But, the most important difference has to do with incentives. As 
abovementioned, for political and economic reforms, the ENP offers in return increased 
political, security, economic and cultural cooperation. 
Regarding structures, the neighbourhood policy implements the same instruments 
and techniques as for the pre-accession process for the central and eastern European states. 
As already mentioned previously, in the framework of the ENP the political priorities will 
be contained in Action Plans, while for candidate countries they are contained in Accession 
Partnerships. 
So, the ENP is a framework within which specific Action Plans can be proposed, 
designed to meet the definite needs of each partner country. The general goal is to bring the 
neighbouring countries closer to the Union and its principles such as rule of law, respect to 
human rights and free market economy. Nicolas Hayoz asks the question whether the ENP 
leaves the participating countries in the EU’s backyard or the latter is the first step towards 
future integration. Because of its nature (notwithstanding with ongoing denies from the EU 
side), one might consider that the European Neighbourhood Policy as a tool for 
Europeanization is a preparatory step for future membership. By means the ENP, the EU 
leads the associated countries step by step towards the EU system of governance. It is a fact 
that the ENP is a tool of assimilation by which the EU tries to influence and, thus, stabilize 
its neighbouring countries. The EU is convinced that these countries will profit from its 
system of governance. And thus - possibly unintended - these countries are being prepared, 
on a step by step basis, for a future membership, because they become more European on 
the grounds of the system change caused by the Action Plan implementation. The author 
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says, if the ENP policies agreed upon in the Action Plans are implemented, then, these 
countries will get more European not only in their rhetoric, but in concrete and measurable 
terms; and it will be difficult for the EU to say “No” to a country that has borne the costs of 
transformation and wants membership.
145
  
According to Hayoz, the 2007 accession of Bulgaria and Romania was the 
undisputed proof for a successful Europeanization. Enlargement is one of the most 
successful and impressive political transformations on the European continent ever made. 
“The goal of accession is certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform we can think of. 
But, why should a less ambitious goal, such as, the carrot of Single Market, not have some 
effect?” Analysts have mostly expressed doubts whether there is any such “silver carrot” 
instead of the “golden carrot” – enlargement. “Everything but the institutions” sounds really 
odd. Europeanization without the carrot of accession comes somehow down to colonization 
pure. The Union has to realize that insisting on a policy – “everything but the institutions” – 
means giving up the values on which the EU itself is built. At the same time, one has to take 
into account that without a clear target, neither political elite nor the ordinary citizens can be 
mobilized for the demanding Europeanization agenda. Besides, following Hayoz’s analysis, 
if it really is the EU’s target to achieve a Europe that spans the continent, there is a need of 
an Europeanization agenda for the countries that are not integrated yet. However, this 
Europeanization agenda has to be an agenda with commitments for both sides: a 
commitment by the prospective candidate countries to an Europeanization reform agenda 
and a commitment by the EU that the end of the road will be EU membership. He argues 
that the chance to benefit from such a joint Europeanization agenda has to be granted to 
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and, I would say, to the three Caucasian republics – Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan too. It is clear that there is a long road from the commitment to 
enlargement until enlargement itself. Still, a verbal commitment to such an agenda for the 
South Caucasus, would immediately give the Action Plans and the ENP as a whole a 
different dimension.
146
 
In sum, as abovementioned, the ENP can be criticized because of many reasons: it 
is not well targeted, it is deliberately ambiguous, it is devoid of any long-term vision, it 
offers a lot of rhetoric and is the result of self concern rather than of mutual understanding. 
Taking into view that the South Caucasus states are either already well integrated with other 
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European structures such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE, or in the process of 
integration (the NATO); the new challenge for the EU is now how best to integrate these 
countries in a continent wide project looking not at the present governments, but rather at 
the ordinary citizens, who are open to the process of Europeanization and are ready to take 
over the European values. Support for granting the South Caucasus a long term European 
perspective can be expected not only from Poland but the Baltic countries and some “old” 
member states such as Sweden, Finland, Greece, etc. These countries were always in the 
post of advocate for the South Caucasus region. In case the long term EU perspective will 
be granted to the SC states, the countries and their citizens will be much more motivated to 
embark on the Europeanization agenda of the Action Plans.  
A good start for the aforementioned would be the European Union’s active 
involvement in the BSEC. This would help to promote European cooperation framework 
including Russia; at the same time, it would be a very positive step forward in favour of the 
South Caucasian countries in order to overcome the Russian economic and political 
influence. In addition, the BSEC format could be very helpful for cross-border cooperation 
in all the relevant areas of the ENP such as – energy, transport and environment.147 
Let us take a deeper look on the Action Plans, which are the primary EU tools to 
accomplish the already mentioned ENP objectives. As mentioned above, the Action Plans 
reflect an individual country needs and capacities and the latter’s interests in the EU. I will 
scrutinize the documents in relation to the conflict resolution, which is a point of the paper’s 
concern. 
 
5.1 The Action Plans and conflict resolution 
In 2005-2006, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia entered dialogues with the EU to 
prepare country-specific cross-pillar Action Plans, which were aimed at building mutual 
commitment to common values and provide a point of reference for future programming 
under the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)
148
.  
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The Action Plans were drafted on the basis of Country Reports made by the EC. 
They contained major findings/weaknesses in relevant areas. The Action Plans were 
finished in fall 2006 after a delay due to an unrelated dispute between Azerbaijan and the 
EU over Cyprus. The EU has pledged that successful fulfilment of the Action Plan can lead 
to further deve1opment of bilateral relations, including new contractual links in the form of 
European Neighbourhood Agreements. 
Following the Crisis Group evaluation – the Action Plans risk becoming sole 
technical documents, which do little to strengthen genuine political ties. Besides, the 
potential of Action Plans to promote conflict resolution has not been fully exploited. 
According to the original strategy, the ENP was to “reinforce stability and security and 
contribute to efforts at conflict resolution” and to strengthen “the EU’s contribution to 
promote the settlement of regional conflicts”. However, by reviewing the South Caucasus 
plans, there is nothing to find concerning concrete steps for conflict resolution, but the latter 
is included as one of many priorities under “political dialogue and reform”. The focus is 
made on trade relations and economic and political change. An exception is the AP of 
Moldova in which a viable solution to the Transdniestria conflict is defined as a key priority 
and seven steps are elaborated.
149
 
In its 2005 recommendations for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the 
Commission restricted its commitment to conflict resolution, stating that the Action Plans 
should offer “further support for economic rehabilitation of the conflict zones in the context 
of conflict settlement”. Indeed the commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-
Waldner in her speech in Slovenia concerning the South Caucasus has underlined the EU 
aspiration to contribute the conflict solving process in the region, but, at the same time, she 
made clear that the Union intends the abovementioned through promoting democracy and 
human rights in the South Caucasus and no direct involvement in the conflicts from the EU 
side can be discussed at this stage.
150
 As a consequence, Georgian sources expressed 
frustration that the EU was unwilling to incorporate more conflict resolution commitments 
in the action plan.  
Thus, it can be argued that the EU underlines its strong interest towards the region, 
but, does few to those ends at the same time. Maybe the Union has its own method for 
conflict resolution in the Caucasus region and applies only “soft” instruments like 
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developing the countries and the societies by implementing more European values in the 
area, hence enabling the countries to solve own problems theirselves. On the other hand, the 
EU is long enough in the South Caucasus (since the PCA start in 1999) that a product of 
being successful should be identifiable already. As far as, there is no success in terms of 
peace building in the region, the EU’s “soft” method of conflict resolution could be put in 
question. This new beginning of the EU-South Caucasus relations (introduction of the ENP) 
was, at the same time, a new hope for the area (for Georgia in particular) that this time the 
action plans would examine the conflict solving problem appropriately; but, as I have 
already mentioned, these expectations prove to be unilateral. EU puts a big value on its 
relations with Russia and will abstain to get involved in the conflicts as a political party. A 
thorough analysis of the Action Plans with respect to conflict resolution follows hereafter in 
the second part of the thesis. 
 
5.2 The South Caucasus States and the Action Plans 
As already mentioned previously, Tbilisi wants the peaceful resolution of internal 
conflicts to be the first priority in the Action Plan. Tbilisi considers integration into the 
Europe to be a key factor for resolving its conflicts and assumes that cooperation with the 
EU will be based only on respect of the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia 
within its internationally recognized borders”. It seeks EU support for implementing the 
Georgian peace plans for settlement of the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and 
would like the Action Plan to include more instruments from the ESDP toolbox promoting 
regional stability and crisis management. Georgia appreciates the economic rehabilitation 
assistance the EU provides in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but declares that this kind of 
help should be supplemented by greater political and military engagement. Thus, Tbilisi 
seeks direct EU political participation in the settlement of the conflicts, which it considers to 
be unresolved primarily because of Russian ambiguous meddling; and believes that the EU 
could exercise a positive influence on Russia to make its role more constructive.  
Besides, following the Crisis Group’s report; Georgia underlines importance of 
cooperation on justice, freedom and security in order to strengthen border and migration 
management. This issue is of a great significance for the country, because of the 
uncontrolled South Ossetian and Abkhazian regions, which is deemed to host organized 
crime. The launch of the EU Observer Mission in Georgia (October 2008), after the armed 
confrontations of August 2008, is a sign of success in this respect. 
So, the Georgian side believes that the abovementioned enhanced EU presence in 
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the country would serve as a counterweight to Moscow. One more important point to be 
underlined is the fact that Tbilisi insists the EU has to include the restoration of Georgia’s 
territorial integrity and the resolution of the conflicts on the EU-Russia cooperation agenda. 
Some European diplomats in Tbilisi doubt, however, that the EU is in a position to 
influence Russia on the South Caucasus and note that Russia is a more important strategic 
partner for most member states than Georgia.
151
 
As the International Crisis Group states, from the European Union point of view: 
The EU-Russia work on developing a Common Space of Cooperation in the Field of 
External Security, aimed at strengthening EU-Russia dialogue on matters of practical 
cooperation on crisis management in order to prepare the ground for joint initiatives in the 
settlement of regional conflicts, provides a basis for the Union to engage with Russia in 
conflict management issues in the South Caucasus. But, how the recent (August 2008) crisis 
in the region will influence the initiative is still a question. 
The Crisis Group argues that the abovementioned Georgian ambitions are too 
high. “Conflict resolution in the Action Plan is more a Georgian-wanted issue than an EU 
one. We had other priorities (. . .) “. These words belong to an EU diplomat serving in 
Tbilisi. The EU would prefer the Action Plan to address successful political and economic 
reforms in the country instead of the conflict resolution; and it proves to be true, since, by 
reviewing the AP much is told about the planed reforms, but little accent is made on dispute 
settlement. Brussels has proposed a softer approach to conflict resolution, pledging to assist 
in “enhanced efforts at confidence building” and to provide further economic assistance if 
there is progress on the disputes. The EC is mainly interested in supporting current UN and 
OSCE negotiation efforts and formats and believes its main contribution to conflict 
resolution should be assisting Georgia create a state based on European values and 
standards, which ultimately could be more attractive to South Ossetia and Abkhazia than 
independence or closer integration with Russia.
152
 After Russia has recognized the 
independence of the abovementioned regions in the end of August 2008, it will be more 
difficult for the EU to persuade Abkhazia or South Ossetia to give up the independence and 
integrate themselves back in Georgia. 
Armenia and Azerbaijan have different priorities concerning the European Union 
and Russia as compared to Georgia. Armenia sees the EU as an increasingly important 
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partner that can play a complementary role in its foreign policy and maintains separate 
relations also with Russia, U.S.A and Iran. 
To some degree like Georgia, Armenia initially used its June 2005 “Framework 
proposal for its Action Plan” to ask the EU help addressing some of the consequences of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It called for assistance in maintaining and strengthening the 
regime of ceasefire in the zone of the conflict and to work towards exclusively peaceful 
conflict settlement taking into account the right of people of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-
determination. Besides, Armenia has requested the EU to refrain from funding any regional 
projects that increase its isolation and is looking forward to Brussels to encourage Ankara to 
open the borders with Armenia seeking to normalize relations. 
Following the Crisis Group analysis, unlike Georgia, Armenia largely accepted EU 
suggestions and considers that democratic reforms, strengthening institutional capacities, 
reconstruction of economies and building strong civil societies are conducive to conflict 
resolution. Yerevan is keen to see EU assistance in variety of fields, including the 
development of transport corridors, which would enhance regional cooperation. 
The International Crisis Group argues that similarly like it was for Armenia, Azeri 
foreign policy is based on balancing the EU, Russia and the U.S political penetration. But, 
unlike Georgia, Azerbaijan has not been aggressive in trying to shape the Action Plan to its 
conflict resolution needs. It did not insisted that Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution be a 
top priority; or call on the EU to assist in finding a solution that respects its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. However it has been 
disappointed by EU unwillingness to declare dearly that Armenia occupies Azerbaijan 
territory. Point that could be interesting for Baku is the issue of withdrawal of Armenian 
forces from its territory.
153
 
Like it was in Georgian case, the Azeri Action Plan doesn’t say anything about the 
EU’s reinforced role in supporting resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or commit 
the parties to reach a negotiated settlement, but an accent is made on economic relations and 
various reforms. Here, we should remember the past Azeri denial to allow any kind of 
rehabilitation or confidence building activities in the conflict region, till the Armenian 
militaries occupying its territories around Nagorno-Karabakh withdraw.  
Only the following specific actions are indicated in the AP in order to contribute to 
the peaceful resolution of the conflict: increased diplomatic efforts; continued support for a 
peaceful solution; and increased support for the OSCE Minsk Group negotiation process. 
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Other sections refer to promoting sustained efforts for peace as well as aid for internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, but the language is even weaker than that in the 
Georgian AP. As commissioner Ferrero-Waldner indicated during her visit in the region: 
Economic integration of the South Caucasus is a necessary condition for regional stability. 
Indeed, as it appears below, the EU puts much more weight on the economic side of the AP 
as compared to other dimensions of the latter with direct relevance to conflict resolution. 
As abovementioned, the European Union abstained to get involved directly in the 
conflict resolution, but contributed to other fields which it considered to be most vital for 
the region at the moment being. As it seems, the Commission is trying to promote human 
rights and democratization processes in the South Caucasus, which would prepare 
appropriate ground for conflict resolution. Indeed, strengthening democracy, human rights, 
and rule of law, including judicial reform are set as key priorities in the Action Plans. In his 
speech in Azerbaijan in September 2004, the Commission President Romano Prodi asserted: 
“By promoting democracy, the rule of law, human rights, the market economy and conflict 
settlement, the European Neighbourhood Policy will help improve life for Azerbaijanis.”154 
This on its turn will contribute to peace promotion in the region. 
The three South Caucasian countries are asked among others to: ratify and 
implement the Optional Protocol of the UN Convention against Torture, implement 
democratic local elections, develop an independent public broadcasting service, and make 
NGO registration procedures less bureaucratic. This is common for the three states, aimed at 
supporting the new democracies. Thus, as it is to see from above, by supporting and 
developing the key indicators for a real democracy including strengthening the civil society, 
the EU is trying to promote the SC countries as states build up on democratic basis, which 
would per se open the path to conflict resolution. 
Somewhat surprisingly, as suggested by the International Crisis Group, an 
observer of the Action Plan negotiations noted that the process went better than expected. 
Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan have all generally accepted the Brussels language on 
democratization and rule of law. This statement was made by the December 2005. Now, the 
real test will be how the Action Plans are implemented, which will be better to see in the 
near future. For present, there are sound critics concerning the APs: While individual 
priorities are generally precise, those for the instruments and methods to guarantee and 
monitor the follow-up process are not. The Commission should report publicly at regular 
intervals on progress and areas needing further support. To increase public ownership, it 
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should also organize conferences, seminars, training sessions and meetings on Action Plan 
implementation with civil society, local authorities and media. All these would require 
substantial time, creativity and funding – the Crisis Group in its report 2006. 
One more point, which is important to be mentioned is the fact that participation of 
the civil society representatives in the Action Plan preparations has largely been limited to a 
small number of governmental officials. Civil society has had little or no chance to 
contribute to the process. There was nearly no involvement of local NGOs in the 
preparations. As the International Crisis Group argues – the civil society has no idea what 
the Action Plans are. In most cases, they have even no information what the European 
Union is or does. This is a huge problem in the region and must be handled adequately. First 
of all, people have to get informed in order to choose. Then, their choice can be taken into 
consideration while updating the Action Plans. In this case, the plans would be people 
oriented, which is very necessary for the region’s democratic development. The Civil 
society participation in the latter process is a point of huge importance, since a strong civil 
society can contribute much to peace  building processes in a country; and to make it 
happen, the decisive role is to be played by the local governments and the EU as a whole. 
The local NGO sector must be reinforced by information delivery, training and taking part 
in the process of negotiations on the Action Plans, which is directly linked with the region’s 
future. Enabling people to make a free and competent choice is decisive point in the South 
Caucasus at present. 
As abovementioned, public participation has been very limited in monitoring the 
process of the AP drafting not to speak about implementation of the documents. In Georgia, 
by the initiative of the government the Experts Council was created to provide public 
participation and transparency in the EU integration process. They submitted an 
“alternative” Action Plan proposal to the Commission delegation in Tbilisi and in Brussels. 
It was a tactic step from few representatives of the Georgian civil society in order to 
participate in Action Plan preparation processes. As a consequence, five representatives 
were invited to sit on the special commission set up by presidential decree to draft the 
Action Plan. Besides, NGOs were included in information sharing meetings with the State 
Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. 
To the same purpose as it was in Georgia, in February 2006, the special non-
governmental Committee (ANCEI) was created in Azerbaijan. It consisted of 39 most 
powerful actors from the civil sector, such as editors of the leading newspapers, 
businessmen, etc.  
 93 
In Armenia the coalition of around 40 NGOs started to work on the issues in early 
2005. As Alieva argues; unlike Georgia, the NGOs were not allowed even to see their 
government’s drafts or to participate in any official meetings. In February 2006, the 
Armenian foreign minister invited nine NGO representatives only to think about concrete 
activities which could be included in the plan and receive ENPI funding.
155
 
Alieva states that in all three states, the donors – Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 
Heinrich-Boell Foundation, EU, Open Society Institute – tried to promote cooperation 
between the state and non-governmental actors during negotiation process and adoption of 
the Action Plans. The degree of openness and cooperation with NGOs from the side of the 
national governments differed in the three states. The author argues that, while Georgian 
NGOs managed to deliver and discuss their vision during the common round tables with the 
EU and the government arranged by the Open Society Institute, the Azerbaijani non-
governmental Committee (ANCEI) was officially refused by the government, which 
nevertheless greeted the creation of such organization (the same case as it was for Armenia). 
The other sources report difficulties in communication with the governments during 
negotiations in all three states with relatively open attitude of the government in Georgia. 
Unfortunately, in sum, the civil society participation in the Action Plans’ 
drafting/implementation processes is to be evaluated as not successful. Alieva says that the 
most regional NGO representatives blamed Brussels for not formalizing their involvement 
in the process as the Commission officials did consult with civil society representatives only 
informally. Although, the European Parliament recommended that Azerbaijan draw civil 
society groups in order to assist with Action Plan preparation, the local government was not 
enthusiastic about including NGOs in this process. An Azeri NGO leader explained that she 
had been repeatedly denied access the information about the drafts. All in all, local NGOs 
were shut out of the whole Action Plan drafting/implementation processes. Unfortunately, 
even the Commission officials did not regularly meet with civil society representatives 
during their visits in the region.  
Consequently, concerning the abovementioned, there should be competent and 
rush actions from the EU side to prevent this; because, the lack of the civil society 
participation and consultation in those developments has a very bad impact on public 
understanding and engagement in the present EU integration process. 
At last but not at least, as Nicu Popescu recommends: The South Caucasus states 
have to learn lessons from Moldova and Ukraine as these states are few steps ahead with 
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respect to Action Plan implementation processes. In particular, Popescu states that in 
Moldova and Ukraine the civil society participation in those processes was organized at a 
high level. Besides, civil society does control the action plan implementation and makes 
recommendations to the latter.
156
 It should be indeed a good example for the South 
Caucasus countries’ governments to “learn lessons”.   
As we have seen, there is a lack of information on and civil society participation in 
European Union related issues in the whole South Caucasus region. It has a fatal character, 
especially in the rural areas, not to speak about the unrecognized entities of Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia as well as Nagorno-Karabakh. The Crisis Group argues that Action Plan discussions 
could serve as a means to build confidence with the de facto authorities rather than alienate 
them further from the countries of which the international community considers them a part. 
The EU might have “to include the societies of the non-recognised entities in Action Plan 
drafting, they should not be excluded from future ENP programs and ENPI funding 
opportunities. Supporting democratisation, human rights, and civil society development in 
the secessionist entities might be appropriately included in the Action Plans. But, these are 
not options considered seriously by Georgian or Azerbaijani central authorities.”157 
One more thing which could contribute to conflict resolution, would be regional 
cooperation, which following to Brussels’ considerations, would serve as a basis for the 
peaceful resolution of the conflicts. If we consider history of the EU, it is easy to see that 
regional cooperation made conflict impossible within the Union. The SC could follow this 
good example. Unfortunately, this approach is of little interest to any of the three South 
Caucasus states. 
Following the Crisis Group report, Armenia wants regional cooperation as a means 
to break out of its isolation, but does not consider the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to be a 
proper subject for the Action Plan. Here is an Armenian view regarding the 
abovementioned: “The Action Plan is a bilateral document; the resolution of the NK conflict 
involves other parties who are not part of its implementation”.  
On the other hand, enhanced regional cooperation is unacceptable for Azerbaijan 
until there is a lasting solution to the conflict. Although, regional cooperation might 
encourage confidence building between the sides and would have definitely a positive 
impact on the conflict resolution process, Baku seems to never change this proposition. 
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As a consequence, there has been little information exchange and coordination 
between Tbilisi, Baku and Yerevan during the Action Plan preparations. The International 
Crisis Group declares that a sort of competition has been started between the three states. 
Tbilisi generally feels that it leads because of the progress it considers it has made in 
democratization, promotion of human rights and other reforms. Yerevan believes it was 
better prepared for negotiations because of its less ambition in its demands concerning the 
Plan. Baku believes that it is the most attractive for the EU because of its energetic 
resources. 
As Georgia saw that there was a little prospective to develop the regional 
cooperation within the South Caucasus region, it has begun to promote the approach that 
regional cooperation should be developed in the Action Plan not in the South Caucasus 
context, but the Black Sea region. This was the matter after the Cyprus incident, which has 
had a negative impact on the Action Plan drafting. In particular, the Action Plan negotiation 
process was delayed for all the three states, because of the Azeri non compliance to cancel 
the official flights to Cyprus.  
Thus, Georgia has started to look forward to the Black Sea direction in order to 
promote regional cooperation. As Crisis Group states, it (Georgia) counts on the support of 
the “new friends of Georgia” group, including the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Romania and to a 
lesser extend Poland. All of these states have become lobbyists for Georgia in EU 
structures. Georgia has made a strategic choice to look outside the South Caucasus in order 
to build up a group of allies in its wider neighbourhood. Armenian president Kocharian 
stated: “No country should pay the price for the problems of others.”158 This statement 
could serve as a good justification for Georgia’s decision. 
 
Conclusion  
A continent wide EU is of course a long term vision. The Union at present might 
prefer to continue for quite some time without any new vision. The consolidation versus 
enlargement dilemma seems to have replaced the former deepening versus widening 
dilemma. But, as Hayoz argues, events like the Rose Revolution in the Caucasus and the 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine open windows of opportunity that have to be used to the 
mutual benefits on both, EU and non-EU sides.
159
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As far as security in the South Caucasus is of a great importance for the EU at 
present, the conflict resolution must be on the top of the EU political agenda to the region. 
There can be no peace in the area while the conflicts still exist. The cease fires are defined 
in time and there is still danger that the armed conflict could be renewed. We have all 
witnessed the armed escalations in August 2008, which grew into the Russia-Georgian open 
large scale war.  
As Nicu Popescu states: “It is time for the EU and countries of the South Caucasus 
to think how the secessionist entities can be connected to the ENP. This can start with the 
involvement of the secessionist entities into some ENP programmes, particularly in such 
fields as education, transport development and democratization. This will serve the conflict 
resolution processes by involving the whole South Caucasus in the broader network of 
European values, norms and standards.”160 The author condemns the fact that the 
secessionist entities in the region are excluded from the ENP, which makes the policy 
objectives of a stable neighbourhood in the region harder to achieve. He argues about the 
challenge, how to connect the secessionist entities of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-
Karabakh to the ENP process without granting them international recognition. Because, if 
these entities are not connected to the ENP, the intra-regional gap in norms, values, 
standards, legislation and degrees of reforms made, will have only an increasing character 
making the societies of the countries even more separated. This will not contribute neither 
to the settlement of the conflicts, nor to the achievement of the ENP objectives. 
From the Azeri civil society point of view, the EU failure to use Action Plans as a 
tool of direct contribution to the Armenian – Azerbaijani conflict, contradicts the latter’s 
goals in the region in the following respect: First, conflict on Nagorno-Karabakh is the 
major conflict, which divides the region in two blocks and prevents Caucasus states from 
the trilateral security cooperation in which EU shows significant interest. Secondly, it 
prevents realization of the European vision of the regional and trans-regional economic 
cooperation and transportation routs. Thirdly, it blocks democratization and reform process 
and thus European integration process. Fourthly, it leaves the “grey zones”, where the 
control over illegal trade and activities is complicated.
161
 
At last but not at least, I believe that granting the membership perspective to the 
South Caucasus countries could contribute much to conflict resolution. The accession 
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incentive could prove to be a good conflict solving instrument. The golden carrot of joining 
the EU encourages the candidates to comply with conditionality. This could be a good 
motivation for the conflicting regions in the South Caucasus too. The possible EU 
accession, which is very unrealistic for the de facto states at present, could change their 
mind towards – Example is made for Abkhazia and South Ossetia – better with Georgia and 
within the EU, than with Russia and internationally unrecognized. 
Now, I will continue with the Action Plans and other EC documents coming 
within the scope of the ENP by reviewing and analysing them with respect to conflict 
resolution for each SC country. The following detailed analysis is necessary for final 
evaluation of the ENP in conflict resolution terms, which will be provided in the last part of 
the work.  
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II) The South Caucasus Countries – ENP and Conflict Resolution 
 
In previous part, I have examined the South Caucasus in terms of main foreign 
interests and overall political and economic situation. After that, I have introduced the 
European Union as a global actor. ENP, CFSP and ESDP are scrutinized as separate articles 
in the chapter. As the last paragraph in the part I, is provided the EU performance as an 
international mediator in the South Caucasus; the programmes implemented and the results 
shown. I have examined how the EU policy towards the South Caucasus has evolved in time 
and what factors did influence it. We have seen what priorities the European Union has in the 
region and how they differ from that of the USA or Russia. Besides, I have explained what are 
weaknesses and strengths of the EU politics towards the South Caucasus and how the post of 
the Special Representative to the region could be improved.  
The biggest question in the paper is, weather the ENP is the right instrument for the 
relations with the South Caucasus and how effective could it be considered in terms of 
conflict resolution?  
As previously already mentioned, the ENP Action Plans were drafted on the basis of 
Country Reports, which were finalized by the EC in 2005. These Action Plans are political 
documents and are used to evaluate progress to be made and timetable for its achievement in 
key areas. They are negotiated between the EC and the country concerned and are drafted 
following the specific priorities, which the EU might have towards a neighbour. These range 
from commitment to democracy and rule of law to minority rights and combating terrorism. 
Other priorities include economic development, border management, transport and 
environment.  
The interesting point for us in this part of the paper is the potential of the ENP, in 
particular, the Action Plans to promote the peace building in the region. Let us give analysis 
to the EC documents (Country Reports, Country Strategy Papers, National Indicative 
Programmes, and Action Plans) and hold detailed discussions for the three South Caucasian 
states country by country and see how effective can they be considered in terms of conflict 
resolution.  
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1. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan
162
 – ENP and Conflict Resolution 
Country Reports 
In the Country Reports for Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, which were finalized 
in 2005, the European Commission reports on political, economic and social situation in the 
states. The reports begin with an assessment of bilateral relations between the EU and the 
South Caucasian countries. They reflect progress under the Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreement, and describe the current situation in areas of particular interest for this 
partnership: Democracy and the rule of law; human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
territorial and other conflicts/disputes; justice and home affairs; etc.  
The Country Report for Georgia is 31 pages long document from which 2 pages 
report on territorial disputes. In the paragraph 2.4, Abkhazian and South Ossetian cases are 
presented separately. It begins with the Abkhaz conflict having following structure: Short 
history of the dispute; international mediators involved and conflict settlement efforts made; 
Russia and its behaviour in Abkhazia deserves special attention in the paragraph stating that 
the latter has had a crucial impact on the developments in the region and Georgia as a whole. 
It is followed by a breath overview of the programs and other actions taken by the EU in order 
to promote peace in Abkhazia. 
The South Ossetian case is presented with the similar structure. Thus, the Country 
Report is a descriptive document and lays out the country data in specific areas of EU 
interests. 
The Country Report for Armenia is 29 pages altogether and only a half page is 
dedicated to the topic of territorial conflicts, while more than half of the document refers to 
Economic and Social Situation in Armenia. This might be the first note to the fact that the 
Union’s involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is really miserable as compared to 
Abkhazia or South Ossetia.  
In the beginning of the report on territorial dispute, a short historical overview of the 
conflict is provided. Afterwards, it is mentioned that, since 1992, the OSCE has been the 
primary forum for mediation efforts led by the Minsk Group (co-chaired by Russia, the US 
and France as already mentioned previously). There are only couple of words said in the 
paragraph regarding the EU contribution to peace building in Nagorno-Karabakh: “The 
European Union, including through the EU Special Representative to Southern Caucasus, 
continues to provide strong political support to the mediation efforts of the OSCE Minsk 
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Group.”163 This is one more proof for the abovementioned statement that the EU is far from 
direct engagement in the conflict being political or economic, but its contribution to peace 
building is restricted to providing support to the OSCE Minsk Group mediation efforts. 
However, it is not specified, what kind of “strong political support” is meant in the 
announcement above. 
In the Azeri Country Report, statement concerning the territorial conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh is made in the paragraph 2.4. As it was for Armenia, this report begins 
with a short historical overview of the conflict. Then, information about the OSCE (the OSCE 
Minsk Group) efforts to settle peace is presented. The report says that the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani foreign ministers meet regularly in the context of the so-called Prague Process in 
order to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Besides, it is said in the report that the 
presidents Robert Kocharian and Ilham Aliev had a long bilateral discussion in the margins of 
the September 2004 CIS Summit held in Astana (Kazakhstan). However, no agreement was 
reached so far towards the peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Minsk 
Group co-chairs (Russia, USA and France) are continuing to assist the parties in their 
dialogue. 
At the same time, the paragraph states that “as a consequence of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan is very reluctant to engage in any co-operation with Armenia, 
either on a bilateral basis or within the framework of international organizations.”164 Indeed, 
international society’s involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is restricted because of 
Azerbaijan’s denial to allow any kind of assistance to the region till the Armenian forces 
withdraw from the occupied territories around the conflict area. This fact hinders the EU’s 
active engagement in the dispute too. As mentioned above, the European Union’s 
involvement in the region is limited to providing support to the mediation efforts of the OSCE 
Minsk Group; and as the report says: the EU Special Representative to Southern Caucasus has 
to play a decisive role in this process as well.
165
 
In the end of the paragraph, the dispute over border demarcation of the Caspian See 
is outlined. I will not get in closer touch with the latter topic as far as it falls outside the 
paper’s concern. 
 
                                                 
163
 Commission of the European Communities – Commission Staff working paper; Annex to: “European 
Neighbourhood Policy” Country Report Armenia. COM(2005) 72 final. p.11 
164
 Commission of the European Communities – Commission Staff working paper; Annex to: “European 
Neighbourhood Policy” Country Report Azerbaijan. COM(2005) 72 final. p.11 
165
 Commission of the European Communities – Commission Staff working paper; Annex to: “European 
Neighbourhood Policy” Country Report Azerbaijan. COM(2005) 72 final. p.11 
 101 
Country Strategy Papers 
On the basis of the Country Reports described above – Country Strategy Papers, 
National Indicative Programmes and the Action Plans were made for Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. 
The Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Georgia amounts 44 pages and covers EC 
financial assistance to the country for the period 2007-2013. It is stated in the paper that EC 
assistance over the period covered by this CSP will mostly focus on supporting Georgia in 
fulfilling its commitments under the ENP AP and contributing to the attainment of the MDGs. 
Priorities for EC assistance under the CSP have been broadly based on the seven headings of 
the EC-Georgia ENP AP. These seven headings will be discussed later in the following 
chapter. 
The Country Strategy Paper provides a comprehensive overview of future EC 
assistance priorities encompassing all EC Financial instruments and programmes; including 
eight priority areas: Rule of law; improvement of business climate; economic development 
and poverty reduction; cooperation on JLS
166
 and border management; regional cooperation; 
resolution of internal conflicts; cooperation on foreign and security policy; Transport and 
energy. 
The document starts with overall external policy goals of the EU and goes to 
strategic objectives of the EC cooperation with Georgia. These Objectives are:
167
  
 
1) A mutually beneficial partnership promoting Georgia’s transition to a 
fully fledged democracy and market economy. 
2) Implementing the ENP and the EU-Georgian ENP Action Plan. 
3) Security Challenges. 
4) Security and diversification of energy supply 
5) Development policy objectives 
 
The strategic objective number 3 is the most interesting for the paper, since few 
words are said about the territorial disputes in Georgia: “ (…) the EU attaches great 
importance to the resolution of conflicts in Georgia’s two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia and is actively involved in ongoing efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement, 
partly through the offices of the EUSR for the Southern Caucasus and through providing 
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financial assistance for reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in Georgia’s conflict zones. 
The EU is also assisting Georgia in improving its border management capacity with a view to 
increasing security at Georgia’s external borders.”168 So, in this message the EU gives short 
but clear description how and with what means it contributes to peace building and what 
character has its engagement in Georgia. 
The Country Strategy Paper Armenia says: “The principal objective of EU-Armenia 
cooperation at this stage is to develop an increasingly close relationship between the EU and 
Armenia, going beyond past levels of cooperation to a deepening of political cooperation and 
accompanied by continued economic growth and continued results in poverty reduction;”169 
whereas, no word is mentioned in connection to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As 
previously indicated the EU involvement in the latter conflict is close to not existent as 
compared to that in Abkhazia or Tskhinvali region. That is why the Country Strategy Paper 
for Armenia doesn’t say anything regarding the issue.  
The EU assistance to Armenia over the five years period will be provided under the 
ENPI (this is true for Georgia and Azerbaijan too) and will help to achieve the policy 
objectives mentioned above. Funding levels for the country are currently estimated at € 98,4 
million for 5 years period. Besides, Armenia will benefit from allocations under the ENPI 
regional programme and CBC
170
 thematic and nuclear programmes. In addition, in the scope 
of the EU’s strategic external relations objective, policy coherence needs to be ensured 
between all available instruments in dealing with Armenia. Thus, right “policy mix” is to be 
determined. 
In the paragraph 2.2 of the document, strategic objectives of the European Union 
cooperation with Armenia are outlined. With regard to peace building, the only interesting 
point in the whole paragraph is the statement presented under the title Security Challenges: 
“the EU aims to stabilise the whole Southern Caucasus region and attaches great importance 
to the peaceful resolution of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. It is actively involved in 
ongoing efforts to achieve a settlement, amongst other things through the good offices of the 
EU’s Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus.”171 Although, the statement above 
indicates that the EU is actively involved in ongoing efforts to achieve peace, it has no depth 
as no detailed description of the EUSR endeavours towards the conflict resolution is provided. 
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“Amongst other things” is very imprecise expression too. We will have to deal with this 
problem later as well while discussing the Georgian matter; but, in Armenian and Azeri cases 
this problem exists at a greater extend as the European Union’s contribution to conflict 
resolution process in Nagorno-Karabakh is soundly slighter than it is for Abkhazia or 
Tskhinvali region. 
The next paragraph of the CSP presents the Armenian policy agenda. Here, the 
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is presented separately; but somewhat surprisingly this part 
of the paragraph consists of only three lines stating that: “Finding a peaceful solution to the 
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is always described a key priority of the Armenian 
government despite present difficulties in reaching agreement with Azerbaijan on a 
framework for peace settlement.”172 This is the same problem mentioned above, but from 
Armenian perspective this time. There is no definition provided of the programmes and/or 
efforts the Armenian government has designed/brought up, or is going to do so, in order to 
contribute to peace building. Should the words above mean that no specific steps are taken by 
Armenians to reach the settlement? As it is obvious at this stage, neither Armenian nor Azeri 
side shows eagerness to resolve the conflict, but they prefer to maintain the status quo and 
look forward for the international organizations, in particular the OSCE Minsk Group, to help 
in achievement of a consensus which would be acceptable for the both sides. What is it as 
such? Does such consensus exist? These questions are really interesting, but as they go 
beyond the problem raised in the paper, I will hold no discussion on this topic. 
The paragraph 4 in the CSP states that in February and June 2006 a breakthrough for 
a peace agreement was expected at the last meetings between President Kocharian and his 
Azerbaijani colleague Aliyev in Rambouillet and respectively Bucharest. Unfortunately, no 
compromise was met on those occasions and triggered some disappointment in the 
international community. Then, in early October 2006, Foreign Ministers of both countries 
started to meet again following an interruption for several months. Thus, as the CSP outlines, 
there were some attempts from the conflicting sides to hold negotiations for peaceful 
resolution of the conflict, but unfortunately, with no success so far. At the same time, the 
paragraph says that the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and closed borders with Turkey and 
Azerbaijan hinder Armenia’s development considerably; and much of the country’s future 
overall progress will therefore depend on successful conflict settlement, and, on the 
normalization of relations with neighbours. It is underlined simultaneously that the Armenian 
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foreign policy agenda is clearly dominated by the NK conflict and peaceful conflict settlement 
as a whole; however, no specifications are provided this time again. 
In the end of the Paragraph 4, perspectives of the EU-Armenian bilateral relations 
are outlined. Here, the Action Plan is mentioned to be unique opportunity for Armenia to 
transform itself into a more modern and democratic country. The paragraph states that there is 
a genuine progress made by Armenia in carrying out internal reforms; though, coming closer 
to European standards; and this is a good sign for relations between the EU and Armenia that 
they will become deeper and stronger. At the same time, it is stated that, if the settlement of 
the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh still would take place soon, this would give further 
development of these relations an additional boost.
173
 Thus, the development of EU-Armenian 
relations is evaluated very positively by the European Commission, where a prompt resolution 
of the conflict would simply “give further development an additional boost”. I believe, if the 
EU really wants to resolve the conflict in the region, it must be more demanding in Armenian 
government’s endeavours to settle a peace and should set the extended efforts in conflict 
settlement by the government of Armenia as a precondition for the broader EU-Armenian 
bilateral relations, which would definitely help to speed up the process of peaceful resolution 
of the dispute. 
As it was for Georgia and Armenia, the Country Strategy Paper Azerbaijan covers 
the period of 2007-2013. It is stated in the paper that in recent years Azerbaijan was slow in 
pursuing an “evolutionary” reform strategy to develop democracy and a market; thus, much 
remains to be done in the coming years. At the same time, the EU sees itself as an accelerator 
of this process in the country and declares that principal objective of cooperation with 
Azerbaijan is “to develop an increasingly close relationship, going beyond past levels of 
cooperation to gradual economic integration and deeper political cooperation.”174 The EC 
declares that the assistance over 5 years period, covered by the strategy, will therefore aim at 
supporting Azerbaijan’s reform agenda on the basis of the policy objectives defined in the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement entered into force in June 1999 and the EU-
Azerbaijan ENP Action Plan of November 2006. The latter will be analysed below. 
Somewhat surprisingly, in the National Indicative Programme (NIP) for 2007-2010 
(detailed analysis of the latter will be provided hereafter) the abovementioned assistance is 
translated into supporting the following three priority areas: 1) Democratic development and 
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good governance; 2) Socio-economic reform and fight against poverty and administrative 
capacity building; 3) Support for legislative and economic reforms in the transport, energy 
and environment sectors. Thereby, no word is said about the conflict resolution issue, without 
which none of the priorities above could come true.  
Besides, it is said in the CSP that the document “has been developed in close 
consultation with the Azerbaijani authorities and fully reflects national priorities”.175 Does it 
mean that the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict does not fit to the Azeri 
national priorities? As we remember, this problem was existent in the Armenian case too. 
Further more, the paper says that “member states, other donors and civil society organizations 
were consulted during the drafting process”.176 Allegedly, there was a very poor 
communication with Azeri civil society while drafting the AP; more detailed information 
about the issue was already provided in the work previously.  
The primary objective of the European Union as a global actor is poverty reduction, 
with the complementary aims of promoting good governance and greater respect for human 
rights in a bid to ensure the stability and security of the countries in the regional context. At 
the same time, it emphasises the need for a differentiated approach depending on the context 
and the particular needs of individual states. Thus, as it is mentioned previously, it is of the 
utmost importance for the EU to define the right “policy mix”. This means that, in the light of 
the EU’s strategic objectives in external relations, policy coherence needs to be ensured 
between all available instruments when dealing with a country. This strategy of the Union will 
help Azerbaijan to achieve the Millennium Development Goals as it was in Georgian case. 
In the paragraph 1.2, the strategic objectives of the EU cooperation with Azerbaijan 
are defined. These objectives are:
177
 
 
1. A mutually beneficial partnership promoting Azerbaijan’s transition 
2. Implementing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU-Azerbaijan 
ENP Action Plan 
3. Security challenges 
4. Development policy objectives 
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The objective number three is relevant for the paper as it comes within the scope of 
conflict resolution issue. It is declared in the paragraph that the EU aims at stabilizing the 
whole Southern Caucasus region by supporting the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict; and “should a peace deal be struck and actively implemented within the 
lifespan of the present CSP, several basic assumptions of the strategy might change quite 
radically and, consequently, the EC’s approach to assistance should be updated.” Thus, like it 
was for Armenia, the EC expresses its readiness to change and update the present strategy and 
assistance, when positive changes are made towards peace building and implementation of the 
EC priorities. 
This keenness from the EU side to speed up and change its relations towards deeper 
engagement with its neighbours in the South Caucasus is common for Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. This eagerness is to be evaluated very positively, as it might motivate the 
countries to enhance efforts in order to promote democracy and rule of law as well as to settle 
a peace. As already mentioned, the Nagorno-Karabakh case has more frozen character as 
compared to Abkhazia or South Ossetia. This is true because, due to already known 
restrictions, space for the international society including the European Union to move freely 
and contribute to peaceful resolution of the conflict is really small. So, it is time for 
Azerbaijan and Armenia to find a common language on that issue and let the Union to help 
the region through diverse programmes at its disposal. Nevertheless, referring back to the EU 
statement provided above, more detailed information about – how and in what extend is the 
EU going to change the strategy and update its assistance – would help to make the countries 
more confident in their EU orientation and would contribute to their motivation to make 
decisive changes. 
In the paragraph 2, an outline of the Azeri policy agenda is made. In particular, the 
title – Cooperation for the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – is 
dedicated to the Azeri-Armenian territorial dispute. In the document the EC expresses its 
strong commitment to support a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and is 
going to contribute this process through the means available. This involves, amongst others, 
continuing support for civil society and promotion of democratic values as well as respect for 
human rights in the country. 
At the same time, the Union declares that if the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is settled 
within the timeframe of the present CSP, the EC will provide further specific assistance to 
help consolidate the settlement, including the reconstruction and rehabilitation of conflict 
area; return to conflict area of Azerbaijani IDPs and refugees; and elimination of the 
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excessive accumulation of conventional weapons such as SALW and ERW. In addition, the 
Union suggests that under the appropriate financial instrument, support for confidence 
building initiatives could be set up as well. Thus, the EC underlines its readiness one more 
time to grant the abovementioned assistance, providing that the conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh will be settled within the timeframe of the CSP. 
Now, let us treat the same matter from Azeri perspective this time. While reviewing 
the external policy of Azerbaijan towards the EU, the following priorities are outlined: 
“Azerbaijan intends to pursue its policy of integration with the EU through the 
implementation of the PCA and the ENP Action Plan. Enhanced energy relations between the 
EU and Azerbaijan will play an important role in this context.”178 Thus, the conflict resolution 
issue is totally missing, whilst underlining importance of cooperation in energy matters. 
However, the title – Cooperation with Russia – suggests: “Azerbaijan recognises that good 
bilateral relations with Russia are important, and that Russia is a key neighbour with strong 
political, economic and social interests in Azerbaijan. Russia also remains an influential 
player as regards the protracted conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, including the one with 
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.”179 What could it mean? Is Russia a better mediator for 
Azerbaijan than the EU? Thus, one can conclude that Russia’s influence over the South 
Caucasus is still great and the latter remains as a major external force in the region; at least for 
Azerbaijan. 
Interesting is that only Georgia of the three South Caucasian states, has an anti-
Russian policy and tries to replace the latter’s influence in the region with the western one. 
Neither Armenia
180
 nor Azerbaijan has been as strict against Russian aggression as Georgia. It 
is a dilemma which needs a suitable answer. Georgia, while looking to the west, counts on the 
western help to resolve the conflicts and is trying to minimize the Russian influence in the 
country. Armenia, while underling its pro-western orientation, is maintaining intensive 
relation with Russia too; and Azerbaijan, while counting on its energetic resources, tries to 
have good relations with Russia as well as with the European Union and the USA. And the 
European Union itself, while underlining its commitment to peace building and security in the 
region, declares that Russia is more strategic partner for her than the South Caucasus states. 
Thus, it is a “big game” and in defining the rules to the game important role play the 
following factors: energetic resources, regional security and territories of influence; and each 
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turn in the “game”, depends on specific developments concerning the factors above. Here, we 
should remember the following statement one more time: “Interests of the actors are 
originated from their political imaginations” (Ernst Haas 2001). 
Let us come back to the point of the paper and continue with the CSPs by further 
analysing the EU-South Caucasus states relations with respect to peace building. 
The paragraph 3 of the CSP Georgia, gives a breath overview of the country’s 
internal and then external policies, which is followed by presentation of the political, 
economic and social situation. Afterwards, an overview of the past and ongoing EC assistance 
to Georgia is provided. It begins with the EC assistance to the country in 1991-2005. All the 
programs and budgets are presented which were fledged to the country during the period. 
Hereafter, under the title “Key lessons learnt for the new programming cycle”, analysis is 
given to the degree of success of the past programmes. Thus, weaknesses are identified and 
alternative ways to avoid the past disadvantages are discussed. 
The Paragraph 5 of the document “EC response strategy” is a kind of answer to all 
challenges (identified weaknesses) presented in the first part of the paper. Thus, as it appears 
below, main objectives of the EU towards Georgia based on the challenges identified in the 
country are: 
 support PCA implementation; 
 support the achievement of the ENP AP’s objectives; 
 contribute to the achievement of the MDGs for Georgia; 
 be compatible with available EC resources (i.e. for instance exclude capital-
intensive investments); 
 allow concentration of limited EC resources on a reduced number of key 
priorities; 
 facilitate as much as possible the transition from technical assistance to 
budgetary support; 
 where appropriate, be complementary with other donors’ and IFIs’ 
interventions. 
 
These objectives are followed by the key priorities of the EU assistance to Georgia: 
1) Political dialogue and reform; 2) Cooperation for the settlement of Georgia’s internal 
conflicts; 3) Cooperation on justice, freedom and security; 4) Economic and social reform, 
poverty reduction and sustainable development; 5) Trade-related issues, market and 
regulatory reforms; 6) Cooperation in specific sectors: transport, energy, environment, 
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information society and media, R&D; 7) People-to-people contacts. These priorities are 
presented in the AP as well and are the same to the seven chapter headings of the document 
mentioned previously. These assistance priorities apply to all EC assistance instruments and 
programmes which will or might be available for the country. 
Priority number 2, which gives an explanation to the EU’s commitment to resolve 
the territorial conflicts, points out the EC’s will to support the peaceful resolution of the 
Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts on the basis of Georgia’s territorial integrity. In order to 
complement the EUSR’s political activities, the Commission continues its support for 
rehabilitation and reconstruction in conflict zones as a means of improving the climate of 
confidence between the parties to the conflict and provides help in improving the living 
conditions of the effected populations and of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Further 
more, the EC identifies areas of its possible future engagement: Depending on developments 
regarding the peace processes in the two conflicts, further EU assistance could be considered 
in support of all aspects of conflict settlement and settlement consolidation including the 
elimination of the excessive accumulation of conventional weapons such as illicit SALW 
(small arms and light weapons) and ERW (explosive remnants of war). As we remember this 
kind of statement was made by Azeri case too, but the voice of the EC was even weaker as 
compared to this one. So, as it appears and is argued in previous part of the work, in the field 
of conflict resolution the EU sees itself more as an economic actor than political one. We will 
have a broader discussion on this topic later while analysing the Action Plans. 
Interesting is as well, means and instruments via which the EU tries to promote its 
priorities in Georgia. As it is mentioned already, from 2007 onwards, EC assistance will be 
provided through a set of new instruments. ENPI will be the principal new tool for providing 
assistance to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Certain measures, in particular, in the areas of 
conflict prevention and crisis management and resolution may also be supported by the 
Stability Instrument.  
Technical Assistance, which was the predominant tool for the EC’s aid to the South 
Caucasus and was negatively evaluated as mentioned in the previous part, was replaced by the 
abovementioned new instrument. Following the Commission’s statement, ENPI will 
substantially increase flexibility. Other types of assistance such as: twinning, TAIEX, 
budgetary support, including in the context of sector-wide approaches (SWAPs), 
infrastructure and equipment funding, will be available and used wherever appropriate. 
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Here are the instruments which will be made available to Georgia under the present 
CSP:
181
 
 ENPI national allocation for Georgia 
Priority Area 1: Support for democratic development, the rule of law and governance 
             Sub-priority 1.1: Democracy, human rights, civil society development 
             Sub-priority 1.2: Rule of law and judicial reform 
             Sub-priority 1.3: Good governance, public finance reform and administrative capacity 
                                         building 
Priority Area 2: Support for economic development and ENP AP implementation; 
             Sub-priority 2.1: Promoting external trade and improving the investment climate; 
             Sub-priority 2.2: Supporting PCA/ENP AP implementation and regulatory reforms 
             Sub-Priority 2.3: Education, including vocational education, science, and people-to 
                                         people contacts/exchanges 
Priority Area 3: Support for poverty reduction and social reforms 
             Sub-priority 3.1: Strengthening social reforms in health and social protection 
             Sub-priority 3.2: Rural and regional development 
Priority Area 4: Support for peaceful settlement of Georgia’s internal conflicts. 
 ENPI Eastern trans-national/regional programme 
 ENPI Inter Regional programme 
 ENPI cross-border cooperation (CBC)/Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Programmes (NPP) 
 ENPI thematic programmes 
 Stability Instrument 
 EIDHR II Instrument 
 Participation of Georgia in Community programmes 
 
From these instruments, only the first and sixth one (ENPI national allocation for 
Georgia and Stability Instrument) come in touch with conflict resolution topic. As it appears 
above, the first instrument – ENPI national allocation for Georgia has four priority areas with 
eight sub-priorities. Whereas, “Support for peaceful settlement of Georgia’s internal 
conflicts” is outlined as the last priority; it has no sub-priorities and informs us poorly about 
its content and goal.  
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Stability Instrument says definitely more about the conflict resolution and is more 
precise at the same time. The main goal of the Stability Instrument is to provide an effective, 
timely, flexible and integrated response to crises, emerging crises or continued political 
instability. “In the case of Georgia, this is particularly relevant to the conflicts in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, which continue to call into question Georgia’s territorial integrity and 
challenge Georgia’s security. (…) Future support for the implementation of peace plans for 
the resolution of Georgia’s conflicts may be provided under the Stability Instrument. Equally 
important for Georgia may be measures to address the effects on the civilian population of 
anti-personnel mines, unexploded ordnance ammunition, surplus firearms or other explosive 
devices.”182 But, simultaneously, as the text concerns the future support for implementation of 
peace plans for the resolution of Georgia’s conflicts, no exact actions are provided, but only 
the prospect of such support under the instrument is meant. 
In the end of the CSP, annex 3 figures out the total EC grants to Georgia 1992-2006. 
During this period, the country has received the amount of € 505.2 million through diverse 
programs and instruments.
183
 TACIS is the most valuable in terms of money spent, since only 
through this instrument the EU has granted Georgia € 129 m. The second biggest program is 
ECHO; through the latter Georgia was granted € 102.2 m. 
Rehabilitation program in the conflict zones amounts € 23m. It is approximately 1/5 
as compared to TACIS. At the same time, one has to take into the view that the economic 
rehabilitation in Abkhazia has started only in 1997 (South Ossetia – 1998), whereas TACIS 
and ECHO programs there presented already in 1992. The fact is one more proof that the EU 
is definitely a “new comer” in Georgia as the conflict regions are regarded. To confirm this 
statement, we have to take a look at the grants pledged through CFSP, which together with 
RRM amounts € 9m.184 The CFSP was introduced in Georgia after six years as cease fire was 
agreed. Under the latter instrument together with OSCE only joint actions were taken to equip 
and support Georgian border guards in order to prevent spill over of the Chechen conflict into 
the country in 2000-2001.  
Notwithstanding the EU’s late engagement in the conflict zones, the EC is the 
largest donor in the regions, having allocated € 25 million of assistance to Abkhazia and 
almost € 8 million to South Ossetia since 1997. As I have already mentioned, the Union is 
trying to contribute to peace building mostly through economic measures. The EC 
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rehabilitation project in Georgia is aimed at supporting comprehensive programmes of social 
and economic rehabilitation in the conflict areas of South Ossetia (€ 7.5 million since 1997) 
and Abkhazia (€ 2 million since 2005). In order to continue rehabilitation activities in the 
regions in 2004-2006, a further allocation of € 4 million has been pledged. In addition, the EC 
has granted € 9.5 million to Georgia for urgent repairs at the Enguri Hydro Power Plant 
(HPP). Following the Commission declaration in the CSP – “the rehabilitation programmes 
served to raise the profile of the EU significantly in the confidence building process. The 
Enguri project has also demonstrated that economic rehabilitation can be effective in bringing 
the two parties closer.”185 But, at the same time, the recent war in August 2008, has shown 
how fragile could be this kind of contribution, if the conflicts are not resolved and potential of 
war still exists.  
In order to maximize the added value, the rehabilitation programme has been 
complemented by a mix of policy instruments including humanitarian assistance, 
decentralized cooperation and EIDHR projects. Besides, the Delegation and ECHO have put 
great emphasis on ensuring a coherent policy to link relief to rehabilitation and development 
(LRRD) for the region using various instruments available. It is stated in the paper that this 
approach should be continued (as it was indeed) under the ENPI and upcoming thematic 
programmes from 2007 onwards. 
To have a short overview of other EU programs and instruments and the actions 
taken from 1992 to 2006 not falling under the topic of conflict resolution please see the 
appendix 6 (pp. 186-187). 
As mentioned above, besides the economic rehabilitation, the EC has taken several 
actions under CFSP in order to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the Abkhaz and 
Ossetian conflicts. As it is outlined in the annex 6 of the Country Strategy Paper, financing 
the EUSR post to the South Caucasus comes within the CFSP scope. We have already seen in 
the first part of the thesis that the new EUSR has a prerogative to “contribute” instead to 
“assist” to peaceful settlement of the conflicts. The EC is aware of the fact that this changing 
in the EUSR’s mandate is really a progressive step forward towards more political 
engagement of the EU in the conflicting regions; still no exact steps are designed to illustrate 
how the EUSR is going to contribute to the peace building process.  
The annex 6 says also that the EU is contributing to the South Ossetia JCC work, 
where it has an observer status. Unfortunately, there is no further description in what way and 
with what means does the EC contribute to the latter; but if we judge from the perspective that 
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an observer has no right to get involved in the negotiations directly, but only to take part in 
the organization of the commission meetings, insure a constructive dialogue and take over the 
fact finding mission, it will be clear that no decisive part in the piece building from the 
political perspective can be played by the EU on that occasion. On the other hand, the 
observer role in the commission is quite normal for the Union and suits perfectly to the EU’s 
political imaginations and willingness to be involved in the Georgian conflicts. Further more, 
the European Union is no party to the conflict and observer status is rightly suitable in this 
case. But, sometimes Georgian officials irritated from the fact that Russia, officially mediator, 
acts as a party to the conflict, want the EU to get more political stakes in order to attain 
equilibrium. Unfortunately, after the armed confrontation between Russia and Georgia, 
followed by the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent by Russia in 
August 2008, there are no peace talks existent at all. 
It is stated in the CSP that under the ENP Action Plan the EU has committed itself to 
contributing further to confidence building and economic assistance aiming at progress in the 
peace settlement process. Furthermore, the EC together with OSCE continues to support the 
reform of Georgian boarder guards and Georgian border management system under CFSP.
186
 
Thus, as already mentioned the EC has identified the fields and methods of contribution in its 
documents and follows this direction strictly very much. Any change in this direction should 
be a product of a positive development in EU-Georgian relations. 
The Annex 7 of the CSP is titled as “MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) for 
Georgia”. There are eight key goals to be achieved in the foreseeable future187. Unfortunately, 
none of these goals include the topic of conflict resolution. It is clear that there is not possible 
to make any estimation regarding the issue, nevertheless peace in Georgia has to come within 
the scope of MDGs, since no real development exists without political stability. 
So, as we have seen, the conflict resolution issue has its certain place in the Country 
Strategy Paper for Georgia, but has less priority as compared to rule of law mission or 
transport and energy, which deserve more attention from the Union. 
The paragraph 5 of the Armenian Country Strategy Paper provides us with an 
overview of past and ongoing EC assistance to the country. In Armenian case as compared to 
previous (Georgian) one, this assistance has nothing to do with the conflict resolution topic; 
therefore I will not go into the depth of the latter. To take a look of this assistance, please see 
the Appendix 8 provided in the end of the work (pp.189-190). 
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Like it was for Georgia, the presentation of the past and ongoing programmes is 
followed by the title Key lessons learnt for the new programming cycle. Here, an evaluation 
of the assistance under the Tacis programme is provided with the perspective that weaknesses 
found must be taken into view for the new programming cycle. This evaluation has no 
relevance to the paper, since, this time too, nothing is said regarding the peace building in the 
country. 
Afterwards, while discussing Coordination and complementarity with other donors, 
the abovementioned cooperation of the EU with the OSCE Minsk Group is totally missing, 
but the activities of the Union are presented with the perspective of reforms made and further 
economic development: “The EC is currently active in all the above mentioned areas with 
specific emphasis on institutional and economic reform, including on regulatory issues. Under 
the new strategy, EC assistance will additionally and in particular focus on governance issues. 
The EC will also substantially increase its assistance to target more directly poverty reduction 
and economic growth in particular at regional and local community level, including social 
services and education.”188 This fact underlines the truth that neither economic nor political 
contribution is made by the European Union towards Nagorno-Karabakh directly. 
In the annex 5 of the CSP Armenia, it is stated that efforts towards peaceful 
settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh play an important role in the context of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and the settlement process has recently entered a new 
phase with greater EU involvement through the services of the EUSR. Furthermore, the EC 
says that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict hinders economic development in the region and 
suggests: „Depending on developments regarding a peace deal, the EC could provide further 
specific assistance related to aspects of peaceful conflict settlement and settlement 
consolidation.” However, neither “important role” and “new phase” nor “services of the 
EUSR” and “further specific assistance” are specified in the text. Thus, reader gets no 
competent information but pure message stating that the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh 
comes within the CFSP scope of interests and greater involvement of the EU in the region is 
foreseen. All in all, after reviewing the annex 5, one has nearly no understanding of what will 
be done (what exact actions will be taken) under CFSP in Armenia and how the latter is going 
to be improved. 
The paragraph 6 of the document is a sort of response to the weaknesses and 
problems found during the past years. It is an EC response strategy, which should tackle the 
evaluated problems in the country in a new, more sufficient way. The Commission declares 
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that the principal objective of EU-Armenian cooperation at present stage is to develop an 
increasingly close relationship with the country going beyond past levels of cooperation 
towards deeper political collaboration and gradual economic integration. Quite the same as we 
have met it while reviewing the Georgian paper. 
In this respect the European Union has estimated eight priority areas also provided 
in the Action Plan. These assistance priorities apply in principle to all assistance instruments 
and programmes which will or might be available for Armenia. They are:
189
 
 
 Strengthening of democratic structures, of the rule of law; 
 Strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
 Encourage further economic development, enhance poverty reduction efforts and 
social cohesion; 
 Further improvement of investment climate and strengthening of private sector led 
growth; 
 Further convergence of economic legislation and administrative practices; 
 Development of an energy strategy, including an early decommissioning of the 
Medzamor Nuclear Power Plant; 
 Contribute to a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 
 Enhanced efforts in the field of regional cooperation. 
 
The priority number seven – Contribute to a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict – is interesting in our case. It is said that the EC will continue its 
engagement in support of a peaceful settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh; this 
statement is followed by a short explanation what “the EC engagement” in this case could 
mean: “this involves in the first place supporting efforts of the EUSR and the OSCE Minsk 
Group, but also to encourage people to people contacts, to actively involve civil society in 
peaceful conflict solution efforts and to support humanitarian and de-mining initiatives. (…) 
Under the appropriate financial instrument, the EC could also provide support for confidence-
building initiatives in the South Caucasus region.” Thus, this statement has much more 
substance than those met previously, since there is a kind of explanation provided regarding 
the EC engagement in the region. 
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In order to fulfil the priorities, the Union has a new set of instruments and means via 
which the cooperation between the EU and its neighbours, in particular, between the EU and 
Armenia should become successful. As already mentioned, ENPI will be the principal new 
tool for providing assistance to the SC states. At the same time, certain measures in the area of 
conflict prevention and crisis management may also be supported under Stability Instrument. 
The CSP states that Armenia will also receive support for participation in 
Community programmes, agencies and networks, insofar as these will be opened to the 
country. In general, importance that cooperation with Armenia provides appropriate support 
to fulfil commitments under the ENP Action Plan is underlined. Thus, the Union is convinced 
that the new instrument will be more successful and will increase flexibility. At the same 
time, the Commission expresses its keenness to open the gate of Community programmes to 
Armenia depending on the degree in meeting the Action Plan commitments by the latter. 
The title – ENPI national allocation Armenia – states that assistance provided under 
the ENPI for Armenia will focus on the following priority areas which have been selected on 
the basis of joint EU- Armenia policy objectives. They are: 
190
 
 
Priority Area 1: Support for Democratic Structures and Good Governance 
Priority Area 2: Support for Regulatory Reform and Administrative Capacity Building 
Priority Area 3: Support for Poverty Reduction Efforts 
 
Interesting is that neither of these priorities contain the conflict resolution issue. 
Does it mean that the peaceful settlement of the conflict is less important than the three 
priorities above? This fact has certainly to do with the Azeri denial to allow any kind of EU 
activities in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, till the Armenian militaries withdraw from the 
Azeri territory around the area; but, this problem on its turn needs a prompt and concise action 
in order to push the conflict resolution process forward which seems to be frozen at present. 
Afterwards, in the document the statement already known to us is provided: 
“depending on developments regarding the settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, 
the EC would provide specific assistance related to all aspects of peaceful conflict settlement 
and settlement consolidation.” This announcement is provided several times in the CSP 
document, which, I believe, could mean that the European Commission wishes to express its 
readiness and willingness regarding providing assistance to the Nagorno-Karabakh region as 
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it is in Abkhazian and South Ossetian cases; now it is up to Armenia and Azerbaijan to let the 
latter come true. 
As I have already outlined, besides the ENPI, there is a Stability Instrument via 
which certain measures in the area of conflict prevention and resolution will be provided. 
Besides its genuine goal of providing an effective, timely, flexible and integrated response to 
crises, emerging crises or continued political instability, the latter covers the area of non-
proliferation of technologies and expertise related to weapons of mass destruction. In the case 
of Armenia, this instrument has a special importance with regard to the conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh. At the same time, it is said in the document that “new efforts are 
currently being made to peacefully settle this conflict, but there is little hope that this might 
actually happen in the near future.”191 It is really interesting, what is actually meant under 
“new efforts being made” and/or why is the Commission so hopeless regarding the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict in the near future? 
Afterwards, the EC suggests: “in case of a peaceful conflict settlement, support, 
especially for the needed rehabilitation and reconstruction, could be provided under this 
instrument.” Thus, as mentioned already, the EU is ready to provide help to the region and is 
currently waiting for positive developments, which would allow the EC to start the assistance. 
As it was for Armenia, the Azeri CSP provides us with an overview of the past and 
ongoing EC assistance; the latter is outlined in the paragraph 4. Because of the well known 
grounds, this assistance too has no relevance to conflict resolution issue; Therefore, this time 
again, I will not discuss it in the paper. To have a brief overview of it, please see the appendix 
9 in the end of the work (p. 191). 
After presentation of the assistance, the Commission discusses on key lessons learnt 
for the new programming cycle. This time I will give more information about the issue, in 
order to better understand the EU priorities in the country. It is stated in the paragraph that the 
Commission has launched the evaluation of the Tacis programme in the end of 2004 and has 
made the following recommendations:
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 Increasing relevance to the context of the partner countries 
 Moving to a programme-based approach 
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 Diversifying the programme approach to improve the response to individual country 
needs 
 Improving the effectiveness and sustainability of sectoral intervention 
 Improving project/programme quality assurance tools. 
 
The evaluation suggests that during the first few years, the Tacis programme was 
mainly governed by a “top-down” approach. This was partly a consequence of the need for 
institution building in the countries in transition, and partly an insufficient sense of ownership 
on the part of the national authorities. It is said in the evaluation that National Indicative 
Programmes (NIPs) tended to be over detailed, which meant they were not flexible enough at 
project identification level to respond to evolving needs. The main recommendations were 
integrated into the current 2004-2006 National Indicative Programme, which will be analysed 
hereafter. 
As a result of the evaluations and then recommendations made, the EC will focus in 
this new programming exercise on defining strategic priorities and objectives rather than 
specific activities or delivery mechanisms. National authorities are being involved in this 
process from the very beginning and have shown a greater level of commitment and 
ownership as a result of the clearer political framework provided by the ENP. It is stated that 
the EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan adopted on 14 November 2006 goes along these lines. Thus, 
“future assistance will build on the substantial work carried out to date but aim to increase the 
impact by making future assistance more integrated and coherent.”193 
As we can see, these evaluations and recommendations are made mainly to the Tacis 
programme and the NIP, which, unfortunately, have nothing to do with conflict resolution. I 
have provided the evaluations and recommendations just for an example in order to see that 
the Union tries to learn from mistakes done and updates its programmes and instruments in 
order to achieve more progress. Thus, if we imagine that the European Union will be allowed 
to contribute to the peace building in the Nagorno-Karabakh region with direct engagement, I 
am optimistic that this involvement will be successful. 
Complementarity and coordination with other donors is deemed to be decisive by the 
EC in order to achieve progress and success in the region. As we have already met while 
reviewing Armenian CSP, the Union together with other donors is active in the areas relating 
to governance, economic reform and development, as well as social reform and protection. 
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Under the abovementioned new strategy, EC assistance will continue to focus strongly on 
governance-related issues and the regulatory aspects of economic reform. Support for 
infrastructure development in close collaboration with the EIB, EBRD and other IFIs will be 
increased further. Besides, the paper states that the Commission attends regular coordination 
meetings with other donors, including on this future strategy, as far as, the government-led 
donor coordination is weak in the country. Further more, the following evaluation is made in 
the document: “The added value of EC assistance stems clearly from: (1) the level and 
ambition of the political objectives to be achieved through EC funding, as enshrined in the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and in the ENP Action Plan; (2) the possibility of the 
EC operating in several sectors at the same time (unlike most other donors), with beneficial 
cross-fertilisation between economic, social and political initiatives supported by the EC; (3) 
the experience accumulated by the EC in Azerbaijan since the country’s independence.”194 
Simultaneously, it is to be mentioned that, while reviewing the EU cooperation with other 
donors, no word is said concerning the EU collaboration with the OSCE, in particular, with 
the OSCE Minsk Group; and, the conflict resolution topic is totally missing. As we 
remember, the same matter occurred in Armenian case too. Although, the EU cooperation in 
peace building matters might be less developed than that in other fields; I believe, providing 
the details of this cooperation has an utmost importance, since, the resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict is a precondition for Azerbaijan’s peaceful development. 
Consistency of the EC cooperation policy with other core policies of the latter plays 
an important role as already mentioned. A good “policy mix” is to be assured between the 
CFSP, border management and migration, trade, energy, transport and other related policies 
towards the region. CFSP is interesting for us in this case as it deals with the conflict 
resolution issue. The paper states that through CFSP the EU has been gradually increasing its 
involvement in international efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict since the 
appointment of the EUSR to the South Caucasus.
195
 But, as it was the matter many times 
already, no details are provided concerning the European Union’s “increasing involvement” 
and “international efforts”. It is very decisive to provide such kind of information, since, 
reader, who is really interested in this topic and wants to get a deeper understanding of the EU 
contribution to conflict resolution, needs to know details regarding the means taken by the 
Union to this end. 
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Further more, through CFSP the EC has been providing financial support to address 
the Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL) problem in the context of its Mine Actions and will 
probably extend its activities once the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is settled. Other problems 
to be addressed under this instrument are the small arms and light weapons and Soviet rocket 
fuel deposits. Thus, as outlined above, there are number of issues addressed or to be addressed 
via CFSP. However, there is a potential of dealing with much more problems under this 
instrument in the area. Unfortunately, as it is mentioned in the text above, the conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh is slowing down this opportunity, which needs a prompt and adequate 
response. So, Azerbaijan and Armenia really have to find a common language concerning the 
EU direct contribution to conflict resolution as soon as possible.  
The lessons learnt during the past years’ inefficient performance are followed by the 
EC response strategy, which we have met already while analysing Georgia and Armenia. This 
response strategy has to be a kind of remedy to the past weaknesses found out by the Union. 
As I have already mentioned, the principal objective of the EU-Azeri cooperation at this stage 
is to develop an increasingly close relationship, going beyond past levels of economic and 
political cooperation. This includes cooperation on energy, foreign and security policy. Thus, 
the EC assistance over the period covered by this strategy will be mainly concentrated on the 
following areas: development of democracy and the market economy in the country, ensuring 
an efficient management of oil and gas revenues, etc. In addition, the following statement is 
made in the text: “the EU has the leverage necessary to make a tangible contribution to the 
reform process.”196 It is really worrisome that due to already known restrictions, the European 
Union can not include the Nagorno-Karabakh region in its assistance programme. 
In conformity with the EC response strategy, the EC assistance priorities are defined 
in the CSP. They have been identified on the basis of the policy objectives defined in the EU-
Azeri Action Plan and apply to all assistance instruments and programmes, which will or 
might be available for the country:
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 Political dialogue and reform 
 Economic and social reform, poverty reduction and sustainable development 
 Trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform 
 Cooperation in the field of Justice, Freedom and Security 
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 Energy, transport, environment, information society and media 
 People-to-people contacts 
 
From the Assistance priorities above, only the first and the last one come in touch 
with conflict resolution topic. The first assistance priority states: In terms of enhanced 
cooperation on foreign and security policy, particular attention will be paid to conflict 
prevention and crisis management with a particular focus on Azerbaijan’s role in settling the 
protracted conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Besides, much attention will be 
paid to issues relating to WMD non-proliferation and disarmament, including conventional 
disarmament and landmines. 
The last assistance priority touches the peace building issue through people-to-
people contacts; in particular, the paper says that further development of people-to-people 
contacts at the regional level will be an important means of triggering confidence building, 
and thus contributing to the peaceful settlement of the protracted conflict. 
As we see, conflict resolution is a definite priority for the Commission. More to the 
point, the Union underlines the importance of Azerbaijan’s role in finding a peaceful solution. 
At the same time, the Commission itself makes efforts to contribute to peace in the region 
through the abovementioned activities under CFSP and confidence building. 
In the paragraph 5.3, the instruments and means are defined via which the 
implementation of the EC assistance will happen. These are ENPI and Stability Instrument, 
which I have already examined several times previously. The Commission expresses its 
confidence that the introduction of these new external assistance instruments will substantially 
increase flexibility. Besides, the document outlines that new cooperation tools like Twinning 
or TAIEX will play an essential role in achieving the priority objectives set out in the Action 
Plan
198
. They will be available and used whenever appropriate. For instance, Twinning and 
TAIEX will run under the current Tacis programmes and help the Azeri national authorities to 
prepare coherent sectoral strategies.  
Assistance under the ENPI national allocation for Azerbaijan will focus on the 
following three priority areas, which have been selected on the basis of joint EU-Azerbaijan 
policy objectives, and lessons learnt from previous assistance; complementarity with other 
donors is respected also:
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Priority Area 1: Support for Democratic Development and Good Governance; 
Priority Area 2: Support for socio-economic reform (with emphasis on regulatory 
approximation with the EU acquis), fight against poverty and administrative capacity 
building; 
Priority Area 3: Support for legislative and economic reforms in the transport, energy and 
environment sectors. 
 
This time too, the conflict resolution topic is missing. As it was the matter while 
analysing Armenia, the already known statement to us is provided in the document: 
“Depending on developments regarding the peaceful settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh, the EC will provide specific assistance related to all aspects of conflict settlement 
and settlement consolidation.” This is a huge problem and needs an urgent and competent 
answer from Azeri/Armenian as well as EU sides as argued previously. 
As already known, the Stability Instrument partly touches the conflict resolution 
topic too. As we remember, the main goal of the latter is to provide an effective, timely, 
flexible and integrated response to crises, emerging crises or continued political instability. 
Thus, in the case of Azerbaijan, the Stability Instrument will have a huge relevance to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as the dispute continues to call into question Azerbaijan’s 
territorial integrity and challenges its security. Besides, the instrument will deal with effects 
on the civilian population of anti-personnel mines, unexploded ordnance or other explosive 
devices. 
All in all, while reviewing the document, in comparison with other assistance 
priorities for the Commission, like – support for Democratic Development and Good 
Governance; support for socio-economic reform; fight against poverty, or support to 
transport, energy and environment sectors; etc – little is said about the EU contribution to 
peace building. This has much to do with the fact that the Union has a really limited space to 
act in the conflict region. At the same time, the Union has manifold underlined its enthusiasm 
to “provide specific assistance related to all aspects of conflict settlement and settlement 
consolidation”. Thus, as I have mentioned, it is now up to Azerbaijan and Armenia including 
support from international society (in particular the OSCE Minsk Group) to push the 
negotiations forward, towards a peaceful settlement. At the same time, as far as international 
society was not successful so far to fulfil the goal, it is important to find other more efficient 
ways to reach the point within the scope of a peaceful framework. In this regard, a more 
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demanding voice from the European Union in order to get engaged in the conflict resolution 
process directly could prove to be effective. 
Now, let me continue with analysing the National Indicative Programmes for the 
three South Caucasian states and see how this documents deal with the conflict settlement 
issue. 
 
National Indicative Programmes 
The National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) cover the period of 2007-2010 and 
define in greater details the focus of operations under the national allocation of the new 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). They are intended as a guide to 
planning and project identification during the four-years programming period and set out a 
limited number of priority areas together with the objectives and results to be achieved. 
The National Indicative Programme for Georgia provides us with the information 
about the EC assistance for the first four years of the CSP focused on four priority areas. 
These priorities are the same which we have already touched above while presenting the 
ENPI national allocation to Georgia. As mentioned, “Support for peaceful settlement of 
Georgia’s internal conflicts” is the fourth one among other priorities. 
The total four years’ estimated budget for these four priorities amounts € 120.4 
million. The paper says: this allocation may be increased through allocations under a new 
“Governance Facility”, which will reward those ENP countries which show the best 
performance in relation to governance issues.
200
 Interesting is that only 16% of the total sum 
is pledged to the fourth priority – conflict resolution. At the same time, it is to be mentioned 
that 16% means already greater attention as compared to the amount of money spent during 
the past years; but, yet the Commission shows an ambition to get more political stakes in the 
Georgian conflict resolution process, it definitely has to handle the issue more precisely and 
constructively in its documents with substantial budget. The recent (August 2008) war in 
Georgia has shown that the EU strategy to deal with the conflicts in the country could be put 
under question; thus, conflict resolution must be the priority and has to deserve more attention 
on the EU’s political agenda. There is no economic prosperity without political one. It means 
that first the conflicts are to be solved, which would make suitable ground for country’s 
economic development and not vice versa. Political instability, which can grow into gun fire 
any time, can blow up all the efforts and work of the international players provided to the 
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conflicting regions for so many years. Exactly this was the matter during the abovementioned 
Russia-Georgian war in the beginning of August 08. 
If we go deeper in the National Indicative Programme, we will find out that these 
four priority areas are described in more details than it was in the CSP. The structure is the 
following: a) Long term impact; b) Specific objectives; c) Expected results; d) Indicators of 
achievement. 
In the paragraph 7 – “Support for peaceful settlement of Georgia’s internal conflicts” 
– contribution to end the frozen conflicts in the country is identified as long term impact. To 
make the latter come true, the following specific objectives are planned: support EU 
involvement in the peaceful settlement of the conflicts in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali 
Region/South Ossetia; the EC contribution to rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in the 
regions. Through this action the expected results are estimated: Defusing existing tensions and 
mistrust between the parties and improving living standards in conflict areas; preventing new 
outbreaks of violence. At last, the following indicators of achievement are provided: Creating 
an environment conducive to a final settlement of the conflicts (Long term impact level); 
implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction projects; contribution to the functioning 
of conflict-settlement mechanisms and implementation of peace plans (Specific objectives 
level). 
In order to assure a smooth implementation of the programme, there is identified a 
specific strategy in the NIP. It is stated that the main guiding principle underlying the 
implementation of this programme is a close partnership with Georgia’s authorities in order to 
achieve joint policy objectives. Relevant Georgian stakeholders should be included to the 
greatest possible extent in the design of operations, thus emphasising even further a clear link 
that must be formed between joint policy objectives and assistance cooperation. A sector 
support approach, in combination with other forms of EC assistance, should be encouraged 
wherever the necessary conditions are met and wherever this can lead to greater efficiency in 
achieving the CSP/NIP’s objectives. At the same time, coordination and complementarity 
with other donors should be sought. Thus, it can be interpreted that the EU cooperates very 
closely with Georgian officials in all fields covered by the programme. The Union’s 
neighbourhood instrument is very flexible and can be changed or amended any time in order 
to achieve effectiveness. Therefore, regarding the conflict resolution, the EC present strategy 
can be changed any time as well, if internal and external developments would allow or require 
such action. 
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In the end of the NIP, there is a paragraph “Risks and assumptions,” which starts 
with the following assumption: there is a continuous commitment to the reform agenda and 
policy objectives in the jointly agreed EU-Georgia Action Plan and the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement. Should this assumption no longer hold true, as a result of major 
policy changes on the part of Georgian, the priorities under this Indicative Programme and the 
underlying Country Strategy Paper might have to be subject to an early review. At that stage, 
it was agreed that the future EC assistance strategy had to be based on jointly agreed policy 
objectives while selecting a limited number of priority areas where EC financial assistance 
could be expected to have most impact. The abovementioned is one more proof for the 
statement above that the EU is always ready to review the documents, respectively, change or 
amend the paragraphs. Decisive in this respect is a good EU-Georgian cooperation and 
partnership, as well as the country’s success in implementing the European values and basic 
freedoms accompanied by a smooth Europeanization process as a whole. 
It is obvious from above that the EU is playing certain role (be small or big) in the 
process of conflict resolution and uses means, which it considers to be the most appropriate 
for Georgia for given time and situation. Thus, the EU has no intention to play any kind of 
decisive political role in peace building unilaterally as some Georgian authorities expect it 
from the Union. But, at the same time, it is obvious as well that the EU’s sole economic 
engagement in the conflict regions is changing towards more political one. However, I 
believe, that the political steps which might be taken by the EU in conjunction with Abkhazia 
or South Ossetia will be the subject to negotiations with Russia, since the Commission has 
many times underlined the fact that Russia is more strategic partner for the EU than any 
country in the South Caucasus region. Simultaneously, the statement that the Union is 
intended to more political engagement in the Georgia’s conflicts is true and can be justified 
with the EU monitoring mission in the country, which was launched in October 2008 as a 
result of the Russia-Georgian armed confrontation. 
As compared to the NIP Georgia, the National Indicative Programme Armenia – has 
little to do with conflict resolution. Assistance provided under this programme should focus 
on the three priority areas which I have outlined already while analysing the CSP. These 
priorities have nothing to do with the conflict settlement issue. Therefore, I will not discuss 
and go deeper into the three priorities as they fall outside the problem arisen in the paper. 
However, it is to be mentioned that there are the same words said in the NIP concerning the 
conflict resolution, which we have met many times in the CSP previously: “depending on 
developments regarding the peaceful settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the 
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EC will be ready to provide specific assistance related to all aspects of conflict settlement and 
settlement consolidation.” So, as I have argued, the Union has no free space to act in the 
region, but depends on specific developments concerning the peace building. There arises a 
question: What factors did influence and encourage the fact that the European Union is absent 
politically as well as economically in Nagorno-Karabakh region? On the one hand, as I 
mentioned it, Azeri government does not allow any kind of EU assistance to the region till 
their territories around the Karabakh are left by the Armenian troops. But, on the other hand, 
as the Union is actively involved in economic rehabilitation and confidence building 
processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, I think, the same strategy in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
case would help a lot to melt the ice and push the negotiations forward towards a peaceful 
settlement; but, obviously the parties to the conflict have other priorities and do not consider 
the EU economic or political assistance as decisive. 
In the end of the NIP, it is declared that any changes in EU-Armenian bilateral 
relations may cause an early review of the document. Thus, it is not late for Armenia to get 
back to the table of negotiations with Azerbaijan and hold talks on the possible EU direct 
involvement in rehabilitation and confidence building processes in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
region. 
As it was in Georgian and Armenian cases, the Azeri NIP also is focused on the 
three priority areas, which I have already provided above while analysing the CSP. These 
priorities are presented in greater details including sub-priorities and are analyzed respecting 
the three dimensions: 1) long-term impact; 2) specific objectives; 3) expected results. Unlike 
Georgia and Armenia, the EC underlines strategic importance of Azerbaijan in the energy 
sector and declares the country as a key strategic partner for the EU, both as a producer and 
transit country.  
Financial resources available for Azerbaijan under the National Indicative 
Programme for 2007-2010 are estimated at €92 million.201 As we know, none of the 
abovementioned priorities include the conflict resolution topic; however, this time again, as it 
was the case in the Armenian NIP, the same words are said concerning the conflict settlement: 
“depending on developments regarding the peaceful settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh, the EC will be ready to provide specific assistance related to all aspects of conflict 
settlement and settlement consolidation.” Thus, as we see, in the Azeri NIP the Union 
underlines again its enthusiastic attitude towards a possible engagement in the conflict with 
special programmes and instruments, provided that there are positive developments in peace 
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negotiations between the conflicting parties, which would allow the EC to pledge its 
assistance to Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Like it was for Georgia, in the end of the document, under the title – Risks and 
assumptions – it is said that the paper will be updated and reviewed depending on specific 
developments regarding the implementation process of the defined priorities; actually, this 
statement is common for the three NIPs, but, this time I have provided the latter in order to 
express hope that still everything is open; thus, there still remains possibility of updating the 
EC documents through including the conflict resolution issue in the EU-Azeri common 
priorities (this is true for Georgia and Armenia as well). Unfortunately, so far, there are no 
such developments to be observed in the bilateral relations. 
In order to assure successful performance, the Commission underlines its keenness 
towards harmonization and coordination with member states and other donors stating that “in 
the spirit of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, attention will need to be paid in the 
period ahead to closer donor coordination, particularly in the context of preparing and 
implementing sector-wide support programmes.”202 The consistence problem between the 
member states I have already examined in the first part of the work. Here, it would be worth 
to mention one more time that the Union will be in a position to put an added value in the 
South Caucasus, when it acts in a common and precise way including the coordination with 
other donors. 
In the end, one can conclude that the EU is engaged via various instruments and 
programs in Azerbaijan, promoting democracy, market economy, human rights, etc. 
Unfortunately, the EC can not contribute to peace building directly without Azeri-Armenian 
common consent. However, I believe that implementation of the European values in 
Azerbaijan and Armenia through different types of actions, provided in the priority areas 
previously, will have their effect regarding the peace settlement issue too; these means that 
Europeanized Azeri and Armenian societies (including government officials) might get in a 
position to negotiate, thus, get back to the negotiation table. The latter on its turn, will help to 
push the two conflicting parties forward towards a favourable end e.g. peaceful resolution of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
Now, I will continue with analysis of the EC Action Plans, which were agreed 
formally by the EU and the SC countries on 14 November 2006. 
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1.1 The Action Plans 
In previous chapter I have examined the Country Reports, the Country Strategy 
Papers and the National Indicative Programmes with respect to peace building. This 
Paragraph gives analysis to the Action Plans with the same regard, which outlines the 
strategic objectives of the SC states and the EU cooperation for five years period. 
As I have mentioned already, the European Neighbourhood Policy sets ambitious 
objectives based on commitments to shared values and effective implementation of political, 
economic and institutional reforms. Following the EC paper: Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan are invited to enter into intensified political, security, economic and cultural 
relations with the EU, where the enhanced regional and cross border cooperation and shared 
responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict resolution is envisaged. At the same time, it 
is stated in the documents that the level of ambition of the relationship will depend on the 
degree of the countries’ commitment to common values as well as on their capacity to 
implement jointly agreed priorities in compliance with international and European norms and 
principles. 
After the submission of the Country Reports by the Commission in March 2005, 
which included the recommendation to start negotiations for drawing up the Action Plans, the 
drafting process of the documents in consultation with the presidency and the High 
Representative and in close cooperation with Georgian, Armenian and Azeri authorities was 
launched. After some delays, which I have mentioned already in previous part of the work, 
the Action Plans were brought into force as they were endorsed by the EU-Georgian 
(respectively Armenian and Azerbaijani) Cooperation Council on 14
th
 November 2006. The 
Commission declares that a successful implementation of the documents will help fulfil the 
provisions in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and will contribute to an 
increasingly close relationship of the EU with the SC countries, involving a significant degree 
of economic integration and a deepening political co-operation. As mentioned in the paper, 
implementation of the Action Plans will significantly advance the approximation of local 
legislation, norms and standards to those of the European Union, encouraging and supporting 
the countries’ objective of further integration into European economic and social structures. 
The Action Plans point out that the EU Special Representative for the South 
Caucasus will assist the relevant bodies in the implementation of these documents in 
accordance with his mandate. Thus, the success of implementation of the EC papers partly 
depends on the EUSR’s good assistance and right professional suggestions. Unfortunately, 
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there is no further information about the way and extend this “assistance” will take place; 
thereby no word is said about the conflict resolution topic too. 
The EU will support the Government of Armenia in establishing an European 
Information Centre in Yerevan in order to raise public awareness about the Union and will 
provide its assistance in drafting a Government Communication Strategy on European 
Integration. This is a very good initiative aimed at strengthening the Armenian civil society as 
well as the government. This kind of activities in all the three SC states will contribute 
soundly to the process of Europeanization and the latter on its turn will promote peace 
building in the region. 
The AP for Georgia starts with 14 new partnership perspectives opened by the ENP. 
To have an overview of these perspectives please see the appendix 11 in the end of the work 
(pp.193-194). 
In the perspective number three, the EU expresses its readiness to continue “strong 
EU commitment to support the settlement of Georgia’s internal conflicts, drawing on the 
instruments at the EU’s disposal, and in close consultation with the UN and OSCE. The EU is 
ready to consider ways to strengthen further its engagement.” Thus, as the statement above 
outlines, the Union does not express its commitment to resolution of Georgia’s conflicts, but 
she shows willingness to check ways and methods of its deeper involvement in the conflict 
resolution in cooperation with the UN and OSCE; at the same time, as mentioned previously, 
these developments depend on the degree of Georgia’s success in the Action Plan 
implementation. 
The perspective five envisages “increased possibilities for closer co-operation in the 
area of foreign and security policy, including European Security and Defence Policy, in 
particular, on the issues of regional stability and crisis management.” As already outlined in 
the paper, stability in the South Caucasus is of the utmost importance for the European Union, 
especially after the enlargement 2007. So, the Commission expresses its keenness to 
cooperate intensively in the field of stability and crisis management by means of the CFSP 
and ESDP. As we remember, the first action under CFSP was taken in 2000-2001 as support 
was provided to Georgian boarder guards. But, it was just a starting point and now, the EU is 
ready to review and intensify its relations with the country under this instrument. The 
deployment of 200 EU observers in the Georgia’s conflicting regions was a good proof of it. 
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The partnership perspectives in the Action Plan are followed by the priorities for 
action. There are eight priorities in the document which set out the key areas in EU-Georgian 
cooperation:
203
 
 
Priority area 1: 
Strengthen rule of law especially through reform of the judicial system, including the 
penitentiary system, and through rebuilding state institutions. Strengthen democratic 
institutions and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in compliance with 
international commitments of Georgia (PCA, Council of Europe, OSCE, UN). 
 
Priority area 2: 
Improve the business and investment climate, including a transparent privatisation process, 
and continue the fight against corruption. 
 
Priority area 3: 
Encourage economic development and enhance poverty reduction efforts and social cohesion, 
promote sustainable development including the protection of the environment; further 
convergence of economic legislation and administrative practices. 
 
Priority area 4: 
Enhance cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security, including in the field of 
border management. 
 
Priority area 5: 
Strengthen regional cooperation. 
 
Priority area 6: 
Promote peaceful resolution of internal conflicts. 
 
Priority area 7: 
Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy. 
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Priority area 8: 
Transport and Energy. Take into consideration the transit potential of Georgia as well as its 
interconnection with the transport and energy networks of the European Union in order to 
ensure effective cooperation in the areas of energy and transport between the EU and the 
states in the Black Sea and Caspian regions in the framework of the “Baku Initiative”. 
 
In order to make these priorities come true, each one is followed by the specific 
actions to be taken. Here, I provide only specific actions defined for the priority area number 
six – Promote peaceful resolution of internal conflicts – since only this one comes within the 
scope of the paper’s interest:204 
 
- Contribute to the conflict settlement in Abkhazia, Georgia and Tskinvali Region/South 
Ossetia, Georgia, based on respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Georgia within its internationally recognised borders; 
- Enhanced efforts at confidence building; 
- Consideration of further economic assistance in light of the progress in the conflict 
settlement process; 
- Contribute actively, and in any relevant forum, to accelerating the process of 
demilitarisation and of conflict resolution on the basis of the Peace Plan supported by 
the OSCE ministerial Council in Ljubljana in December 2005; 
- The EU points to the need to increase the effectiveness of the negotiating mechanisms. 
The work of the Joint Control Commission should be measured by the rapid 
implementation of all outstanding agreements previously reached and in particular by 
the start of demilitarisation; 
- The EU stresses the need for a constructive cooperation between interested 
international actors in the region, including the EU and OSCE Member States, on 
additional efforts contributing to peaceful settlement mechanisms in Tskinvali 
Region/S. Ossetia and Abhkazia; 
- Include the issue of territorial integrity of Georgia and settlement of Georgia’s internal 
conflicts in EU-Russia political dialogue meetings. 
 
Thus, the EU, while expressing its eagerness to contribute to peace building in 
Georgia, underlines the importance of conflict resolution respecting the country’s sovereignty 
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and territorial integrity within the internationally recognized borders. As already mentioned, 
the Union sees its peace building role in Georgia more as an economic contributor than a 
political actor. The EU believes that, if the country will reach the European social and 
economic standards, then its attractiveness will grow and the conflicting regions might wish 
to integrate themselves back to Georgia.  
To reach the abovementioned the European Union intends to enhance efforts at 
confidence building and considers ways of further economic assistance to Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. Besides, following the Peace Plan supported by the OSCE ministerial Council 
in Ljubljana in December 2005, the EU sees its enhanced role in the process of 
demilitarization of the Tskhinvali region. 
To increase the effectiveness of negotiating mechanisms is the further point of the 
Union’s activity in respect to conflict resolution. In particular, there is a need of rapid 
implementation mechanism of the agreements met by the Joint Control Commission/South 
Ossetia; for instance: start of demilitarization. Here, I would like to underline one more time 
that the EU, now, has to bring the conflicting parties back to negotiation tables first and assure 
the continuity of the peace talks; since at present, there are no negotiations at all as a result of 
August 2008 confrontations. 
The Commission believes, in order to make the peace building activity more 
productive, regional cooperation is of the greatest importance. A constructive cooperation 
between interested international actors in the region, including the EU and the OSCE Member 
States, will contribute to the conflict settlement process and promote stability as a whole. This 
EU priority is common for the three SC states. 
At last, but not at least, EU underlines the importance of inclusion the issue of 
conflict resolution on the basis of territorial integrity of Georgia in EU-Russian political 
dialogues. This is a quite interesting point of the document, since, till recently, before the 
abovementioned confrontation between Russia and Georgia has happened, the latter topic was 
granted a miserable value on the EU political agenda. But, even if the Union has got more 
interested in this issue as a result of the war and Russia’s non compliance with the EU 
brokered Six Points agreement, the question – how the Union is going to promote the 
Georgian matter in its relations with Russia? – remains unclear. On the Summit of Nice in the 
mid of November 2008, president Sarcosie has declared that Russia has fulfilled the most 
points of the signed agreement and expressed the Union’s willingness to intensify economic 
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and political cooperation with the latter.
205
 To the contrary, Georgian sources report Russia’s 
non compliance with the agreement and predatory behaviour in the country.
206
 Interesting is 
as well, how demanding is the EU going to be in Georgian subject in its dialogues with Russia 
(if it is going to be the case at all); since, as we know, the EU depends very much itself on the 
latter’s energetic resources. So far, the Union’s potential to influence and pressurize Russia in 
Georgian matters was minimal. 
In the priority area seven – Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy – enhanced 
EU-Georgian cooperation on CFSP including ESDP is underlined one more time. Further 
more, it is suggested that Georgia may be invited on a case by case basis to align itself with 
EU positions on regional and international issues. This priority too, is common for the three 
SC states as we will see it later. The latter is a really good intention of the EU, which will 
contribute soundly to Georgia’s respectively Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s ability to conduct 
their foreign and security policies. Such initiatives will promote the countries’ international 
experience and level of development generally. In fact, there are many similarities in the 
Georgian, Armenian and Azeri APs, and it is no surprise as the three SC countries represent 
one geographic region with relatively same degree of political, economic and social 
prosperity. 
As to the third specific action under this priority area, the European Union expresses 
its keenness to enhance EU-Georgian consultations on crisis management. It is a kind of proof 
that the EU is eager to do its best in order to make Georgia, and the South Caucasus as a 
whole, stabile. The abovementioned dictates that peace and stability in the region is the EU 
priority, which will make Georgia ready for further “explorations”. The South Caucasus and 
Georgia in particular, is a relatively new “exploration” for the EU with much potential in it, 
and the frozen conflicts in the region slow down the process of “discovery”.  
At the same time, to the contrary, maintaining friendly and cooperative relations 
with Russia is another priority for the EU and it seems to have not less importance than that of 
stability in the South Caucasus. This is a kind of dilemma and needs an urgent and adequate 
response. 
If we take a careful look on the priorities stated in the Action Plans, it will be clear 
that promotion of democracy and human rights, economic prosperity, transport and energy are 
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the basic EU concern to the region. But, at the same time, it should be realized that conflict 
resolution and regional cooperation are the keys, through which the priorities can be achieved. 
Now, I will continue with partnership perspectives and priorities provided in the AP 
Armenia and let us see what differences or similarities exist with respect to conflict resolution 
in comparison to the latter case.  
As it was in the Georgian document, the new partnership perspectives are presented 
in the beginning of the Action Plan. To have an overview of them, please see the appendix 12 
in the end of the paper (p.195). 
There are nine new partnership perspectives, from which the third one concerns the 
Nagorno-Karabakh topic: “Continuing strong EU commitment to support the settlement of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, drawing on the instruments at the EU’s disposal, and in close 
consultation with the OSCE. The EU is ready to consider ways to strengthen further its 
engagement in conflict resolution and post conflict rehabilitation.” This is a message which 
underlines the Commissions readiness to strengthen its engagement in conflict resolution and 
post conflict rehabilitation. However, it would be the subject to close cooperation and 
consultation with the OSCE. As I have mentioned it already, the degree of the EU 
involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict depends on Azeri-Armenian readiness to 
compromise on that matter. Thus, in this stage the European Union can do nothing more but 
to show its eagerness and motivation of contributing to the conflict resolution. 
The new partnership perspectives are followed by eight priorities. These priorities 
are set out in the Action Plan and cover areas within and beyond the scope of the past 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.
207
  
 
Priority area 1: 
Strengthening of democratic structures, of the rule of law, including reform of the judiciary 
and combat of fraud and corruption; 
 
Priority area 2: 
Strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in compliance with 
international commitments of Armenia (PCA, CoE, OSCE, UN); 
 
 
 
                                                 
207
 European Commission – European Neighbourhood Policy. European Union-Armenia Action Plan. November 
2006. pp. 4-10 
 135 
Priority area 3: 
Encourage further economic development; enhance poverty reduction efforts and social 
cohesion, thereby contributing to the long term objective of sustainable development, 
including the protection of the environment; 
 
Priority area 4: 
Further improvement of investment climate and strengthening of private sector-led growth; 
 
Priority area 5: 
Further convergence of economic legislation and administrative practices; 
 
Priority area 6: 
Development of an energy strategy, including an early decommissioning of the Medzamor 
Nuclear Power Plant (MNPP); 
 
Priority area 7: 
Contribute to a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 
 
Priority area 8: 
Enhanced efforts in the field of regional cooperation. 
 
The priority area number 7 refers to peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. There are specific actions defined through which the latter should happen:
208
 
 
 Increase diplomatic efforts, including through the EUSR, and continue to support a 
peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 
 Increase political support to the OSCE Minsk Group conflict settlement efforts on the 
basis of international norms and principles, including the principle of self 
determination of peoples; 
 Encourage people to people contacts; 
 Intensify the EU dialogue with the parties concerned with a view to the acceleration of 
the negotiations towards a political settlement; 
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Thus, the Union expresses its willingness one more time to increase diplomatic 
efforts in order to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the conflict and the EUSR has to 
play an important role in this process. However, there are no concrete actions defined through 
which the abovementioned should come true. “Increase diplomatic efforts” is too abstract 
expression with little content and gives reader little information concerning the matter. 
Further more, “continue to support a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” 
falls under the same critic too, since neither past nor planned support details are provided. As 
we will see, the same critic is valid for the Azeri AP. 
The second specific action above deserves a sound attention. If, in Georgian case, 
the EU political support was granted on the basis of territorial integrity of Georgia, in 
Nagorno-Karabakh case, the political support of the EU is subject to the principle of self 
determination of peoples. Here, comes a question: what is with the territorial integrity of 
Azerbaijan? Later, while reviewing the AP for Azerbaijan, we will see that there is no word 
said about the territorial integrity of the country. From the latter perspective, right for self 
determination could be granted to Abkhazian or South Ossetian people as well. On what basis 
does the EU make such statements remains unknown. 
The third and fourth specific actions are of the utmost importance to the peace 
settlement process, since encouraging people to people contacts will contribute to confidence 
building; and intensified EU dialogue with the conflicting parties will push forward the 
peaceful negotiations and promote the perspective of conflict resolution as a whole. These 
actions are provided in the Azeri AP as well. I will get back to this point hereafter in the Azeri 
case. 
Now, let us take a look on the perspectives and priorities outlined in the AP for 
Azerbaijan in order to get a whole picture of the EU concern to those three SC states with 
respect to conflict resolution.  
The paragraph 2 of the AP outlines the new partnership perspectives in EU-Azeri 
intensified relations. To have an overview of these perspectives, please see the appendix 13 
(p.196). 
From those partnership perspectives, the third one comes into the scope of the 
problem arisen in the paper e.g. EU contribution to peace building in the region: “Continuing 
strong EU commitment to support the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, drawing 
on the instruments at the EU’s disposal, including the EUSR, and in close consultation with 
the OSCE. The EU is ready to consider ways to strengthen further its engagement in conflict 
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resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation.” As we remember it is quite the same statement as 
it was in the AP for Armenia. We will see that in comparison to Georgian one, Armenian and 
Azeri APs have much more in common regarding the conflict resolution issue. Surely, this 
fact has much to do with the Nagorno-Karabakh region which is common problem between 
these neighbour countries. 
Referring back to the EU statement above, I would like to underline the following 
firm declaration of the EC – “The EU is ready to consider ways to strengthen further its 
engagement in conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation” – which has a very central 
meaning and gives a clear sign to Azerbaijan that it is time to resolve the dispute and the EU’s 
role in achieving this settlement could be very decisive. But, at the same time, to this point, 
there is a lack of information concerning the EU possible contribution to peace building as it 
was the case while reviewing Georgia and Armenia. It remains not clear for the reader, what 
does the EU “strong commitment” or “support” to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict exactly mean. Besides, there is nearly no information about the “instruments at the 
EU’s disposal” and how the Union is going to use them. 
In the end of the Paragraph 2, the EC says that in light of the fulfilment of the 
objectives of this Action Plan and of the overall evolution of EU-Azeri relations, 
consideration will be given in due time to the possibility of a new contractual relationship. So, 
still there is a possibility for the both sides to identify weaknesses and try to tackle the 
problems appropriately for the next new upgraded phase. It would mean for Azerbaijan – 
allowing the EU direct engagement in the conflict; and for the European Commission – to 
change its shy approach to the region and implement more instruments to stabilize the South 
Caucasus. Further more, providing more precise and broader information about the actions 
taken and/or to be taken with respect to conflict resolution, including the programmes and 
instruments, will be decisive as well. 
According to the new partnership perspectives above, ten priorities for action are 
presented in the Action Plan:
209
 
 
Priority area 1 
Contribute to a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 
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Priority area 2 
Strengthen democracy in the country, including through fair and transparent electoral process, 
in line with international requirements; 
 
Priority area 3 
Strengthen the protection of human rights and of fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, in 
compliance with international commitments of Azerbaijan (PCA, CoE, OSCE, UN); 
 
Priority area 4 
Improve the business and investment climate, particularly by strengthening the fight against 
Corruption; 
 
Priority area 5 
Improve functioning of customs; 
 
Priority area 6 
Support balanced and sustained economic development, with a particular focus on 
diversification of economic activities, development of rural areas, poverty reduction and 
social/territorial cohesion; promote sustainable development including the protection of the 
environment; 
 
Priority area 7 
Further convergence of economic legislation and administrative practices; 
 
Priority area 8 
Strengthening EU-Azerbaijan energy bilateral cooperation and energy and transport regional 
cooperation, in order to achieve the objectives of the November 2004 Baku Ministerial 
Conferences; 
 
Priority area 9 
Enhancement of cooperation in the field of Justice, Freedom and Security, including in the 
field of border management; 
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Priority area 10 
Strengthen regional cooperation. 
 
The priority number one is the most interesting for the paper as it concerns the 
conflict resolution directly. There are presented four specific actions to this priority, through 
which the European Union will contribute to a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. They are:
210
 
 
 Increase diplomatic efforts, including through the EUSR, and continue to support a 
peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 
 Increase political support to OSCE Minsk Group conflict settlement efforts on the 
basis of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and OSCE documents and 
decisions; 
 Encourage people-to-people contacts; 
 Intensify the EU dialogue with the states concerned with a view to acceleration of the 
negotiations towards a political settlement. 
 
If we take into the view that the European Union has a pretty restricted space to act, 
then the specific actions above seem to be appropriate and competent. On the other hand, as I 
have already underlined while reviewing the Armenian AP, there is a lack of information 
about “increase diplomatic efforts” in conjunction with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; and 
“increase political support” concerning the OSCE Minsk Group conflict settlement efforts. 
The same problem applies to the third specific action – encourage people-to-people 
contacts. It is true that promoting people-to-people contacts will contribute to confidence 
building and peace building as a whole. Nevertheless, specifying the ways via which this 
action will be realized is of the utmost importance for the parties interested in the latter topic. 
The fourth specific action outlines a clear motivation of the EU to push the two 
conflicting parties forward towards a peaceful conflict settlement through intensified political 
dialogue. This is a very good EU intention which needs an adequate dealing in order to reach 
the goal. The European Union should not forget that the particular dispute is a kind of unique 
conflict with frozen character and international society was not successful so far to mediate 
sufficiently. Thus, the EU has to learn on the past mistakes and be more demanding and act 
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more innovative in order to be able to fulfil the goal. However, much depends on the Azeri 
and Armenian sides too; the European Union can not do much without the parties’ common 
consent. 
In the end of the paragraph 3 of the Action Plans, a common statement is made for 
the three SC states by the Union. In fact, there is a message made by the European 
Commission that the progress of meeting the priorities provided above, will be monitored and 
on the basis of this monitoring a mid-term report will be issued reporting on progress of a 
country in that respect. Afterwards, following the mid-term report, the Union together with 
Georgian, Armenian and Azeri authorities will review the Action Plans with the perspective 
to make some changes. Of course, this possible adaptation in the documents will depend on 
the progress achieved by the countries in implementing the agreed priorities.  
In the end of the five years, as defined in the Action Plans, the Commission will 
issue the final report on the same basis. Depending on the progress achieved, further decisions 
may be taken how to develop bilateral relations for the next step including the possibility of 
new contractual links. Hence, the bilateral relations under the ENP are flexible and there is a 
possibility for the parties to identify weaknesses and solve problems. Now, it is up to Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as the EU, how quick they will recognize the 
abovementioned problems, and find solutions to them; and, as faster it will happen, as 
successful will be the Union’s performance in the region. There will be definitely more to say 
about this issue, after the mid-term reports will be provided by the Commission. 
In the paragraph 4 of the three Action Plans, under the title – General objectives and 
Actions – further actions are listed, which in many cases complement the specific actions 
already discussed above. Here, I will discuss only those which are relevant to the paper, thus, 
to conflict resolution.  
So, in the paragraph, further emphasis is made on cooperation on foreign and 
security policy, conflict prevention and crisis management. In particular, strengthening 
political dialogue and cooperation on foreign and security matters deserve sound attention and 
complementary actions are provided in order to make this cooperation successful. As we 
remember, cooperation on CFSP and ESDP was one of the priorities in the AP Georgia; but, 
this time, the latter is provided with much more substance and details.  
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The following complementary actions are provided in the paragraph 4 of the AP 
Georgia:
211
 
 
 Continue and develop EU-Georgia political dialogue on regional and international 
issues, including in the framework of the Council of Europe, OSCE and the UN, and 
on the implementation of the European Security Strategy; 
 Develop cooperation on sanctions issued by the EU, including arms embargoes; 
 Develop an enhanced political dialogue and regular exchange of information on 
Common Foreign and Security Policy including European Security and Defence 
Policy; 
 Sign and Ratify the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the International 
Criminal Court; 
 Fight against international crime in accordance with international law, giving due 
regard to preserving the integrity of the Rome Statute. 
 
Complementary actions provided in the AP Armenia:
212
  
 
 Continue and develop EU-Armenian political dialogue on regional and international 
issues, including in the framework of the Council of Europe, OSCE and UN, and on 
the implementation of the European Security Strategy; 
 Develop cooperation on sanctions issued by the EU, including arms embargoes; 
 Develop an enhanced political dialogue and regular exchange of information on 
Common Foreign and Security Policy including European Security and Defence 
Policy; 
 The EU may invite Armenia on a case-by-case basis to align itself with the EU’s 
positions on regional and international issues; 
 Initiate the accession to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; 
 Make the necessary legislative and constitutional amendments for its implementation; 
 Fight against international crime in accordance with international law, giving due 
regard to preserving the integrity of the Rome Statute; 
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Complementary actions in the Azeri AP:
213
 
 
 Continue to develop EU-Azerbaijan political dialogue on regional and international 
issues, including in the framework of the Council of Europe, OSCE, NATO and the 
UN, and on the implementation of the European Security Strategy; 
 The EU may invite Azerbaijan on a case-by-case basis to align itself with the EU’s 
positions on regional and international issues; 
 Conduct consultations on sanctions issued by the EU, including arms embargoes; 
 Develop an enhanced political dialogue and regular exchange of information on 
Common Foreign and Security Policy including European Security and Defence 
Policy; 
 Exchange of information and possible assistance in the process of security sector 
reforms; 
 Initiate the accession to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and 
make the necessary legislative and constitutional amendments for its implementation. 
Fight against international crime in accordance with international law, giving due 
regard to preserving the integrity of the Rome Statute. 
 
The complementary actions for Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan above are similar 
in many points. It is easy to see that the EU considers those SC states as parts of the political 
Europe and treats them within its security framework. That is why the European Union 
expresses its keenness to enhance cooperation and develop political dialogue on 
implementation of the European Security Strategy. The Commission emphasises one more 
time the importance of close cooperation in CFSP including ESDP, which should be 
promoted through enhanced political dialogue and regular exchange of information. 
Cooperation on sanctions issued by the EU, including arms embargoes, considers the Union to 
be vital in the EU-SC relations too. Besides, further development of cooperation in addressing 
common security threats, including non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
illegal arms exports, as well as, strengthening efforts and cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism and regional cooperation, come within the scope of those complementary actions 
through which the region’s integration in European structures should happen.  
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The abovementioned intention of enhanced political dialogue and regular exchange 
of information on CFSP including ESDP, can be evaluated in positive terms only. This will 
contribute to the SC states’ ability to tackle appropriately the regional as well as international 
field related problems, and subsequently, promote peace in the area. Besides, the possible EU 
assistance in security sector reform, would influence the peace building in the region 
positively only. 
As it was in Georgian case mentioned previously, the Commission grants Armenia 
and Azerbaijan the possibility to align with the EU’s positions on regional and international 
issues on a case-by-case basis. This innovation will contribute to the countries’ international 
experience and will promote EU-Armenian (respectively Azeri) cooperation a lot. 
The paragraph 4 of the three APs addresses the existing territorial disputes as well 
and provides complementary actions negotiated between the parties.  
In the AP Georgia, – Cooperation for the settlement of Georgia’s internal conflicts – 
is a separate chapter within the paragraph 4. The latter is divided into two main parts. 
“Promote sustained efforts towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Tskhinvali 
region/South Ossetia, Georgia” – is the title of the first part, which is followed by eight 
complementary actions to be taken in the region:
214
 
 
1. enhance EU-Georgia political dialogue on, and contribute to, the settlement of the 
Georgian internal conflict in Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia respecting the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia; 
2. implementation of demilitarization agreements and intensification of work in the Joint 
Commission Control (JCC); 
3. Georgia to enhance its confidence-building efforts; 
4. Support the active involvement of civil society in the conflict resolution efforts; 
5. EU to contribute to further confidence building and economic assistance in light of 
progress in settlement process; 
6. continue to develop the role of the EUSR for the South Caucasus in conflict resolution 
within his mandate; 
7. EU to enhance support for OSCE efforts and work in the JCC framework, including 
through promoting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; 
8. Include the issue of settlement of internal conflict in Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, 
Georgia in EU-Russia political dialogue meetings; 
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Thus, the EU underlines one more time the importance of the peaceful conflict 
resolution process with respect to Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thereby, 
implementation of demilitarization agreements and intensification of the work in the Joint 
Control Commission is deemed to be decisive in this regard. Though, there are no concrete 
steps mentioned how and with what means the Commission sees this intensified work.  
Afterwards, importance of Georgia’s role in confidence building and active 
involvement of the civil society in the conflict resolution efforts are underlined. It is true that 
confidence building is the first step in the whole process of the conflict settlement and 
Georgia has to enhance its efforts in this respect. Furthermore, active involvement of the civil 
society in the conflict resolution serves to the same end, which will contribute to confidence 
building and thus, will help to reintegrate the two conflicting peoples. But, at the same time, 
really important is, that a kind of balance between the government and the civil society in the 
conflict settlement efforts is assured. 
The European Union shows ambitions to intensify its political role in peace building 
processes in the South Caucasus; however, at this stage, its contribution to conflict resolution 
is restricted to further confidence building and economic assistance. As we know, 
development of the EUSR role in the regional conflict resolution processes is underlined in 
the Action Plans. The latter initiative can be considered as a willingness of the EU to get some 
political stakes in the negotiations. Although the latter is really a good intention, which would 
make the EU’s political role in the conflict settlement more significant, there occurs the same 
problem which we met manifold already. There are introduced no exact ways how this 
development should happen, but sole enthusiasm of doing so is shown. May be all these have 
something to do with the EU uncertainty towards the region, which I have already examined 
in the first part of the paper. The EU is unwilling to specify its objectives, since she can not 
predict how its relations with Georgia (respectively Armenia and Azerbaijan) will develop 
and prefers to introduce this kind of developments step by step following the degree of 
success in those relations.  
As I have already mentioned, the EC indicates in its documents that the character of 
cooperation with Georgia will be the subject to review and, respectively, possible changes in 
the document will depend on the progress shown by the country in implementation of the 
priorities outlined in the paper. Besides, as underlined previously, the character of the EU-
Georgian relations depends very much on developments in the EU-Russian cooperation. 
Furthermore, as the Union puts a great accent on the regional cooperation, enhanced support 
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for OSCE efforts and greater work in the JCC framework, are emphasized among the 
complementary actions in the AP Georgia. This includes promotion of the return of refugees 
and internally displaced persons. But, neither this time any kind of concrete steps concerning 
the refugee return issue are provided. 
The inclusion of the settlement of internal conflict on Tskhinvali region/South 
Ossetia in the EU-Russia political dialogues is underlined once again in the end of the 
complementary actions provided for Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia. In what way and in 
what extend it should happen, remains unclear as examined above. Besides, it is still a 
question, if the EU priorities and specific actions will change as a result of the Russia-
Georgian war 2008. Obviously, we will get our answers in the near future, after the mid term 
reports are made. 
The second part of the paragraph 4 – Cooperation for the settlement of Georgia’s 
internal conflicts – envisages promotion of sustained efforts towards peaceful resolution of 
the conflict in Abkhazia. Seven complementary actions are introduced in this part:
215
 
 
1. Enhance EU-Georgia political dialogue on, and contribute to, the settlement of the 
conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Georgia within its internationally recognized borders; 
2. Georgia to enhance its confidence-building efforts; 
3. EU to step up support to UN in Geneva process; 
4. EU to consider further confidence building and economic assistance in light of 
progress in settlement process; 
5. Support the active involvement of civil society in the conflict resolution efforts; 
6. Include the issue of settlement of internal conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia in EU-Russia 
political dialogue meetings; 
7. EU to enhance support for the UN and the OSCE in order for them to carry out the 
implementation of their mandate, including in the field of HR; 
 
The complementary actions for Abkhazia and problems interconnected with them 
are quite the same as it was for South Ossetia. For instance, in the action three – EU to step up 
support to UN in Geneva process – no specification for the EU support to the Geneva process 
is provided, as it was for the JCC in the latter case.  
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Regional cooperation is underlined in this part as well; where, enhancement of the 
EU support to the UN and the OSCE including the field of human rights is emphasized. Thus, 
it is a proof once again that the Union puts a huge value on regional cooperation as a 
successful means towards conflict resolution. Here, a kind of conclusion can be made that the 
Union abstains from any type of direct involvement in the Georgian conflicts and prefers to 
contribute to peace building via mediators such as the UN or the OSCE, which indeed in 
many cases are main implementators of the EU funded projects in Georgia (the UN in 
Abkhazia and the OSCE in South Ossetia).  
Now, let me continue with the AP Armenia and see what complementary actions are 
provided in the paper concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There are 5 complementary 
specific actions in order to promote sustained efforts towards the peaceful resolution of the 
dispute:
216
 
 
1. Increase political support to the OSCE Minsk Group conflict settlement efforts on the 
basis of international norms and principles, including the principle of self-
determination of peoples; 
2. Explore possibilities to provide EU support for humanitarian and de-mining 
initiatives; 
3. Promote measures to assist refugees and IDPs; 
4. Promote the active involvement of civil society; 
5. Reinforce the cooperation on these and other matters in support of conflict resolution 
with the EU Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus; 
 
These complementary actions are quite similar to the specific actions provided 
recently. Here, the increased political support to the OSCE Minsk Group, respecting the 
principle of self-determination of peoples is underlined one more time. Besides, the European 
Union expresses its keenness once again to promote its engagement in the region. It should 
happen through: supporting humanitarian and de-mining initiatives, assisting refugees and 
IDPs and promoting active involvement of civil society in the field of the conflict resolution 
through diverse EU funded projects. As already mentioned, the EUSR has to reinforce its 
involvement in and contribution to achieving the abovementioned, which could be a starting 
point for settling peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. But, concrete actions and programmes via 
which the latter should happen are missing this time too.  
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One more interesting point to be underlined is the following statement provided in 
the paragraph 4.7 – People-to-people contacts: “ensure the right of national minorities to 
receive education in their native languages within the secondary education system”.217 This 
initiative can be assessed as positive only as it contributes to confidence building, therefore to 
conflict resolution; but, which minorities are meant in this case is not clear and thus, needs 
specification. 
Let us take a look on the complementary actions provided in the Azeri AP, which 
are almost similar to those actions for Armenia above:
218
 
 
 Increase political support to OSCE Minsk Group conflict settlement efforts on the 
basis of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and OSCE documents and 
decisions; 
 Implement de-mining initiatives; 
 Promote measures to assist IDPs and refugees; 
 Promote the active involvement of civil society; 
 Reinforce the cooperation on these and other matters in support of conflict resolution 
with the EU Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus. 
 
From the complementary actions outlined, only the second action is different as 
compared to those for Armenia. As we see, like it was for Armenia, these complementary 
actions include measures such as implement de-mining initiatives; promote measures to assist 
IDPs and refugees; reinforce cooperation with EUSR in peace building matters, which will 
promote the Union’s direct engagement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process. 
I believe, it is a good start which indeed could lead to the extended political involvement of 
the EU in the dispute. As mentioned previously, active involvement of the civil society in the 
conflict resolution process is an outstanding EU initiative, which will neutralize the 
government’s central role in the process, thus, will contribute to peace building very much. 
Of course, there are some problems and weaknesses, which I have underlined many 
times; but, I am optimistic that they will be identified and tackled appropriately step by step; 
and, as it is mentioned in the last complementary action, the EUSR has to play a decisive role 
in these developments and the process of peace settlement as a whole.  
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In particular, I believe, that the EU has to push the conflict resolution process in the 
region more actively towards the goal with those already discussed and other new efficient 
means. The Union has to be more demanding and should pressurize the conflicting parties in 
order to settle a peace. Taking into view that the OSCE Minsk Group with its soft measures 
was not successful so far to mediate sufficiently; and the fact that security in the region is of 
the utmost importance for the European Union; the latter has to act somewhat differently and 
innovative, even apply pressure if necessary (and obviously it is necessary), in order to reach 
the abovementioned goal. 
In the end of the three Action Plans, the paragraph 5 – Monitoring – states that the 
documents will be monitored by the joint bodies established under the Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement. Besides, these bodies will assure a soft implementation process of the 
papers. The EC will produce reports on the Action Plans’ implementation at regular intervals 
and the SC states are expected to provide information for these reports. There is the EU 
enthusiasm underlined one more time to cooperate closely with international organizations 
and donors, which will definitely promote the efficiency of the action. 
Further more, it is stated in the documents one more time that the Action Plans can 
be regularly amended and/or updated based upon bilateral agreements to reflect progress in 
addressing the priorities. Thus, according to weaknesses identified and lessons learnt, the 
European Union can adopt updated, more sufficient priorities and actions in order to reach the 
set goal. Therefore, the mid-term reports, which are to be issued in the near future, are great 
opportunity for the parties to identify problems and tackle them in an appropriate manner. I 
believe, the European Union’s nearly non involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and 
its shy approach to the Georgian disputes should be reflected in these reports and a sufficient 
remedy to the problems should be found. This would be the starting point in favour of peace 
settlement in the region; other problems and weaknesses arisen could be responded and solved 
step by step through the same way. 
As provided in the APs, “a first review of the implementation of the Action Plan will 
be undertaken within two years of its adoption”. This means, about the end of 2008. After 
these mid-term reports are issued, much more can be said about the degree of success or 
mistakes made, and future updated strategy of the Union.  
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Conclusion 
All in all, while reviewing and analysing the EC documents, one can conclude that 
the ENP is more competitive and precise instrument of the European Union as compared to 
PCA. On the other hand, there are weaknesses which require prompt and competent answer in 
order to reach the set goals. The European Neighbourhood policy is quite a new instrument of 
the EU with many points discussed above to be made better; consequently, it will be 
definitely not easy for the latter to give an adequate response to the challenges which the 
South Caucasus faces within the short period of time.  
As we have seen in the EC papers for Georgia, the Union tries to give an answer to 
the conflicts through the ENP framework. Although, this response seems to have more 
economic character than political one, it is the way via which the EU is willing to tackle the 
challenges at this stage. At the same time, as already mentioned, the European Union does not 
exclude the possibility of deeper political involvement in future, which depends on 
developments in the EU-Georgian relations. Simultaneously, we should not forget that the 
developments in the EU-Georgia cooperation are influenced by shifts in the EU-Russian 
relations very much. 
The European Union contribution to the conflict resolution in Azerbaijani and 
Armenian cases is quite the same as far as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the one dispute 
between the two South Caucasian states. As we have witnessed, unlike Georgia, the EU direct 
involvement in the conflict region is nearly non existent, and consequently, the EC papers 
analyzed above deal with the conflict settlement issue very briefly and slightly. The only EU 
contribution to peace building in this respect is supporting the OSCE Minsk Group in its 
peace building efforts. But, at the same time, as it seems the Nagorno-Karabakh case is more 
complicated than compared to Abkhazian or South Ossetian cases; every decision concerning 
the region including the EU’s deeper involvement, should be negotiated between Armenian 
and Azeri sides. As past experience shows, such consensuses between the two conflicting 
parties are really hard to reach. 
In comparison with the latter case, the EU contribution to the conflict resolution 
process in Georgia is sound. As mentioned above, the EC is providing assistance to Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia generally through rehabilitation and confidence building programmes. It is 
already known that this aid has sole economic character and the EU’s direct political 
involvement in the negotiation processes is still missing despite Georgia’s continuing 
demands. Here, as I have already underlined, come into the “game” Russia and its own 
ambitions towards the South Caucasus; thereby, the USA and its influence on the region play 
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also an important role. I have discussed on this problem already in the first part of the work 
and I am going to touch this topic later as well in the last part of the thesis. 
Now, let me continue with the part III of the paper, where I will give a final 
evaluation to the ENP with regard to peace and security building in the South Caucasus as 
compared to internationally recognized security promotion methods. Then, I will provide 
personal recommendations suggesting what could be made better towards a better peace 
building; and, at last, by answering the main question of the thesis arisen in beginning of the 
work – whether the ENP is/or could be the right policy towards the South Caucasus as peace 
building is concerned – I will make the final conclusion taking into view all those analysis, 
evaluations and recommendations made in the whole work. 
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III) Evaluations and Recommendations 
 
1. European Neighbourhood Policy as a security policy 
 
In previous part, I have analysed the action plans and other EC documents in terms 
of conflict resolution for each South Caucasian country. In this chapter of the part III, I am 
going to examine the ENP as a security policy and evaluate the latter in this respect. As we 
have seen the ENP responds rather weakly to the conflict resolution topic in the South 
Caucasus region and as far as peace building and security are directly bounded to each other, 
it would make sense to evaluate the ENP as a security policy and see what role does the 
Caucasus play in EU security partnership? 
Originally, the European Neighbourhood Policy has two main objectives: 
strengthening stability, security and well-being for the EU member states and neighbouring 
countries, and preventing the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and 
its neighbours. At the same time, we should not forget that ENP is a single policy towards 
countries as different as Morocco and Russia, Libya and Belarus; the biggest question which 
arises in my mind is, whether the European Neighbourhood Policy is the right policy towards 
the South Caucasus region at all? Its framework is quite broad and covers all the EU 
neighbours while no difference is made respecting country’s level of economic and social 
development; political situation in a country is also not envisaged.  
It is really hard to design a policy for such a broad neighbourhood, which would 
respond all the needs and expectations existing within such a huge area as the political Europe 
and its neighbourhood. But, I believe, at least it would make sense to differentiate countries 
according to their level of political prosperity. Especially, I want to underline countries with 
instable political situations and frozen conflicts such as the South Caucasian states. 
As Fulvio Attina argues, security is a major aim of the ENP. “In this respect, Russia, 
Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Mediterranean countries are expected to become partners 
of the Union in the progressive construction of a security community extended from the 
Atlantic to the Urals, from the Caucasus and the Middle East to the Artic Sea.” At the same 
time, the author underlines that ENP as a security project “is far from being fully fudged in 
the Brussels factory”.219 This statement is true, and we are going to see that in this chapter 
while giving analysis to ENP in security terms.  
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Before I will give the final answer to the question arisen above, it is vital to judge 
the European Neighbourhood Policy as a security policy; but, first it is important to provide a 
short general overview of regional security arrangements and explain what security 
partnership is as such. 
Attina declares that regional security varies from zero-level (no agreement on 
cooperative measures of security) to institutionalized structure of cooperation (i.e. the 
amalgamated security community defined by Karl Deutsch). Successful security cooperation 
is not a product of a good neighbourhood or flourishing interaction between a group of 
countries, but the positive change in such co-operations depends on political decisions of the 
leaders of participating states. And, the decisions on their turn depend on expectations of 
better welfare conditions as an effect of increased security cooperation. “In other words, 
increasing organized security cooperation and the institutionalization of peaceful management 
of international conflicts depend on the elite’s perception of the gains that derive from 
extending the successful experimentation of previous security cooperation. (…). Briefly, it is 
assumed that security cooperation in a region expands on as much as formal institutions and 
social practices mutually reinforce each other, and decision-makers perceive additional gains 
from future cooperation.”220 As we remember Ernst Haas suggests the same: “Interests of the 
actors are originated from their political imaginations” (Ernst Haas 2001). In this context, 
“Political imaginations” has a broad sense and can be understood differently in every case. 
But, in this particular matter above, the latter could have the meaning of “expectations of 
better welfare” and/or “additional gains (perceived)”. 
To interpret the explanation above in the South Caucasus context, it will be clear one 
more time that the degree of the SC states’ integration in the ENP and thus, in the EU 
structures including security field, depends on bilateral political decisions, which on their turn 
are influenced by the expectations of better welfare conditions. These expectations and 
political decisions made by the Union as well as by the SC countries I have already examined 
in previous chapters. But, this time, I would like to underline one more time the ambiguity of 
this political orientation and decisions made. As already known, in these actually bilateral 
(EU-South Caucasus) relations, USA and Russia play a big role as well; and I would say, 
exactly this multiplicity of political actors involved including already mentioned uncertainty 
in setting priorities has made “the game” complicated and hinders the ENP to be successful as 
a security policy and a conflict solving instrument for the South Caucasus region.  
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Now, let me continue with introducing forms of regional security partnership and 
judge the ENP in the South Caucasus by those indicators. 
Regions, in which military confrontation is currently practiced (the Middle East) or 
is maintained by the governments as unavoidable means of statehood, are less attractive for 
other developed states to create any security arrangement by explicit agreements. Thus, in this 
case, governments do not agree on any form of collective solution of security problems.  
Military alliances are formed on the belief that the coordination of military force 
with likeminded countries is more successful than self defence in dissuading potential 
aggressors. Creation of a military alliance means encouraging other countries which do not 
participate in the latter to build an opposite alliance in order to make a kind of equilibrium of 
forces. Accordingly, it can be inferred that in many cases military alliances do not improve 
security condition of the members states but crystallize conflict relations that make constant 
or increase instability depending on circumstances.
221
 
To judge from the latter perspective, to include the South Caucasus states in the ENP 
framework, was a really brave step done by the EU. Firstly, the region was full with 
unresolved conflicts and thus, was a good source of war potential; and secondly, there was a 
risk taken by the Union that the inclusion of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the ENP, 
would made Russia feel attacked as far as the region was always deemed to be a zone of the 
latter’s influence. Thus, while analysing the ENP as a security policy in the South Caucasus, 
the facts above must be taken into the view. 
Attina differentiates five types of regional security arrangements between the 
aforementioned – No formal arrangement – and – Amalgamated security community. (See the 
illustration below). 
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The regional security arrangement line
222
 
 
 
No formal                                                                                                                                     Amalgamated 
arrangement                                                                                                                             Security Community 
.…………I……………………I…………………I…………I…………I………….  
                    A                               B                          C               D1            D2 
 
A – Opposite alliance system 
B – Collective security 
C – Regional security partnership 
D1 – Loosely coupled Pluralistic security Community 
D2 – Tightly coupled Pluralistic security community 
 
The first type is the Opposite military alliance mentioned above, which has no 
formality and is hardly a security body. It is followed by the collective security system. By the 
latter, governments prefer to keep armed forces under strict national control but agree to make 
them available on request as complement to collective force to intervene in case of need 
against an aggressor (for example the Organization of African Union). This kind of systems of 
collective security neither leads automatically to the constitution of collective military forces 
nor to the formation of permanent security mechanisms. Thus, there is a sole military 
partnership without a formal long term agreement.  
The regional security partnership is located between A, B and D1, D2 on the line 
above; thus, it is much more than opposed military alliances or collective security, but 
different from the security community models. In the regional security partnership approach, 
the goal of dissuading aggressor and avoiding interstate violence is attained through including 
as much regional states in a single security arrangement as possible. A good example for this 
kind of security partnership is the international security initiative, which developed in Europe 
with the Helsinki Process.  
The regional security partnership is characterized by the following indicators: 
measures of cooperative security (information exchange on military policies and structures) 
and comprehensive security (military and non military aspects of security) are indivisible part 
of regional security with obligation to improve security conditions in the region and preserve 
geopolitical stability. They are defined in international agreements. The security partnership 
agreements are formed by groups of countries characterized by conflict divisions, not large 
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flows of transactions and communication, and a small sharing of values and institutions. At 
the same time, it must be declared that there exist some exceptions as well; for instance, 
countries are not divided by conflict lines, are linked by large flows of mutual transactions 
and communication, and share the same cultural and institutional values, but they meet 
consensus on introducing cooperation on security problems. Important is, that for some 
political and practical reasons, these states are willing to cooperate in order to reduce the risk 
of violent confrontations, and allow the flow of mutual communication and material 
transactions to make profit. At last, close cooperation between the states over time produces 
common orientations towards problems and values, thus, reduces the security culture 
difference, which leads to the formation of we-ness and common values. So, it is not excluded 
that a regional security partnership turns into a security community.
223
 
To put it out in a short and precise way, the regional security partnership is a kind of 
consensus between the countries of a region to cooperate on the reduction of violence and 
enhancement of stability and peace by making use of different types of agreements and 
mechanisms like formal security treaties, security international organizations, joint action 
agreements, multilateral dialogue processes, peace and stability pacts including confidence 
building and preventive diplomacy measures, also measures for influencing domestic 
structures and processes of the countries at risk of internal violence. 
Thus, to interpret the information above for the ENP, it could be inferred that the 
ENP has something in common with Regional Security Partnership, namely the cooperation 
in security matters (CFSP, ESDP) mentioned in the Action Plans discussed in previous 
chapter. But, at the same time, there are huge differences which make impossible to call the 
EU-SC relations a regional security partnership. These differences are: there are unresolved 
conflicts existing in the region; cultural and institutional values are rather different too. But, 
there is a perspective in the long run that close cooperation under the ENP over time will 
produce common orientations towards problems and values, thus, will reduce the security 
culture difference; however, as far as no membership of the SC states in the European Union 
is foreseen, there is a little hope that an understanding of “we-ness” will be formatted even in 
the long term perspective. 
The good examples of the regional security cooperation are: the process of building 
of the European security system since the launch of the Helsinki Process; ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) in the East Asia/Pacific; and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 
Central Asia. In the fundamental agreements of such security partnerships, shared principles 
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of peaceful relations are proclaimed and sources of conflict, tension and instability are made 
public by the partner governments. The fundamental agreements include the operative 
agreements and mechanisms, which are used in order to implement cooperative measures for 
the management of common security problems. With the operative agreements, multilateral 
offices are created as well as the use is made of international organizations to deal with 
perceived security threats. The most important collective instruments of the security 
partnership are those multilateral offices and organizations, especially, in as much as they are 
responsible for peace-making and peace-keeping operations. 
In order better to understand the whole topic of the regional security partnership, 
please take a view of the main attributes of the latter summarized below. 
 
Main attributes of the regional security partnership model
224
 
Pre-conditions 
 Awareness of the countries of the region for independence and the local effect of global 
problems, 
 Relaxed or no power competition in the international politics of the region and restrained use 
of violence in international conflicts. 
Conditions 
 Consensus of the governments of the region on building security cooperation by reducing 
violence in international relations, improving international and domestic stability, and 
promoting peace and economic growth, 
 No system of opposite military alliances. 
Structures and means 
 Written fundamental agreements, 
 Operative agreements, multilateral offices and international organizations, 
 A set of international and internal measures and mechanism of conflict management and 
prevention, 
 Involvement of extra-regional powers (very probable). 
Consequences 
 Reduction of the gap between the security doctrines and cultures of the countries of the 
region, 
 Increase of defence de-nationalization, 
 Development of security community (possible). 
 
The illustration above is one more proof of the fact that the EU-SC relations under 
the ENP are far from being a security partnership. Here, I would like to underline some 
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statements from the main attributes of the regional security partnership, which are valid for 
the EU-SC relations in positive or negative terms. Restrained use of violence in international 
conflicts is set as a pre-condition for regional security partnership. Thus, taking into the view 
the war of August 2008 between Georgia and Russia, we see that the South Caucasus, in 
particular Georgia, can not fulfil even the preconditions for such security partnership. 
Furthermore, as far as Armenian and Azeri governments can not find common language in 
favour of peace in the region, this fact is the second hindrance towards building a regional 
security partnership. Thirdly, the members of a security partnership should not play double 
games, which is not true for the SC states – by entering the framework of the ENP, Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan were the members of the CIS. Besides, there exist no written 
fundamental agreements in security matters; as we have seen, the Action Plans risk to become 
sole economic documents. Consequently, there are no common internally agreed measures 
and mechanisms of conflict management and prevention; therefore, there is no reduction of 
the gap between security doctrines and cultures of the participating countries; and certainly, 
there should be excluded any kind of perspective of security community development. 
As to definition of security community, Karl Deutsch defines security community as 
a group of people that have become integrated and consider war as an obsolete instrument of 
conflict resolution. This group of people consider themselves as a community and produce a 
favourable ground for the establishment of peaceful conflict resolution institutions. 
Distinction is made between amalgamated security communities and pluralistic security one. 
Deutsch argues that by the first case the states have abandoned their full sovereignty and 
merge into an expanded state; but, by the second one, states retain their legal independence 
but develop common institutions with a sense of “we-ness”. Adler and Barnett point out two 
types of pluralistic communities – loosely and tightly coupled – according to whether they are 
close to giving up the full sovereignty or the vice versa – government centralization.225  
Fulvio Attina gives us examples of each community type mentioned above. The 
formation of federal states like Germany in the 19
th
 century is a good example for the 
amalgamated security community. Scandinavia, Canada and the United States, and the Euro-
Atlantic community are examples of the loosely coupled form of pluralistic security 
community. The author points out the European Union as an example of the tightly coupled 
form of security community; but, at the same time, he underlines that the whole European 
continent is hardly a security community, and the wider Europe with its surroundings “… is 
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still far from being qualified as a case of this arrangement.” And, it is true as we have seen 
already. 
 
1.1 ENP and security around the EU 
As Attina argues, the European security partnership has been put many times to a 
test, but unfortunately, performance has not been always good. However, there are some 
positive records too, as the direct intervention of peacekeeping forces helped to restrain 
violence. The author underlines the fact that since the end of the 90s the European security 
partnership is under the challenge of the current worldwide in-security environment; and 
accordingly, the European governments’ preference for cooperative and comprehensive 
security has been tempered by the so-called “new discourse of threat and danger”. There was 
a clear need for upgrading of the European military preparedness in order to be in a better 
position to deal with the countries which are perceived to be aggressive and irrational like the 
Milosevic’s regime and those with the threats to global terrorism. As a consequence, we have 
witnessed the development of the ESDP for worldwide use as well as some enhancements in 
the Euro-Atlantic strategic preponderance as condition for international stability and peace.
226
 
The introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy is surely to be treated in 
conjunction with the abovementioned need of more security within the Europe. As we already 
know, ENP has two main objectives: strengthening stability and security as well as preventing 
emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. The latter is 
aimed at developing a zone of prosperity and a “ring of friends”, with whom the EU can enjoy 
close, peaceful and cooperative relations. Thus, it is obvious that political and economic 
interdependence is believed by the Union to be the source of political stability and regional 
security. Besides, neighbouring countries are invited to make steps towards regional security 
co-management and participate in initiatives aimed at improving conflict prevention and crisis 
management; as well as, strengthening cooperation to prevent and combat common security 
threats (this matter I have already discussed in previous chapters). Accordingly, Attina argues 
that ENP approach to security consists of the classical concepts: i.e. those of comprehensive 
security – the interdependence of the political, socio-economic, ecologic, cultural and military 
dimensions – and cooperative security – the constant exercise of dialogue and exchange of 
information, knowledge and expertise. 
Referring back to the ENP evaluation as a security policy, I will be strict a little in 
doing so. As it seems from above, the ENP can not be a successful security policy (if it is a 
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security policy at all) because of many reasons. When, the EU is hardly a security community 
itself as Attina declares, then, the ENP can not be expected to deliver properties of a 
functioning security policy. If we judge from the perspective of the regional security 
arrangement line provided above, I would say that the ENP as a security provider in the EU-
SC relations could be set on the collective security level, and I would be very careful in doing 
so, as far as, the Union is far from being ready to make its armed forces available to the SC 
states on request to intervene in a case of need against an aggressor. The justification of the 
latter statement is the Georgia-Russian war of August 2008. As we remember, the EU 
intervened in the conflict via diplomatic means negotiating the Six Points truce with Russia. 
Georgia on its turn participated (and continues to participate) in international peace keeping 
missions such as Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. And, I would say, Georgia is even ready to 
complement the EU armed forces if a need should arise; although, as provided above, these 
intentions do not reciprocate. Thus, to give more precise evaluation, the ENP as a security 
policy in the South Caucasus could be set between A (Opposite alliance system) and B 
(collective security) points of the illustration. At the same time, it must be declared that the 
EU-SC partnership is far from the point A (Opposite alliance system).  
All in all, the ENP as a security policy can not be successful in the region till the 
conflicts exist; but, at the same time, referring back to the ENP critic as a conflict resolution 
policy, we will find ourselves in a dilemma, which if leaved without a prompt and sufficient 
answer, will put into question success of the European Union’s performance as an 
international mediator in the South Caucasus. 
 
Conclusion 
As we have witnessed, the European Neighbourhood Policy with its character is 
hardly a security policy. With this initiative the European Union is firmly committed to the 
long range strategy of building security by improving political and economic being, and 
deepening mutual trust and understanding of the neighbouring states. But, it is really hard to 
give a precise assessment to such kind of endeavour within the period of short time; this 
would be possible after a progressive and long period of implementation of the ENP.  
As Fulvio Attina argues, at present, there is a perspective that shared values, strong 
democratic institutions and a common understanding of the need to institutionalize respect for 
human rights will open the way for closer and more open dialogue on CFSP and ESDP 
between the neighbouring states. And it is true, as we have seen while analysing the Action 
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Plans, intensified dialogue on CFSP was among the EU priorities to the region. Further more, 
the deployment of 200 EU observers in Georgia attest to this. 
Attina reminds that shared neighbourhood implies burden-sharing and joint 
responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by conflict and insecurity. He 
argues that the Union should take over a more active role to facilitate settlement of the 
conflicts in Palestine, Transdniestria and, I would say, in the Caucasus as well. Greater EU 
involvement in the conflict resolution processes of those and other areas at risk would be a 
good demonstration of the latter’s willingness to assume a greater share of burden in peace 
settlement in the neighbouring countries. 
 
2. Final Evaluation and Recommendations 
In this chapter, taking into the view the performance which the European Union has 
shown in the South Caucasus during the past years, I would like to make some 
recommendations how the latter’s role in the region could be made more fruitful towards 
conflict resolution, respectively, security promotion in the area. 
As it is outlined in the first part of the paper, the EU has less political influence in 
the South Caucasus than Russia or the USA. Maybe this fact has much to do with the EU’s 
late appearance in the region. Some authors argue that, as the Union arrived in the Caucasus 
the region was already overcrowded with other international actors. However, the truth is that 
in the beginning the Commission’s involvement in the South Caucasus had sole economic 
character. With respect to peace building, the latter has provided economic assistance to 
Georgian breakaway regions through rehabilitation and confidence building programs only.  
The European Union’s interests in the region are interconnected with energy security 
issue and stability promotion in the area. But, if we treat the development of the EU – South 
Caucasus relations in timeframe, one can suggest that the significance of the South Caucasus, 
respectively, stability in the region is directly tied with the EU enlargement process and 
increases in importance as the Union’s borders come nearer to the area. At the same time, it is 
not easy for the European Union to promote stability and security in the South Caucasus as 
Russia’s influence on the region is still strong and the latter has different interests towards the 
area than the EU. Thus, the Union’s position in the given situation is not easy as it depends on 
Russia’s energetic resources (57%)227 very much; and consequently, the EU is eager to 
maintain friendly political and economic relations with the latter. As I have already 
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mentioned, the Commission has underlined that Russia is more strategic partner for the EU 
than the South Caucasian states.  
Simultaneously, stability in the Caucasus has increased in importance on the EU 
political agenda as Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union in 2007, and the Black 
Sea became the common border between the Union and Georgia. The inclusion of the South 
Caucasian states in the European Neighbourhood Policy framework in 2004 was a very 
diplomatic step of the EU aimed at strengthening the states economically and politically. The 
Union respecting Russia’s interests in the region, has chosen the way of democracy promotion 
contributing to development of market economy and rule of law in the three South Caucasian 
countries. EU believes that independent states with strong democratic institutions will be in a 
position to solve their internal disputes themselves. 
But, still there are some weaknesses to be identified in the EU performance in the 
South Caucasus and I would like to analyse them in the light of the recent Russia-Georgian 
war, which took place in August 2008. 
Firstly, let me underline my concern to the fact and argue that it is really pity that a 
war took place on the Georgian territory in the 21
st
 century, after four years of the ENP 
launch. But, the blame is surely to be put on the parties to the war and not on the European 
Union, which has managed to broker a ceasefire on the 12
th
 August 2008 after five days of 
gunfire. Despite Russia’s resistance to fully obey the EU brokered “Six-Point truce”, the EU 
leaders hold many consultations and negotiations in order to stabilize the region and maintain 
peace. 
Since August 7
th
 2008, the EU has provided €6 million in aid for people effected by 
the conflict in South Ossetia and other parts of Georgia. Individual EU countries have 
provided a further €8.4 million. The EU leaders decided to postpone talks with Russia on a 
new partnership pact until Moscow withdraws its troops to pre-conflict positions. They also 
agreed to a review of relations with Russia condemning Moscow’s recognition of breakaway 
regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. EU leaders also agreed to make 
reconstruction aid available for Georgia and to press for a free trade deal and a relaxed visa 
regime for its citizens. They agreed to help organize an international donors’ conference for 
Georgia.
228
 At a joint European Commission / World Bank Conference held in Brussels on 
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22
nd
 October 2008, 38 countries and 15 international organizations pledged to provide 
approximately US$4.5 billion (€3.4 billion) to the country.229 
Within the scope of the abovementioned pledge, the European Commission has 
provided humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath of the conflict in Georgia and 
started working on a comprehensive assistance package, which will be up to €500 million. 
The package will cover the period of 2008-2010 and will be subject to review based on the 
pace of recovery and evolution of the Georgian economy. The main source of the funding is a 
mix of programmed funds under the ENPI envelope and crisis instruments, such as the 
Instrument for Stability, ECHO - Humanitarian Aid and ECFIN grants for Macro-Financial 
Assistance (MFA). The package also includes the costs for the EU (ESDP) Civilian 
Monitoring Mission in Georgia covered by the CFSP budget.
230
 Thus, as already mentioned 
previously, the European Union has made a decision to deploy an independent civilian 
observer mission in Georgia under the Security and Defence Policy beginning on the 1
st
 of 
October 2008, and comprising more than 200 observers. Furthermore, in its Presidency 
Conclusion, the Council of the European Union calls on Russia to cooperate with Europe in 
peace initiative: “We are convinced that it is in Russia’s own interest not to isolate itself from 
Europe. For its part, the European Union has shown itself willing to engage in partnership and 
cooperation, in keeping with the principles and values on which it is based. We expect Russia 
to behave in a responsible manner, honouring all its commitments.”231 
In the Presidency Conclusions is also underlined the need of more security in the 
region: “Recent events illustrate the need for Europe to intensify its efforts with regard to the 
security of energy supplies. The European Council invites the Council, in cooperation with 
the Commission, to examine initiatives to be taken to this end, in particular as regards 
diversification of energy sources and supply routes.”232 Although, here regional security is 
interpreted more in energetic security terms, it is obvious that the abovementioned war has 
forced the EU to think about more security needs in the South Caucasus. Of course, this EU 
assistance to Georgia is far from being assistance from a security partner discussed in 
previous chapter; but, involving in the war against Russia on the Georgian side would make 
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the whole situation worse. Besides, as many times underlined, Russia is a better partner for 
the EU than the SC countries. Here, we should remember the following statement: “Interests 
are not steadfast but result of a political identity building process” (Reese-Schaefer 1999). 
Thus, it is possible that the present EU priorities will change in future depending on 
developments in the South Caucasus; and the deployment of the EU observer mission in 
Georgia was a successful step forward in this respect. 
So, I would like to underline that the EU response to the Caucasus crisis in 2008, 
was and still is more coherent and firm than it was in the past. It is obvious that since the Iraqi 
crisis the European Union has developed itself in many ways. The Member States are in a 
position to conduct more consistent common action than in recent years. Of course, still with 
some weaknesses as far as the Baltic states took more pro Georgian position in the conflict 
while Germany has reported on massacres exercised by the Georgian military forces against 
the Ossetes; but, to compare this particular action of the EU to the Balkans’ inaction in the 
beginning of the 90s, and the split of CFSP as a result of the Iraqi crisis, one can affirm that 
there were made significant developments in the EU CFSP. Surely, weaknesses remain and 
further common work is needed to make them good. 
 
2.1 Recommendations 
Now, I will try to develop some recommendations, which I believe would be helpful 
for the European Union, respectively, for the South Caucasus states to perform better and 
promote security in the region. 
      
1) The South Caucasian states must set the European Union on the top of their foreign 
policy agenda. Thus, stop all equivocalities and give the EU a clear priority. 
 
2) Then, a kind of policy definition is to be made by the European Union concerning the 
South Caucasus. The EU member states have to think and act in a common way. It is time 
to give a precise definition to the EU policy towards the region. The following question is 
to be answered: What role does the stability in the South Caucasus play for the Union in 
relation with EU-Russian economic interdependence? By answering the question the 
member states must take into the view the fact that over 50% of Russian goods are 
exported to the EU, whereas Russia for the EU as a trade partner is only on the fifth 
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place.
233
 Thus, one can conclude: Although, the European Union is very much dependent 
on the Russian energetic resources, the latter’s economy is not less dependent on the EU’s 
market. Therefore, Russia needs EU as much as the latter needs Russia. This is reason 
enough for the Union to act more strictly in the South Caucasus issues. As far as Russia-
Georgian war has happened after so many years of peace building efforts, one should 
realize that it is not smart to pledge so much money in rehabilitation projects till the 
conflicts are solved. We have all witnessed, how the EU funded renewed infrastructure 
was bombed and terminated during the armed confrontations in August 2008. Therefore, 
one can argue that the EU prioritized “soft” (economic and technical) approach in the 
conflict resolution has failed to succeed and the war has underlined how important is the 
political means in order to solve a conflict. 
 
3) In case, the answer to the question above is given in favour of the stability and peace in 
the South Caucasus, then the following recommendations are valid: 
a) After 15 years of being not successful, Russian peacekeepers should leave; they are to 
be replaced by the European colleagues. Only recently launched EU monitoring 
mission can hardly contribute to stability and security promotion, a good example is 
OSCE or UNOMIG negative experiences. 
b) The role of the EUSR to the South Caucasus must be promoted in respect to conflict 
resolution so that he can, not only contribute to peace building, but drive the parties 
with definite means to a definite end of peaceful conflict resolution. 
c) The conflict resolution issue in the ENP Action Plans must be set as a clear EU 
priority and several definite steps towards the peace building must be elaborated like it 
is in the Action Plan for Moldova. 
d) Cooperation in the field of CFSP and ESDP, meant in the Action Plans, should be 
intensified. If, there will be need, the EU must be in a position to exploit a broad range 
of the instruments coming within the scope of the CFSP; for instance, Rapid Reaction 
Force (RRF). 
e) The Union should recognize weaknesses and learn lessons from the past; for instance, 
the Balkans and the Iraqi crisis. It has to act more coherently and strategically in order 
not to fail but stabilize the Caucasus. 
f) Regarding the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the EU must push and pressurize the 
parties (Armenia and Azerbaijan) towards peaceful negotiations and force them to find 
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a common language to resolve the conflict. This kind of inactivity from the EU side 
regarding the NK region can not be held constant any more; the OSCE Minsk Group 
was not successful so far, thus, it is ground enough for the Union to intervene directly. 
The EU must speak with Turkey as well, concerning the border opening issue with 
Armenia. 
g) The European Union recognizes the territorial integrity of Georgia and argues that the 
conflicts must be solved on the latter basis: but, to the contrary, as we have seen in the 
Armenian AP the Union underlines the right of self-determination of people. I believe, 
it is very important for the EU to give a definition to this fact and make it clear, on 
which ground was the decision made. This definition must be justified appropriately, 
since, it is difficult to understand, why in the Georgian case the territorial integrity is 
set as a clear priority and in the Azeri/Armenian one the right for self-determination. 
h) The European Union must speak with the conflicting regions too, offering incentives 
(they should be more attractive than Russia offers), which would make them open-
minded, respectively, vote for peace and prosperity. What could it be? (The following 
example is made for Georgia). The regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) have 
manifold underlined their willingness to become a part of the EU someday. The long 
term perspective to become the members of the EU as autonomous republics within 
the Georgian borders, would encourage the regions to renew political dialogues with 
the Georgian government for a peaceful settlement of the disputes. Therefore, only 
couple of words are needed in the EC documents to promote peace building in the 
South Caucasus. A statement that Georgia after fulfilling the candidacy criteria has a 
chance to become an EU membership candidate and finally a member of the European 
Union in the long term, would change the whole situation in the region in positive 
terms. 
i) Very decisive is as well, a high ratio of civil society participation in the conflict 
resolution processes. Important is that there are no animosities between the ordinary 
people. That is why more NGO participation in the EU funded projects must be 
encouraged. The Azeri/Georgian NGOs should cooperate with colleagues from the 
conflicting regions and vice versa. This would contribute to confidence building very 
much, and finally, to peace settlement in the long run. 
 
 
 166 
4)  Turkey, as a NATO member state and a candidate country, has to show more interests 
in the process of stabilizing the South Caucasus. The latter should involve itself 
dynamically in the conflict resolution and contribute to the process actively. Turkey has to 
negotiate and find a final solution to the border reopening issue with Armenia and do its 
best to promote security in the region. 
 
5) Georgia has to normalize its relations with Russia. It is not profitable, neither 
economically nor politically for the country to have such strained relations with such 
influential and powerful neighbour as Russia. Georgia has to manage to launch good 
neighbourly relations with the latter; and, at the same time, maintain friendly relations 
with the USA. The abovementioned is not easy, but it is possible with sufficient Georgian 
diplomacy and the European Union has to play the biggest role in it. If Georgia would 
take a clear EU political direction, and the Union would declare the country as its definite 
priority and would give the country long term membership prospective, I believe, this 
would change the recent ambiguous “game” in the Caucasus. However, the “new game” 
must be no equivocal one, but game which drives to definite end with well known means. 
In this case, present US influence in Georgia would sink and would be changed by the EU 
one. Consequently, this fact would downplay the Russian aggression to a certain level, 
knowing that Georgian pro-US orientation has changed towards more EU one. Providing 
that the European Union would be strict in its decision prioritizing Georgia; then, Russia 
has to choose between the EU and Georgia. If we take into the view that over 50% of the 
Russian goods are sold in the EU
234
, I think, the decision would be made in favour of the 
Union. Thus, EU direction is the only right path Georgia can choose and it is justifiable as 
the country is a part of the political Europe. Georgia is neither a Russian colony nor an 
American state but an European country and this must be realized at last. 
 
6) The last recommendation, which I believe would contribute to peace building in the 
South Caucasus, is promotion of the regional cooperation. I believe, in order to secure a 
lasting peace in the region, there is a need of an economic cooperation between the three 
states. They should take the example from the European Union and start regional 
economic cooperation like it was with the Coal and Steel Community in the beginning. Of 
course it is hard to manage this kind of cooperation while so many conflicts exist in the 
region; but, I underline, it should have the sole economic character which would make the 
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countries’ economies interdependent, therefore, regional confrontation would become 
impossible. The key to start such initiative is the reopening of Azeri-Armenian border. 
This does not mean that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict must be solved immediately; but 
this cooperation would drive the parties to the conflict resolution point automatically. In 
this initiative the European Union has to play a very decisive role; at first, the role of 
mediator to re-establish the Azeri-Armenian customs, and then, the role of supervisor to 
deliver know-how to the beginners. This economic cooperation would automatically grow 
into custom free relations leading to close political cooperation in the long term. Thus, 
stability and security in the South Caucasus would be ensured with sustain character. 
 
3. Conclusion  
In the end, taking into the view the performance of the European Union as an 
international mediator in the South Caucasus with respect to peace building in the region, I 
can conclude that the EU is still uncertain about the region. But, it is quite easy to understand 
why?  
As we already know, the European Union has two main priorities towards the South 
Caucasus. The first one is interconnected with energetic resources and its transportation, and 
the second issue is promoting stability and security in the region.  
What aspirations do the South Caucasian states have? Georgia has very clear US 
orientation; Armenia plays the double game between Russia and the USA; and Azerbaijan, 
while putting the biggest value on its energetic resources, tries to maintain a kind of 
equilibrium between Russia, USA and the EU. Thus, no country in the region has a clear 
European orientation.  
Here comes a question: Why would the European Union put the South Caucasus on 
the top of its political agenda and define the region as a priority?  
It is true that energetic resources are important; but, the EU becomes about 57% of 
its need from Russia whereas the Azeri oil and gas can cover only about 3% of the EU need. 
Yes, stability in the region is important for the Union, but deterioration of its relations with 
Russia because of the South Caucasus countries can born instability at a broader scale.  
Therefore, the European Union will follow its present approach to the region and 
develop its relations with the South Caucasus carefully, step by step following the degree of 
the countries’ progress in the Action Plan implementation. If Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan really want to become a part of Europe some day, they have to stop ambiguities in 
their foreign policies and take a clear EU orientation. May be, in this case, the European 
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Union would reciprocate to those real European aspirations of the SC states, and would make 
some decisive steps towards the region, respectively, conflict resolution. 
The recent war between Russia and Georgia (7-12 August 2008) must be a good 
example for the latter, since, the European Union was the first party who tried to mediate 
between Russia and Georgia stopping the gunfire. And, what have done the other main 
foreign actors in the South Caucasus, which arguably make efforts to settle a peace? – Russia 
while bombing the territory of Georgia, the USA has backed the country to answer the 
aggression with counter fire. Now (Fall 2008), the Union takes efforts to make Russia fulfil 
the “Six Points Agreement” signed by the parties to the conflict in August 2008. Thus, the EU 
really cares about stability in the South Caucasus, what I can not say for Russia or the USA; 
and, as soon the three SC states will realize this fact, as good for them. 
At last, I would like to answer the question which I arose in the beginning of the 
thesis, whether the ENP is (or could be) a right policy towards the South Caucasus as peace 
building is concerned. Taking into the view the analysis above, the ENP is a right policy to 
the region, and it is all what the European Union can offer or/and is willing to offer to the 
South Caucasus at present. But, at the same time, it must be underlined, that if the situation 
will not change and the priorities will not alter, as I have argued above, then, the Union will 
not be in a position to provide any decisive contribution to the conflict settling processes via 
present policy. Thus, the European Union could undertake more responsibility for the region 
and upgrade the present policy in order to give an appropriate answer to the challenges 
streaming from the South Caucasus. At the same time, before this development will happen, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia have to decide in favour of the EU and make some decisive 
changes in their foreign policies. 
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Appendix 2   
 
The Abkhazian Case 
Abkhazia is the North-West part of Georgia and covers an area of 8,700 
square kilometers. Its capital Sokhumi, which is situated on the black Sea, is one of 
the most important harbours in the country.  
The Abkhaz-Georgian conflict is one of the post Soviet ethno-political conflicts, 
which occur after the destruction of the Soviet Union. The historical interpretations 
regarding the conflict development are largely contested between the sides. 
Following the Georgian historiographers, the Abkhazian tribes – “Abazgi”, “Apshili” – 
settled the present territory of Abkhazia in I-II centuries A.D. While Georgian tribes – 
“Svani”, “Megrel-Chani” – are known since IV-III centuries B.C on that territory. 
Abkhazians have kinship with North Caucasian tribes and belong to “Abkhaz-Adyge” 
ethnic family. Their language belongs to the “Sircasian-Adyge”, while the Georgian 
one represents the “Kartvelian” language family. As a proof of their theory, Georgian 
scientists indicate the ancient narrations of Byzantine and Turkish 
historiographers.235 
 To the contrary, the Abkhaz people believe that their ancestors resided the 
North-West part of Georgia (the territory of Abkhazia) since IV-III millennium B.C. and 
have no affinity with Georgians. They believe also that the Abkhazian language was 
the cornerstone for all West-European languages and the Abkhazian writing should 
be much older, than the Georgian one.236  
So, it can be inferred that the both sides are trying to prove the historical 
legitimacy of their homeland. 
Whatsoever, the point is that the most historical sources attest a centuries’ 
long record of Abkhaz-Georgian normal, mostly peaceful, coexistence and cultural-
political interaction. Therefore, the historical pretext to the present conflict has to be 
sought not deep into centuries but late nineteenth and early twentieth, when the 
Georgian-Abkhaz relations vividly deteriorated; largely due to Russia’s politics 
towards the Caucasus. 
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The roots of the conflict can be found in the beginning of 20th century, as 
Georgia declared its independence (May 1918). On 11 June 1918, in Tbilisi was 
signed an agreement between Georgian and Abkhaz sides, where Abkhazia had an 
autonomous status within the territory of Georgia. On 21st of February 1921, 
Abkhazia was defined as an autonomous republic in the first constitution of Georgia. 
But unfortunately, Abkhazia and Georgia were not a subject to a long coexistence. 
The Russian Red Army invaded Georgia on 4th March 1921 setting up the Soviet 
rule. Abkhazia and Georgia were forced to enter the Soviet Union as separate Soviet 
Socialist Republics (SSR).237 It was a kind of punishment to Georgia for its 
endeavours to separate itself from Russia and look to the West.  
Abkhazia existed as a separate SSR about 10 years and in December 1931 
has entered back Georgia as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). 
During this period of 10 years, two important historical facts took place, which are of 
sound significance to the conflict. The 16th of December 1921 is the date as the 
Contract of Alliance was signed between Abkhazia and Georgia. This document can 
be seen as an Abkhazian aspiration to reintegrate itself in Georgia. And, the second 
date is the 1st April 1925, as Abkhazia has ratified its own Soviet constitution with 
some reservations concerning the Contract of Alliance.  
After the reintegration of Abkhazia into Georgia in 1931, a picture of peaceful 
interaction of these two ethnicities was changed. Abkhazians accuse Stalin of mass 
repressions against the Abkhaz people. They argue that in late 30s large flows of 
ethnic Georgians (mostly Megrels) moved to Abkhazia, which had a huge impact on 
the ethnic structure of the country. Besides, Abkhazian language was banned and it 
was replaced by the Russian and Georgian languages. Many Abkhazian Schools 
were closed as well. These facts are considered by Abkhazians as an attempt of 
Georgianization.238 
In the beginning of 50s, Abkhazian separatist movement has started. This 
movement became stronger in the 80s. The overall situation in the country by the end 
of the 80s was very strained. Georgian national movement became stronger, 
demanding the country’s independence from the Soviet Union. At the same time, 
Abkhazian separatists claimed Abkhazia’s secession from Georgia and expressed 
their willingness to stay in the Union. Abkhazian attempts to save their ethnicity from 
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Georgianization (in the Abkhaz ASSR, Abkhazians were 18% and Georgians – 48%) 
was misused by Russia. This strained situation was a chance for the latter to control 
the political processes in Tbilisi. Georgia was facing the following threat: either 
Russian rule in the country and with Abkhazia, or independence without it. Later, this 
threat became a reality as we will see. 
A major catalyst of tensions between Georgia and Abkhazia was the 17 March 
1991 all-union referendum on Gorbachov’s Union Treaty.239 While Georgia boycotted 
the vote, Abkhazia’s non-Georgian population voted to enter the proposed Union.   
On 21 February 1992, following the overthrow of  President Gamsakhurdia in 
a coup, the Georgian Military Council reinstated Georgia’s 1921 constitution, where 
Abkhazia has an autonomous status within Georgia. Consequently, on 23 July 1992, 
Abkhazia reinstated its former constitution of 1925. In this constitution the latter is 
defined as a separate SSR. The Georgian Parliament immediately annulled the 
Abkhazian decision. The Abkhaz-Georgian relations became very strained. 
Following the Georgian allegations, the Abkhaz separatists opened a fire 
against Georgian military forces on 14th August 1992. These military units were sent 
to Abkhazia in order to protect the Trans-Caucasus Railway, which was a subject to 
regular attacks of various criminal groupings. This incident was a starting point of the 
armed conflict.240 The war lasted till 1994 and ended with Georgian defeat due to 
Russian support to the secessionist region. Edward Shevardnadze, the Georgian 
leader by that time, was forced to sign the CIS agreement on 8th October 1993 to put 
an end to the war. However, belligerent actions were continued sporadically and 
stopped on 14 May 1994, as a new ceasefire agreement was signed in Moscow 
under the UN mediation. The conflicting parties were disarmed and the conflict zone 
went under control of the CIS peacekeeping force.241 UNOMIG was tasked with 
monitoring, implementation of the agreement and observing CIS force operations.242 
The peace negotiations were not successful so far. UNOMIG has failed to 
bring the parties towards a peaceful solution. The CIS peacekeeping forces, which 
have to assure stability in the region, have become very incompetent and aggressive 
towards Georgians as a result of strained Russia-Georgian relations.  
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Both, Georgian and Abkhazian sides have presented their peace plans, which 
were not accepted by Abkhazia respectively Georgia. Recently (June/July 2008), 
Germany has developed a peace plan which includes the IDPs’ return to their homes 
as key element for the conflict resolution; but unfortunately, the latter was denied by 
the Abkhaz side.  
According to UNHCR, more than 270.000 IDPs (in the main, ethnic Georgians 
– Megrels) were forced to leave Abkhazia as a result of the war. The most of them 
reside in Georgia and are waiting for a return to their homes, which is still a subject of 
dispute. Abkhazians fear that the resettlement of the IDPs will turn them back into the 
ethnic minority. The Georgian government has made IDP return a key precondition 
for starting talks on the status of Abkhazia. After recognition of Abkhazian 
independence by Moscow in August 2008, there are no peace talks between Tbilisi 
and Sokhumi at all. 
By December 2001, more than 70% of Abkhazs were granted Russian 
citizenship. Russia has introduced obligatory visas for Georgian citizens, but the 
Abkhazs are exempted. Furthermore, the Abkhaz-Russian railway connecting 
Sokhumi with Sochi was reopened in late 2002, directly violating CIS sanctions. 
Georgians interpret these facts as direct interventions into their internal affairs by 
Russia. Thus, Moscow has developed Abkhazia as a next Russian province, and 
recently (August 2008) while bombing the Georgian territory, Russia has argued that 
the military action was aimed at defending rights of its citizens.   
The peculiarities of the Russian-Abkhaz border and the Georgian-Abkhaz 
demarcation line have created favourable conditions for smuggling and other illegal 
activities. Some criminal groupings make profit of this. The launch of the EU 
monitoring mission to Georgia in October 2008 could contribute to the overall 
situation in the region in positive terms, thus, promote stability in the country. 
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The South Ossetian Case 
South Ossetia is also called Samachablo (by the Georgians) and occupies 
3,900 square kilometers. It is situated in the northern part of Georgia and borders 
North Ossetia, which is one part of Russia. The South Ossetians are of the Orthodox 
Christian belief. Few of them are Sunni Muslims. The Ossetian language belongs to 
the Iranian branch of the Indo-European language family. The use of the South 
Ossetian language is declining; the most of the South Ossetians use the Russian one 
to communicate. A big part of them has a good command of the Georgian language 
too. 
The Ossetians see themselves as an autochthon ethnicity and descendants of 
Scythians and Alans, tribes that were once nomads wandering through the southern 
parts of today’s Ukraine and Russia as well as the North Caucasus. They believe that 
the first Ossetian feudal state was formed between the 9th and 13th centuries. With 
the Mongol invasion in the 13th century, the Ossetians were forced to withdraw to the 
upper plateaus of the Caucasus. In the 14th century, they began to settle the 
southern slopes of the mountains again.243  
To the contrary, the Georgians are convinced that South Ossetia is one of 
their oldest historical and spiritual centers and indivisible part of Georgia. They 
believe that Ossetians are latecomers in the region. In Georgian view, it was first only 
in the 17th and 18th centuries that the Ossetians began to cross the Caucasian 
mountains and reside the territory of Georgia. But, as it was in the Abkhazian case, 
the roots to the conflict are to be found in the beginning of 20th century, starting with 
invasion of the Russian Red Army in Georgia.  
On 20 April 1922, South Ossetia was made the South Ossetian Autonomous 
Region (Oblast) of Georgia. The new soviet constitution of 5 December 1936 
confirmed the autonomous status of South Ossetia within the Georgian Soviet 
Socialist Republic. 
Later, the Soviet national policy made its footprint on the development of 
Georgia-Ossetian interethnic relations. However, in difference with the Abkhazian 
case, polarization of ethnic relations was not so vivid yet in the Soviet era. The 
Ossetians living in the South Ossetian Autonomous Region (SOAR) with larger ethnic 
share in the region’s population (66,2 per cent) than it was in the Abkhazian case (18 
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per cent), were less preoccupied with alleged threats of assimilation or 
Georgianization. 
However, the South Ossetians began to openly discuss reunification with 
North Ossetia. The Ossetian nationalist movement Ademon Nykhas (Popular Shrine) 
was reinforced in 1988. On 23 November 1989, confrontations between Georgians 
and Ossetians caused the first clashes with casualties.244  
The Georgian Parliament responded to this by placing restrictive measures on 
the Ossetian public considerations of independence. On 20 September 1990, South 
Ossetians replied this fact by declaring independence, and Georgians on their turn 
responded to the latter by completely abolishing the South Ossetian autonomy on 11 
December 1990.  
In the first days of 1991, around 3,000 - 4,000 Georgian militias entered 
Tskhinvali, where they – according to Ossetian sources – carried out massacres. The 
South Ossetians consider this incident as having triggered the conflict, creating tens 
of thousands of refugees.  Georgia’s reason for shifting to armed intervention was 
obviously that it feared it would lose all control over its already administratively and 
ethnically divided territory.245 
Chaos and urban warfare raged in Tskhinvali for about three weeks. After 
informal negotiations with the soviet MVD246, the Georgian militia withdrew from 
Tskhinvali on 26 January 1991. The armed conflict, however, continued sporadically 
throughout 1991.247  
At the Soviet-wide referendum of 17 March 1991, the majority of the South 
Ossetians voted to maintain and reform the Soviet Union. In April 1991, Georgia 
declared independence, neglecting minority interests. Military operations were 
expanded. Apart from the direct parties to the conflict, “outsiders,” allegedly North 
Caucasian combatants and Russian MVD troops were supporting the Ossetians in 
their fight against Georgia. Russian (nominally Soviet) MVD involvement was often 
criticized for exceeding assigned responsibilities of separating the combatants and 
preventing resumption of hostilities. MVD troops were allowed to suppress any 
hostile-fire with a superior counter-responsive if necessary. Such an authority 
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happened to be often misused in a variety of ways; among those, the use of force 
against Georgian combatants and civilians.248 The Russian troops were suspected 
also of leaving their armament and heavy weaponry to the Ossetians.  
Supposedly, deterioration of the political situation in the North Caucasus 
(North Ossetia, Chechnya, Ingushya), forced Russia to mediate the 14 July 1992 
ceasefire agreement in Sochi.249 The agreement sanctioned deployment of Joint 
Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), consisted of Georgian-Russian-South Ossetian troops 
involving North Ossetian armed forces as well; and creation of the Joint Control 
Commission (JCC), dealing with military, economic and social issues. In December 
1992, the CSCE/OSCE began monitoring the ceasefire. 
The conflict in South Ossetia brought about certainly more than one thousand 
deaths250 and around 60 000 Internally Displaced Persons and refugees. Among the 
latter, Ossetian refugees fled mostly to North Ossetia, whereas Georgians - to 
Georgia proper.251  
The fact that the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict has not been resolved, 
opened the door to local businessmen to make a profit from the situation. A mixture 
of smuggling, robbery and kidnapping has become the new pillar of the national 
economy of South Ossetia. These profitable businesses have created the main 
obstacles to a peace settlement.252 
In 2000, with OSCE fervent facilitation and JPKF participation a permanent 
bilateral joint-decision making body - Joint Law-enforcement Coordination Center - 
was established. The Center held plenary meetings not less than once a month to 
discuss and summarize concurrent operations and activities of its sub-structures and, 
at the same time, remained accountant to JCC through regular reporting.  
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There are estimates that about 60 per cent of the residents of South Ossetia 
have become naturalized Russian citizens; and like the Abkhazs, citizens of South 
Ossetia do not need visas to enter Russia while Georgians do. This fact was very 
good used by Moscow in justifing the attack over Georgia in the begginng of August 
2008. 
In March 2006, the Georgian government submitted a draft law on property 
restitution for the victims of the South Ossetian conflict to the Parliament for 
consideration. It recognizes the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees 
to return to their houses if they wish to return and can prove the ownership rights for 
the property. However, this document was not accepted by the Ossetian side.  
As it was by the Abkhazian case, so far, there is no prospective of peaceful 
setlement to be seen in the near future. The OSCE has failed so far to settle a peace. 
After the recognition of South Ossetian independence by Russia in the end of August 
2008 the peaceful solution to the conflict seems to be far away.  
In October 2008, has begun the EU monitoring mission in Georgia, which 
might contribute to stability in the region. But, so far, the Russian troops remain in 
some parts of Georgian proper territory as a result of Russia-Georgian armed 
confrontation of 7-12 August 2008. 
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Appendix 3   
 
 
The Nagorno-Karabakh Case 
One of the first ethno-political conflicts to erupt on the former Soviet territory 
was over the Armenian populated Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh 
(NKAO) located within the territorial boundaries of Azerbaijan. Karabakh has been a 
disputed territory over the centuries and the decision to incorporate it into Azerbaijan 
was taken in 1923 after long debates between the representatives of the government 
of Soviet Azerbaijan, Soviet Armenia, the emissaries of the central Soviet power in 
the Caucasus and the People’s Commissar for Nationality Affairs Joseph Stalin.  
According to US Institute of Peace report, Stalin, by including the Armenian 
populated region within the boundaries of Azerbaijan was pursuing a divide and rule 
policy ensuring that NKAO would remain a sore spot between the two republics and 
would strengthen Moscow’s position as a power broker (Carley 1998: 1).  
It is hard to say what the exact rationale behind such a decision was; but as 
Alexey Zverev argues, “as long as Communist rule held in the USSR, so did the 
uneasy but peaceful relationship between the two peoples of Nagorno-Karabakh” 
(Zverev 1996:19). 
The first confrontation, however, erupted in 1988, when Gorbachev’s 
Perestroika was accompanied by the relative relaxation of tight Soviet rule and the 
Armenian majority in the Nagorno-Karabakh supreme legislative body felt secure 
enough to appeal to the Kremlin and request the region’s unification with Armenia. 
Azerbaijan rejected the Armenian claim and the confrontation soon escalated into a 
violent conflict with both sides accusing each other of initiating the hostilities. In 1989, 
the Supreme Soviet of Armenia passed a resolution proclaiming the unification of 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia which to date has not been rescinded (Carley 
1998:1). In order to remedy the situation, the Soviet leadership decided to impose “a 
special government administration in Karabakh” and thus subjected the region to 
direct control from Moscow. However, the Soviet leadership, preoccupied with 
numerous problems in the wake of its own dissolution, lost many opportunities for 
brokering the agreement or even initiating the negotiations and deploying the 
peacekeepers. According to Svante Cornell, “Moscow simply put a lid on the conflict 
without making a serious effort to deal with the long-term consequences. It was 
therefore inevitable that the conflict would flare-up again” (Cornell 2001:86). 
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In spring 1991, serious fighting broke out involving both the Soviet troops and 
the Armenian and Azeri forces. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh rejected the unification with Armenia and 
proclaimed full independence in early 1992 (Carley 1998:1). By mid-1992 the 
Karabakh Armenians with the support of Armenia proper had launched a successful 
offensive and ended up not only controlling Nagorno-Karabakh but also 
approximately 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory. The establishment of the Lachin 
corridor was of greatest significance, because it created a land bridge from the region 
to Armenia. Even though a ceasefire was signed in 1994, the Armenians refused to 
retreat from the occupied territories until the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh was 
recognized and its security guaranteed.  
According to UNHCR, the war has produced more than one million internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) which mainly reside in Azerbaijan. 
The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which began in the then existing Soviet 
Union, was considered by the international community as an internal conflict and was 
largely neglected by outside powers. The first result of such neglect was the virtually 
uncondemned alteration of existing territorial boundaries between the two states. The 
second result was the de facto acknowledgment of Russian dominance in the area, 
which led to a very limited international involvement in the active phase of the war. 
As Cornell pointed out, “the efforts of the international community to bring an 
end to the war that raged between 1992 and 1994 were half-hearted at best and 
exiguous at worst” (Cornell 2001:61). 
The international mediation efforts increased over time. When both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan joined the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (now 
OSCE) in 1992, the organization took the lead in mediating the conflict and continues 
to do so in the present. A group of CSCE member countries, the so-called “Minsk 
Group” was formed and tasked to negotiate a settlement. In 1994, the High Level 
Planning Group (HLPG) was established with the aim of intensifying action in relation 
to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The prime goal of HLPG was to make 
recommendations on developing and establishing a multinational OSCE 
peacekeeping force. However, the peacekeepers have not been deployed and 
Karabakh remains the only conflict in the South Caucasus where neither Russian nor 
international peacekeeping operations are conducted. In addition to the HLPG, a 
Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in -Office was appointed in 1995 to 
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work on creating conditions for the deployment of an OSCE peacekeeping operation 
and to facilitate “a lasting, comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in all its 
aspects” (OSCE Mission Survey 2001: 1). 
The United Nations took a very cautious stand towards the conflict in Nagorno-
Karabakh and first paid attention only in 1992 after the Armenian offensive. Fact-
finding missions were sent to Karabakh with the aim of collecting information and 
supporting the CSCE efforts on the ground. In addition, the Security Council issued a 
statement in 1992 expressing “serious concern” over the deterioration of the situation 
in Karabakh and breaches of ceasefire agreements. In 1993, the Security Council 
issued its first resolution regarding the conflict and characterized it as “a serious 
threat to the maintenance of the international peace and security in the region” 
(Coppieters 1996:107). 
Even though the share of the United States was quite significant in the overall 
international assistance, its standing towards the conflicting parties of Nagorno-
Karabakh was quite controversial and the subject of intense debates both in the 
United States and in the South Caucasus. The problem was the pro-Armenian bias, 
which resulted from the strong pressure of the Armenian lobby in the US Congress. 
This led to the introduction of the infamous Freedom Support Act Section 907, which 
restricted the non-humanitarian US assistance provided to Azerbaijan.  
Starting from 1997, the US got increasingly engaged in the exploration and 
transportation of Caspian oil, which boosted the confidence of the Azeri government 
in the US to the extent of requesting US co-chairmanship of the Minsk Group. As 
Svante Cornell has observed, “Azerbaijan’s perception of US policy had grown in 
such confidence that Baku actually demanded Washington’s participation in the 
Minsk Group, something that had hardly been imaginable a few years earlier” 
(Cornell 2001:378). 
After the 11th September, the US government has waived the abovementioned 
sanction; allegedly, as a result of its War Against Terror campaign and increasing 
interests of the latter in the Azeri oil resources of the Caspian basin.  
Increasing US interests in the region, especially related to oil resources, 
correlated with greater US participation in the conflict-resolution process. Currently 
much pressure is applied on both sides to reach an agreement, as Karabakh has 
acquired special significance against the background of ongoing oil politics. Some 
observers now believe that the Karabakh conflict is getting more attention from the 
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international community, which has increased the likelihood of reaching a political 
settlement when compared to Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Carley 1998:5).  
However, the OSCE Minsk Group was not successful so far to bring the 
parties to the conflict towards a peaceful settlement. In addition, it is to be mentioned 
that international intervention to the conflict (among others, the EU involvement) 
remains negligible till today as compared to Abkhazia or South Ossetia. 
 
 
Source: Sabanadze Natalie – International Involvement in the South Caucasus. European 
Centre for Minority Issues ECMI, Working Paper No.15, February 2002. pp. 7-11 
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Appendix 4   
 
 
ENP Proposed Incentives 
 
  1. EXTENSION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET AND REGULATORY 
STRUCTURES. 
  2. PREFERENTIAL TRADING RELATIONS AND MARKET OPENING. 
  3. PERSPECTIVES FOR LAWFUL MIGRATION AND MOVEMENT OF PERSONS. 
  4. INTENSIFIED COOPERATION TO PREVENT AND COMBAT COMMON 
SECURITY THREATS. 
  5. GREATER EU POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT.  
  6. GREATER EFFORTS TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS, FURTHER CULTURAL 
CO OPERATION AND ENHANCE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. 
  7. INTEGRATION INTO TRANSPORT, ENERGY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
NETWORKS AND THE EUROPEAN RESEARCH AREA. 
  8. NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION. 
  9. SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM. 
10. ENHANCED ASSISTANCE, BETTER TAILORED TO NEEDS. 
11. NEW SOURCES OF FINANCE. 
 
Source: Attina Fulvio and Rossi Rosa – European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, 
Economic and Social Issues. The Jean Monnet Centre “Euro-med”, Department of Political 
Studies, University of Catania, 2004. p.22 
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Appendix 5 
 
a) Georgia 
 
 
 
General Data 
 
Area                            69.700 km²                             
Population                  4.4 million  
Population Density    66/km²  
GDP per capita          $4,694 
HDI                             0.755  
Currency                     Lari (GEL)               
  
 
Source: Jawad Pamela – Europe’s New Neighborhood on the Verge of War. PRIF Reports    
              No. 74. 2006. p.39; See also EC official site, External Relations, Georgia. The 
             European Union and Georgia (EU).            
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b) Armenia 
 
 
 
General Data 
 
Area                                          29,700 sq km 
Population                                3.2 m (2005) 
Urban population                    64.1% (2005) 
Life Expectancy                       73.4 (2005) 
Population growth rate          -0.2% (2003-2015) 
Fertility Rate per woman       1.3 (2000-2005) 
HDI                                           83 
 
 
Source: European Commission – European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. 
Armenia. Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. p. 25 
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c) Azerbaijan 
 
 
 
General Data 
Land area                                                   86.600 km² 
Population                                                  8 265 700  
Population density                                     95.5 per km² 
Population of biggest city Baku:              1 855 300  
Annual population change (% per year): 2000: +0.8 2001: + 0.8 2002: +0.8 2003: + 0.8 
2004: +1.0 
 
 
Source: European Commission – European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. 
Azerbaijan. Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. p. 30 
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Apendix 6 
 
 
Past EC Assistance to Georgia 
 
TACIS national programme. Since independence, the TACIS programme has 
contributed to the transition towards a market economy and building democratic 
institutions, notably by providing assistance in the field of legal and regulatory 
reforms and the approximation of Georgian legislation to that of the EU. The main 
priority areas covered by the revised TACIS NIP 2004/2006 were: 1. Support for 
institutional, legal and administrative reform mainly in the fields of the rule of law, 
PCA implementation and institutional capacity building in the tax and customs 
administration (EUR 24.5 million); 2. Support for addressing the social consequences 
of transition, with a focus on primary health care, social assistance and child welfare 
reform (EUR 17 million) 
 
Food Security Programme. Since 1996 the European Commission has committed 
EUR 91 million to Georgia through the EC FSP, disbursing EUR 78.3 million between 
1997 and 2005. The programme has been successful overall and has played an 
active role in promoting policies intended to align Georgian practices and legislation 
more with international and EU standards.  
 
ECHO. During the period 1993-2006 Georgia received EUR 102.2 million through 
ECHO mainly in immediate emergency relief to overcome the effects of the civil war 
and the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the years, the 
focus has shifted from food aid to food security and income generating activities, 
increasingly targeting population groups affected by the conflict.  
 
Macro-financial Assistance (MFA).  MFA contributes to supporting Georgia’s 
economic reforms and improving its debt repayment strategy. In July 1998, Georgia 
settled the remaining amount of its arrears to the EU (EUR 131 million). The country 
subsequently benefited from an assistance package (1998-2004) consisting of a loan 
of EUR 110 million and a total grant amount of EUR 65 million. In January 2006, the 
Council adopted a decision to make available a new package of macro-financial 
assistance in the form of a grant facility of EUR 33.5 million. The objective of this 
assistance is to support economic reforms and help Georgia improve debt 
sustainability. This assistance is complementary to the resources provided to Georgia 
by IFIs and bilateral institutions in support of the authorities’ economic stabilisation 
and reform programme. 
 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. Georgia was selected in 
2002 as one of the 29 focus countries eligible under the EIDHR programme. Since 
then, it has received an annual budget of approximately EUR 2 million. Prior to this, 
the EC contributed to democratisation activities through its support to civil society 
under TACIS’ small-scale LIEN programme. In recent years the EIDHR has 
contributed significantly to strengthening the civil society in Georgia, by advocating 
for the protection of human rights, for the fight against torture and for combating 
discrimination against ethnic minorities. 
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Cooperation in the field of education and science. In the period 1995-2005, about 
EUR 6 million was allocated from TACIS National Programmes in Georgia to fund 
twenty TEMPUS projects (pre-Joint European Projects, Joint European Projects and 
Individual Mobility Grants), involving the participation of 16 Georgian universities. 
Those projects aimed at supporting the modernisation and reform of higher education 
system in Georgia. In addition, TACIS supported a policy advice project on vocational 
education and training (VET) reform with the aim of assisting the Ministry of 
Education in Georgia with drafting both a long-term strategy and a VET law (August 
2005-April 2006). The long-term strategy and the draft VET law are currently (July 
2006) still under discussion within the Government. The European Commission 
focused more strongly on higher education reform after Georgia joined the Bologna 
process in Bergen in May 2005. The EC decided to support the Tbilisi State 
University with a separate TACIS project for the “Establishment of a Centre for 
European Studies” (EUR 1m plus EUR 300 000 for equipment and works).  
 
TACIS Regional programmes. The European Commission’s assistance in the field 
of transport is delivered through the TACIS regional programme, the “Transport 
Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia” (TRACECA). It aims to promote trade and 
investment in the TACIS region through connecting existing transport networks in the 
region with each other and European transport networks. The programme INOGATE 
“Interstate Oil and Gas Transit to Europe”, funded under the TACIS Regional 
programme, aims to increase the safety and security of energy transport to Europe, 
and promote IFI and private investment in energy transit. INOGATE fits in well with 
the goals of Georgian energy policy, which is geared to increasing Georgia’s energy 
security and its transit potential. In Georgia, INOGATE has supported the 
construction of a gas metering station by supplying equipment and delivering a 
mobile workshop and a mobile analytical laboratory.  
 
 
Source: European Commission – European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. 
Georgia. Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. pp. 34-36 
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Appendix 7 
 
MDGs for Georgia 
 
Goal 1 targets: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose 
income is less than one dollar a day. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion 
of people who suffer from hunger. 
Goal 2 target: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will 
be able to complete a full course of primary schooling. 
Goal 3 target: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education 
preferably by 2005 and to all levels of education no later than 2015. 
Goal 4 target: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five 
mortality rate. 
Goal 5 target: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal 
mortality ratio. 
Goal 6 targets: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS. 
Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the incidence of malaria and other major 
diseases. 
Goal 7 targets: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country 
policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources. Halve, by 
2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water. By 
2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million 
slum dwellers. 
Goal 8 targets: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory 
trading and financial system. Address the Special Needs of the Least Developed 
Countries. Address the Special Needs of landlocked countries and small island 
developing states. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing 
countries through national and international measures in order to make debt 
sustainable in the long term. In cooperation with developing countries, develop and 
implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth. In cooperation with 
pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in 
developing countries. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the 
benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications. 
 
Source: European Commission – European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. 
Georgia. Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. pp. 41-42 
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Apendix 8 
 
 
EC Assistance to Armenia 1991-2006 
 
Humanitarian assistance (notably ECHO and Food Aid Operations) has accounted 
for nearly 120 million EUR alone and has contributed to alleviating the very severe 
humanitarian situation in the mid-1990s.  
 
TACIS national allocations over the years and the Food Security Programme (FSP) 
represent around 100 million EUR each.  
 
Since Armenian independence, the TACIS programme has efficiently contributed to 
the transition towards market economy, notably by assistance in the fields of legal 
and regulatory reform, approximation of Armenian legislation to that of the EU and 
support for Armenia’s WTO accession. TACIS has also contributed to Armenia’s 
economic recovery through support to the private sector and small and medium sized 
enterprises. 
 
The EC has additionally spent around € 29 million of TACIS funds on improving 
safety of the Medzamor Nuclear Power Plant (MNPP).  
 
TACIS has also provided essential assistance to the implementation of Armenia’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy approved in 2003. The TACIS Action Programme 2006 
(17 Mio EUR) has been approved on 31 July 2006. It has been designed in 
coherence with mutually agreed priorities in the PCA and the ENP Action Plan. It is to 
be seen as a transition link towards new instruments under the ENP. 
 
Armenia has also participated in TACIS Regional Programmes with projects such 
as TRACECA, INOGATE and the Caucasus Regional Environmental Centre 
(REC). 
 
Under the Food Security Programme (FSP) the EC has provided significant 
budgetary support to key agricultural and social sectors in Armenia and has thus 
played an important role in tackling poverty in country. The combination of budget 
support and technical assistance through FSP (with complementary TACIS technical 
assistance in the agriculture and child care fields) has also enabled notable progress 
in the field of land reform and public finance management.  
 
The EC European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
Programme launched its activities in support of NGOs in Armenia in 2003 with the 
objective of promoting and protecting human rights and democratization as well as 
conflict prevention and resolution.  
 
The Tempus Programme has provided considerable support to the modernisation 
and the reform of the higher education system in Armenia. Since 1996, Tempus has 
funded 13 cooperation projects with EU higher education institutions in the areas of 
curriculum development, university management and structural reform. 
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As for the 6th Framework Programme for Research and Development, the 
Armenian National Research and Education Network (ARENA) participates in a 
project for the provision of services for Internet offerings to Research and Education 
Networks in the Caucasus and Central Asia (OCCASION, budget 1,3 M €, 2005-
2007). 
 
Armenia has also benefited from EC Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA, consisting 
of a grant of 30 Million € and a loan of 28 Million €). It ended in 2005 after Armenia 
repaid its last debt to the EC. 
 
 
Source: European Commission – European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. 
Armenia. Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. pp. 13-14 
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Apendix 9 
 
 
EC Assistance to Azerbaijan 1991-2005 
 
The European Community has provided assistance to Azerbaijan totalling almost 
€400 million since 1991. This includes assistance under the TACIS programme 
(including its national and regional components), TACIS Exceptional Assistance 
Programme (EXAP), food security programme (FSP), post-war rehabilitation 
activities, support under thematic budget lines such as the European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and humanitarian assistance provided by 
ECHO. 
 
Under the 2002-2006 Country Strategy Paper (CSP) TACIS assistance has 
focused on two main priority areas: i) support for institutional, legal and administrative 
reform and ii) support for the private sector and assistance for economic 
development.  
 
The Tempus programme has provided considerable support to the modernisation 
and the reform of the higher education system in Azerbaijan.  
 
Regional cooperation on transport and energy are addressed through the Traceca 
and INOGATE Programmes.  
 
Justice and home affairs priorities included further integrating border management, 
combating organised crime and international terrorism, and improving migration and 
asylum management. 
 
The EC is also providing support to help Azerbaijan address the problem of Anti-
Personnel Landmines (APL). Nearly €3.7 m has been allocated, targeting the 
destruction of anti-personnel landmines and awareness-raising campaigns in 
Azerbaijan. 
 
 
Source: European Commission – European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. 
Azerbaijan. Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. pp. 15-16 
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Appendix 10 
 
Financial overview of the priorities provided in the NIP (Azerbaijan) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission – European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. 
Azerbaijan. National Indicative Programme 2007-2010. p. 5 
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Appendix 11 
 
 
New Partnership Perspectives (Georgia) 
 
 The perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of 
integration, including through a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and gradual 
extension of four freedoms to Georgia, as well as the possibility for Georgia to 
participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes; 
 An upgrade in the scope and intensity of political cooperation, through further 
development of mechanisms for political dialogue.  
 Continuing strong EU commitment to support the settlement of Georgia’s 
internal conflicts, drawing on the instruments at the EU’s disposal, and in close 
consultation with the UN and OSCE. The EU is ready to consider ways to 
strengthen further its engagement; 
 Enhancing cooperation in the area of Justice, Freedom and Security, notably 
in the field of border management and migration.  
 Increased possibilities for closer co-operation in the area of foreign and 
security policy, including European Security and Defense Policy in particular 
on the issues of regional stability and crisis management.  
 Deepening trade and economic relations; providing the opportunity for 
convergence of economic legislation, the opening of economies to each other, 
and the continued reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade, which will stimulate 
investment and growth. 
 Enhancing co-operation in the fields of energy, transport and environment 
contributing to energy security and supply diversification needs for the EU.  
 In parallel with the South Caucasus Partnership, enhance bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation in the Black Sea area – including strengthened 
regional economic cooperation between the Baltic, Black and Caspian Sea 
regions;  
 The perspective of identifying particular initiatives that needs to be taken for a 
better governance on maritime related matters in the Black Sea and a more 
coordinated approach to the management of the sea space in the region. 
 Increased financial support: EU financial assistance for Georgia will be 
available to support the actions identified in the present document. The 
Commission is furthermore proposing a new European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for this purpose which will cover the main part 
of EU financial assistance and will include aspects of cross-border and trans-
national cooperation. The Commission also intends to propose an extension of 
the EIB mandate to Georgia as of 2007; 
  Possibilities of gradual opening of reinforced participation in certain 
Community programmes, promoting cultural, educational, environmental and 
scientific links. 
 Support including through financial, technical assistance and twinning to meet 
EU norms and standards, and targeted advice and support for legislative 
approximation through a mechanism such as TAIEX;  
 Establish a dialogue, in accordance with the acquis, on matters related to the 
movement of people between the EU and Georgia; 
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 In light of the fulfilment of the objectives of this Action Plan and of the overall 
evolution of EU-Georgia relations, consideration will be given in due time to 
the possibility of a new enhanced contractual relationship. 
 
 
Source: European Commission – European Neighbourhood Policy. European Union-
Georgia Action Plan. November 2006. pp. 6-7 
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Appendix 12 
 
New Partnership Perspectives (Armenia) 
 
 The perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of 
integration, including through a stake in the EU’s Internal Market, and the 
possibility for Armenia to participate progressively in key aspects of EU 
policies and programmes; 
 An upgrade in the scope and intensity of political cooperation, through further 
development of mechanisms for political dialogue; 
 Continuing strong EU commitment to support the settlement of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, drawing on the instruments at the EU’s disposal, and in 
close consultation with the OSCE. The EU is ready to consider ways to 
strengthen further its engagement in conflict resolution and post conflict 
rehabilitation; 
 Deepening trade and economic relations; providing the opportunity for 
convergence of economic legislation, the opening of economies to each other 
and the continued reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade, which will stimulate 
investment, exports and growth; 
 Increased financial support: EU financial assistance for Armenia will be 
available to support the actions identified in the present document. The 
Commission is furthermore proposing a new European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for this purpose, which will cover the main part 
of EU financial assistance and will include aspects of cross-border and trans-
national cooperation. The Commission will also propose an extension of the 
EIB mandate to Armenia as of 2007; 
 Possibilities of gradual opening of or reinforced participation in certain 
Community programmes, promoting economic, cultural, educational, 
environmental, technical and scientific links; 
 Support including technical assistance and twinning to meet EU norms and 
standards, and targeted advice and support for legislative approximation 
through a mechanism such as TAIEX; 
 Establish a dialogue, in accordance with the acquis, on matters related to the 
movement of people, including on readmission and visa, between the EU and 
Armenia; 
 In light of the fulfilment of the objectives of this Action Plan and of the overall 
evolution of EU – Armenia relations, consideration will be given in due time to 
the possibility of a new enhanced contractual relationship. 
 
 
Source: European Commission – European Neighbourhood Policy. European Union-
Armenia Action Plan. November 2006. pp. 2-3 
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Appendix 13 
 
 
New Partnership Perspectives (Azerbaijan) 
 
 The perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of 
integration, including through a stake in the EU’s Internal Market, and the 
possibility for Azerbaijan to participate progressively in key aspects of EU 
policies and programmes; 
 An upgrade in the scope and intensity of political cooperation, through further 
development of mechanisms for political dialogue and consultations on 
security issues that affect the interests of both sides; 
 Continuing strong EU commitment to support the settlement of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, drawing on the instruments at the EU’s disposal, including 
the EUSR, and in close consultation with the OSCE. The EU is ready to 
consider ways to strengthen further its engagement in conflict resolution and 
post-conflict rehabilitation; 
 Deepening trade and economic relations; providing the opportunity for 
convergence of economic legislation, the opening of economies to each other, 
and the continued reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade, which will stimulate 
investment and growth; 
 Increased financial support: EU financial assistance for Azerbaijan will be 
available to support the actions identified in the present document. The 
Commission is furthermore proposing a new European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for this purpose, which will cover the main part 
of EU financial assistance and will include aspects of cross-border and trans-
national cooperation. The Commission also intends to propose an extension of 
the EIB mandate to Azerbaijan as of 2007; 
 Possibilities of gradual opening of or reinforced participation in certain 
Community programmes, promoting cultural, educational, environmental, 
technical and scientific links; 
 Support including technical assistance and twinning to meet EU norms and 
standards, and targeted advice and support for legislative approximation 
through a mechanism such as TAIEX; 
 Establish a dialogue in accordance with the acquis on matters related to the 
movement of people between the EU and Azerbaijan; 
 Opening as soon as possible of a Commission Delegation in Azerbaijan. 
 
 
Source: European Commission – European Neighbourhood Policy. European Union-
Azerbaijan Action Plan. November 2006. pp. 2-3 
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